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ABSTRACT.

Combating terrorism in Africa seems to be a mission impossible despite numerous antiterrorism Laws in existence. Africa has a union, known as African Union (AU),
comprising of all independent States in Africa, except Morocco. This AU has a well
known anti-terrorism Law known as 'OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating
Terrorism, 1999 and other national anti-terrorism laws in existence in its Member States
nations.

Despite all these anti-terrorism laws, including Plan of Actions for the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism, Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism in existence, terrorist acts are on the increase daily in the
continent.

This dissertation reviews the said OAU (AU) Conventions on Preventing and Combating
Terrorism, identifies its deficiencies and analyses its inefficacies in preventing and
combating terrorism in Africa. It also discusses the Member States' response to the
Convention.

The dissertation, therefore, argues that terrorism will be better combated on regional level
than leaving it on the hands of individual Member States; and recommends that AU
should establish a regional court vested with the jurisdiction of terrorism, for an effective
combating of terrorism in the Continent of Africa.

Xlll

CHAPTER ONE.

1.0. INTRODUCTION.

Terrorism is the world's greatest 'nightmare', yet, effectiveness of combating it is
still unattained. Generally, nearly all nations are, or have been affected by terrorism
in one way or another.

Combating terrorism has become a critical issue of major concern to both
international and domestic laws. Much has been said and scholarly written about
legal provisions on terrorism, such as, treaties, conventions, protocols and
resolutions, but less discourse on the effectiveness of those legal provisions in
combating terrorism.

There are many legal status of universal International instruments relating to the
combating and suppression of terrorism such as, the 1996 Convention on Offences
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Aircraft Convention), 1970
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Unlawful Seizure
Convention), 1971 Civil aviation Convention, 1973 Diplomatic agents Convention,
1980 Nuclear Materials Convention, 1988 Airport Protocol, 1997 Terrorist
Bombing Convention, 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention, 2005 Nuclear
terrorism Convention, etcetera.
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No doubt, there are also several regional and sub regional legislations on terrorism,
such as, OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish acts of Terrorism Taking the form
of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion, that are of International
Significance, 1971, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1977,
SAARC regional Convention on Suppression ofT errorism, 1987, Arab Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998, Convention on the Islamic Conference on
Combating International terrorism, 1999, Organization of African Unity(OAU)
Convention on the prevention and Combating terrorism, 1999 and so on.

The issue is, are the Member States to these legal provisions in compliance with the
requirements of international law (United Nations) in combating and preventing
terrorism?

The United Nation's (UN) 1 Charter, which is at the top of the hierarchy of
international law; enshrined m Art.l03 2 , obligations, rights and duties of all
members of the United Nations.

Chapter I, Art.2 (2) of the Charter provides thus;

"All members, in order to ensure to all of them the
rights and benefits resulting from membership,
shallfuljill in goodfaith the obligations assumed
by them in accordance with the present Charter "3

1

The UN is an international organization which came into being with the entry into force of the UN
Charter, a multilateral treaty, which forms a kind of constitution for the union, on October 24, 1946. The
UN currently has 193 Member States
2
Charter of the UN
3
!d. at Art.2(2)

2

Also, Art. 2 (4) ofthe same Charter, provides that;
"All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use offorce against
territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purpose of the United Nations "4

The same charter also provides for obedience and compliance to decisions of the
Security Council by its members:
"The members of the United Nations agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter. " 5

Further, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 6 had made many resolutions
in combating of terrorism which must be complied with by all lJN Member States.
For instance, Security Council resolution, 13 73 (200 1), which was adopted in
response to the 9/11, 2001 terrorist attack, requires all United Nations Member
States, to take necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, to
criminalize assistance to terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to
terrorists, and to afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection
with criminal investigation and criminal proceedings. 7

Also, Security Council Resolution 1456, 2003 provides:
"States must ensure that any measure taken to combat
4

Jd. at Art.2(4)
ld. at Chap. V, Art.25.
6
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the major organs of the UN, set up by the UN in
its Charter. It consists of 15 members, five permanent members and ten non pem1anent members, which
are to be elected for two years term. Its' functions and powers are enshrined in Chapter V of the Charter
of UN. The permanent members are republic of China, France, Russia federation, United Kingdom and
United States of America.
7
See Security Council Resolution 1373, 2001.
5

3

terrorism comply with all the obligations under
International law, and should adopt such measures in
accordance with international law, in particular
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. "

Are these legal provisions theoretically applicable? If so, to what extent are the
Member States to the legal provisions complying with provisions enshrined therein?
How have these legal provisions helped to combat terrorism in this present time? Or
are there loopholes in these legal documents that urgently need to be amended for
more effective results in combating terrorism? These are some of the questions this
dissertation sets forth to unfold.

Such resolutions, though, maybe difficult to comply with in combating terrorism,
nevertheless, are expected to be complied with by Member States. More often than
none, especially in the recent time, global issue of concern is on terrorism and
continual havoc being committed by terrorists. Terrorist activities are on the
increase day by day, and it is becoming obvious that how to fight it is not yet
legally effective, hence the increase in their incessant activities, daily.

There are certain possibilities that could be militating against effectiveness of
combating terrorism. It may be as a result of ineffectiveness of applicable laws or
that the procedure enshrined in the legal document for combating terrorism cannot
be achieved because of certain circumstances beyond the control of the state or
states, such as poverty, security laxity, corruption, to mention but a few.

4

The Charter of the United Nations and Resolutions of the General Assembly urges
Member States to make National Laws to combat and suppress terrorism. How
possible will this be, especially with the low economic level of some African
countries and other third world countries that are still developing? Lack of modem
technology and facilities are in those countries. More so, International Law requires
a State to carry out its international obligation but neither prescribes nor concerned
about how the state will do that.

Another factor that affects the effectiveness of combating terrorism is culture
diversity and religious differences, especially in the same country. Some people try
to justify terrorist acts by claiming that it is their right to religion, (which is one of
the fundamental human rights) that they are asserting. In other words, what may be
regarded as terrorism in one country or part of a country may actually be normal
and legal in another. As rightly put by D' Amato 'one man's terrorist is another
man's freedom fighter.'

But basic questions are: Is terrorism actually justifiable? If no, how can social
stability be achieved in a diverse culture and religion? Does attainment of such
social stability require certain universal legal provision to achieve it?

On these hypothetical questions will this dissertation anchor its central thesis, which
is: 'a case for removal of combating terrorism from national level to regional level
for effectiveness of combating terrorism'.

5

As mentioned before, some of the reasons behind the central thesis are level of
corruption, poverty, lack of resources especially in developing states and more so
for avoidance of conflict between combating terrorism and Humanitarian and
Human Rights law. Unfortunately, those developing States happen to be the ones
that are greatly affected by terrorist acts.

It is paramount therefore, that the concept of terrorism should be understood
because one of the major reasons affecting inefficiency in combating terrorism is
lack of universal acceptable definition of the term 'terrorism'. At the International
level, attempts to define terrorism have fallen short of its purpose. Either that some
crucial elements are lacking in the definition or that the scope of the definition is
not comprehensive enough to cover all areas of terrorist acts.

Terrorism should also be differentiated from insurgency, despite the fact that at
times the two concepts are at play at the same time. In combating, under
insurgency, regards to human rights and humanitarian law are so essential and
should not be infringed upon, unlike in combating terrorism.

Further, human rights and humanitarian law can also be better adhered to, if the
case advocating in this dissertation will be followed effectively. Perpetrators of the
act will be captured and tried accordingly by the universal law, in a universal court,
acceptable by its Member States.

6

"Universal Court" means, in the context of this dissertation, "Regional Court or
International Court for all or some Member States of a particular Region or Union".
Limitation to the definition of universal court is due to the fact that discourse on the
effectiveness of combating terrorism all over the world will be beyond the scope of
this paper, so also will discussing each of the Conventions and Protocols
enumerated above. Therefore this dissertation is limited to some parts of Africa.

There are much terrorist acts going on in Africa, such as different Islamic extremist
radical groups and some countries are known or rather accused of harbouring
terrorists.

Although there are Conventions on combating of terrorism that are of African
Origins; how effective are these conventions in combating terrorism? Or are they
just enacted for compliance with the United Nations requirements? What is the
originality of these conventions and how have they helped to advance mechanisms
of combating terrorism in Africa? Hence, the reason for the topic of this
dissertation: A Re-Assessment of the Effectiveness of the OAU (AU) Conventions
on Preventing and Combating Terrorism.

Africa is the second largest continent in the world and also the second continent
with highest population after Asia. It contains fifty four countries and Western
Sahara. It also contains the world's longest Nile River system and the world's

7

largest massive Sahara Desert. Africa is bounded by the Mediterranean sea· to the
North, both the Suez Canal and the red Sea along the Sinai peninsula to the
Northeast, the Indian Ocean to the south east and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. 8

As mentioned in the beginning, combating terrorism in Africa had never been a
much debated topic, maybe, because of the developing nature of the countries in
Africa. In this dissertation, focus shall be made on comparing and analyzing the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Preventing and Combating
Terrorism, 1999 (known as OAU Algiers

Convention, 1999), with Arab

Convention for Suppressing Terrorism, 1998 and Convention of the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating of Terrorism, 1999

because of their

African Origins.

Further, researching on the whole of African countries will be too enormous for this
dissertation, thus the discourse shall be limited to Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan
and Nigeria; some of the African countries (in my opinion), that has been focused
as African countries with high rate of terrorist activities, especially Islamic
extremists terrorist activities.

African States have a Union known as African Union (formerly known as OAU)
that unites all Africans. One of their major objectives among others is to "achieve
greater Unity and Solidarity for African countries and the peoples."9 The Union is

8

See Map of Africa; at http/www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/af.htm.

9

Art.3 (a) of the African Union Constitutive Act, 2000.

8

also a member of the United Nations. They have many Conventions, Protocols and
Treaties in force, but the one under review in this dissertation is the OAU Algiers
Convention, 1999.

1.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
(OAU), NOW AFRICAN UNION (AU).

The origin of OAU, can be traced back to late 19th century during the colonization
of African continent. The self-centeredness of the colonial masters in the 19th
century before the end of second world war, which is called 'the scramble of
Africa', and the imposition of their own systems of law on African societies, which
were brutal and denial of African's basic human rights was what led to the demands
for independence and "uhuru" or freedom from colonial masters at the end of
second world war. 10 In addition, the influence of the spread of socialism and the
cold war rivalry led to the rapid political de-colonization of Africa. 11

Based on the grounds supra and fight against apartheid, the leaders of the then
independent African Countries established the OAU. OAU came into existence on
May 25, 1963 in Addis Ababa by the signing of the OAU Charter by 32
governments' representatives. Another 21 States have joined gradually with South

10

Organization of African Unity (OAU)/south African history. www.sahistory.org.za!topic/organizationafr
II Jd.

9

Africa being the 53rd member on May 1994. 12 Morocco remains the only African
Country that is not a member of the OAU.

Article I of the OAU Charter states thus,
"The High Contracting Parties do by the present
Charter establish an Organization to be
known as the ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY"

The first premier president of the Union is Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the then president
of Ghana. This is why May, 25 is celebrated as African Unity day.

1.1.1. STATED OBJECTIVES AND UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE
OAU CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING
TERRORISM:

The OAU'S Charter objectives are to promote the unity and solidarity of African
States, co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better
life for the people of Africa, defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and
independence, eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, promote international
co-operation, giving due regard to the Charter of United Nations and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; and co-ordinate and harmonize members' political,
diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and
defence policies. 13

12

Organization of African Unity (OAU) /African Union (AU)
http/www .dfa.gov .zalforeign/Multilateral/Africa!oau. htm.
13
Art.ii of the Charter of Organization of Africa

10

The principles of the Charter are the sovereign of equality of all Member States,
non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent
existence, peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration, unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as
well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other
States, absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which
are still dependent, and affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regards to all
blocs. 14

The Charter also provides among others in its Articles, Membership, Rights and
duties of Member States, Institutions, the Assembly of heads of State and
Government, the Council of Ministers, General Secretariat and so on.

There is also the Abuja treaty establishing the African Economic Community
(AEC) in May, 1994, which made OAU to operate under the basis of two legal
instruments. For this reason the OAU was officially referred to as OAU/AEC. 15

The need for the amendment of the OAU Charter to meet the challenges of the
twenty first century gave birth to African Union (AU). AU was established in an
Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya on September 9, 1999, with
the ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter and the provisions of the Treaty

14

15

Art. iii of the Charter of Organization of Africa.
Supra note 3.
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establishing the African Economic Community. The Constitutive Act of the African
Union was adopted on July, 11 1h, 2000 during the Lome Summit. 16AU merged
OAU and AEC into one unified institution.

The AU was created to take up the multifaceted challenges confronting the African
continent and peoples "in the light of social, economic and political changes taking
place in the world. 17 The AU objectives are somehow different and more
comprehensive than the one contained in OAU. They are as follows:
"(a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between
the African Countries and the peoples ofAfrica;
(b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
independence of its Member States;
(c) accelerate the political and socio-economic
integration of the continent;
(d) promote and defend African common positions on
issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
(e) encourage international cooperation, taking due
account of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
(f) promote peace, security, and stability on the
continent;
(g) promote democratic principles and institutions,
popular participation and good governance;
(h) promote and protect human and peoples' rights in
accordance with the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights
instruments;
(i) establish the necessary conditions which enable the
continent to play its rightful role in the global economy
and in international negotiations;
(j) promote sustainable development at the economic,
social and cultural levels as well as the integration of
African economies;
(j) promote co-operation in all fields of human activity
to raise the living standards ofAfrican peoples
!d.
Nsongurua J. Udombana., The institutional structure of the Africa Union: A Legal Analysis. 33
CA WILJ 69 at 2.
16

17

12

(k) coordinate and harmonize the policies between the
existing and future Regional Economic Communities
for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union
(l) advance the development of the continent by promoting
research in all fields, in particular in science and
technology;
(m) work with relevant international partners in the
eradication ofpreventable diseases and the promotion
of good health on the continent. " 18

The AU provided for a smooth transitional period from OAU/AEC by the Act
entering into force thirty days after two-third of the fifty three Member States have
ratified it. Also the OAU charter shall remain operative for a transitional period of
one year or such further period as may be determined by the Assembly, for the
purpose of enabling the OAU/AEC undertake the necessary measures regarding the
devolution of its assets and liabilities to the African Union and all matters relating
thereto. 19
The African Union built on the successes of the OAU, which, since its inception,
has developed into political and economic fulcrum of Africa. 20 The AU entered into
force on May 26, 2001, less than one year after its adoption. The OAU was
formerly dissolved on July 9, 2002, during the last session of the OAU Assembly in
Durban, South Africa. 21 The AU was also launched the same period at the same
session. With the launching of the AU, the OAU ceased to be an umbrella
international organization for collective Africa. 22

18

The Constitutive Act of African Union, 2000, supra note 9.
Supra note 3.
20 ld.
21
Nsongurua J. Udombana., supra note 17.
221d.
19

13

The present leaders are dedicated to the principles ofthe OAU and "to the ideals of
freedom, unity and development which the founding leaders sought to achieve in
establishing the organization". 23

Therefore, the AU takes over the rights, powers

and obligations of the OAU as its successor.

The AU Constitutive Act has thirty three (33) articles, besides its preamble. Article
2 establishes the Union, while Articles 27 and 28 provides for signature,
ratification, accession and entry into force? 4

1.1.2. MEMBERS OF OAU (Now AU).

By Article IV of the OAU Charter, 1963, each independent sovereign African State
shall be entitled to become a member of the organization. The members of AU,
therefore, include all African independent Countries except Morocco. There are
actually fifty four(54) countries that are members, namely: Algeria, Angola, Benin,
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa republic, Cape Verde,
Chad, Cote d' }voire, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, GuineaBissau, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi,
Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, South
Africa, Sahrawi Arab Democratic republic, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sao Tome & Principe, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia,

23

24

Id.
Supra note 18.
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Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Sudan recently joined in July, 2011, three
weeks after it attained its independence. Morocco resigned from OAU membership
because the Union recognizes the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, which is a
portion of Western Sahara. 25

The headquarters of AU is in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Union's official
languages are English, French, Arabic and Portuguese; nevertheless, many
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documents are printed in Swahili and other local languages.

The OAU in 1999 adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism, known as the Algiers Convention, which entered into force on 6
December, 2002. As of today, 49 states out of 54 Member States had signed it,
while 40 had ratified it. Cape Verde, Malawi, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are the
countries that are yet to sign it, while Botswana, Cameroon, Central Africa Rep.,
Cote d' Ivore, Democratic Rep. of Congo, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sao Tome & Principe, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe had not ratified it.

1.1.3. CHARTER OF OAU PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES, 1963.

The Algiers Convention stemmed from the purposes and principles enshrined in the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity, particularly, its clauses relating to
security, stability, development of friendly relations and cooperation among its

25

Katherin Schulz Richard, Africa Union: organization of 54 African Countries forms African Union.
http://georgraphy.about.com/od/africamaps/a!african-union.htm
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Member States and the provisions of the declaration on the Code of Conduct for
Inter-African Relations. It refers to the need to promote human values based on
tolerance and rejects all forms of terrorism irrespective of their motivations. 26

The AU Constitutive Act, which succeeded OAU Charter as discussed supra, also
enshrined in its Art. 4, among its other principles, "respect for the sanctity of life,
condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of
terrorism and subversive activities"? 7

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is mandated to request all Member
States to report annually on the steps they had taken to prevent and combat
terrorism, and specifically to implement the Algiers Convention. Additionally, the
solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCAl 8 adopted by the Lome Summit in July 2000, refers
to terrorism under the principle of stability and declared "terrorism, in all its
manifestations, is inimical to stability" 29

In the Plan of action, meant to translate into concrete actions for the principles
governing the CSSDCA process, the Member States agreed, on the necessity to
"exchange information and co-operation, at the
sub-regional level, on security matters, especially
on issues relating to terrorism "30
26

See the preamble ofthe OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating ofTerrorism, 1999.
Art. 3 (a) of the African Union Constitutive Act, 2000, supra note 9.
28
AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI). CSSDCA Solemn Declaration.
29
ld., at par.ll (e).
30
ld.,atpar.14(d))

27
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Pursuant to the decision adopted by the 72nd Ordinary Session of the Council of
Ministers, held in July 2000, in Lome, Togo, 31 the OAU convened an experts
Meeting to consider a Draft Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in criminal
matters, in Addis Ababa, from April 2 to 5, 2001. 32

AU has also established an African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism
(ACSRT) in Algiers, Algeria, as an institution of the AU Commission. It was
established as enshrined in Section H, Par.19-21 of the Plan of Action of African
Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating
of Terrorism in Africa, on September 11 to14, 2002. Its' functions are set out in
Section F, Par. 16(a-d) of the same Plan of Action. Some of the functions includes,
evaluating terrorist threat in Africa, promoting Intra-African co-operation against
terrorism, training measures for combating terrorism, conducting studies, setting up
data basis for gathering and exchanging information, monitoring and analyzing
information relating to terrorism and assisting in implementation of International
Conventions relating to terrorism.

1.2. DECLARATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERAFRICAN RELATIONS PROVISION, 1994.

Africa's commitment in combating terrorism can be traced back as far as July 1992,
when the OAU, during its 28th Ordinary Session, held in Dakar, Senegal, adopted
31

CM/Dec.540(LXXII) Rev.l
African commitments to combating organized crime and terrorism., at 59.
www.iss.co.za/pub/other/ahsi/Goredema-Botha1pt2chap7.pdf
32
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resolution AHG/Res.213

(XXVIII),

aimed at enhancing cooperation and

coordination of efforts among Member States with the zeal to fight extremism. 33

In June, 1994, at is 30th ordinary Session, held in Tunis, Tunisia, the OAU Summit
adopted declaration AHG/Dec1.2 (XXX) on the code of conduct for Inter-African
Relations, which categorically rejected fanaticism and extremism or the use of
religion to commit acts of violence, including tenorist acts. Nevertheless, the code
of conduct recognises that the freedom of religious belief and its peaceful
expression are a fundamental right of all human beings as enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human rights and also recognises the threats posed by
movements based on religious, political and tribal extremism? 4 They want Africa to
be a source of peace, open to dialogue, co-operation and exchange with the rest of
the world, and committed to the search for common responses to future
challenges. 35

1.3. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON TERRORISM:
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

Despite the fact that there is no universal acceptable of definition of tenorism in
international level, however, United Nations adopted what can best be described as
'sectorial approach' and held several general meetings on eliminating international

33

Preventing and Combating Terrorism; March 14,2012. http://www.peaceau.org/en/pages/dsd-counterterrorism
34
See preamble of Declaration of a Code of Conduct for Inter-African relations, Assembly of Heads of
State and Government, Thirtieth Ordinary Session, Tunis, Tunisia, 13-15 June 1994.
Js Id.
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tenorism; such as Resolution 49/60 of the General Assembly, 1994, Resolution
51/210 ofthe General Assembly, 1996 and Resolution 52/164.

Resolution 49/60: The 84th Preliminary meeting of the UN's General Assembly,
held on 9th December, 1994, known as 'Resolution 49/60', recalled its resolutions of
45/51 of 1991 and 48/411 of 1993, of depth consideration of question on measures

to eliminate international tenorism. The assembly was convinced that the adoption
of the declaration on measures to eliminate tenorism should contribute immensely
to combating international tenorism. 36 They, therefore, approved the Resolution
49/60, Declarations on measures to Eliminate International Tenorism, as guided by

the purpose and principles of the UN' s Charter. In its annex, it affirms its resolution
to eliminate international tenorism and other related offences. 37 The Resolution
further stipulates that all States must take appropriate measures in accordance with
the relevant provisions of international law and international standards of human
rights to ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of
tenorist acts in accordance with the relevant provisions of their nationallaw. 38

Resolution 51/210: Further, the UN in its 88th plenary meeting on 171h December,
1996, known as Resolution 511210, which is a supplement to Resolution 49/60,

recalls the said Resolution 49/60 and states that they are disturbed by the
persistence of tenorist acts? 9 At the meeting, the General Assembly, also recalls

36

See United Nation's A/RES/49/60. Measures to eliminate international terrorism
!d. at its annex.
38
Supra note 34 at par.5(a-f).
39
See A/Res/51/21 0. Measures to eliminate international terrorism, 1996.
37
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that in the 84th plenary meeting, that States were encouraged to review urgently the
scope of existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and
elimination of terrorism in all its forms. 40

The General Assembly categorically condemns all acts, methods and practices of
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed. 41
They also encouraged States to exchange verified information on facts related to
terrorism. 42 States were urged to become parties to Conventions on terrorism and
other related offences if they have not done so and also re-emphasis on the need for
States to enact appropriate domestic legislation necessary to implement the
provisions of those Conventions and protocols, to ensure that the jurisdiction of
their courts enables them to bring to trial the perpetrators of terrorist acts and to
provide support and assistance to other governments for those purpose. 43

But, the perturbing question remains; how will this common goal of eliminating
international terrorism be achieved in different States with different national laws
and legislations, without infringing on principles of international human rights?

Can terrorism be justifiable? How can one actually claim that terrorist act is part of
the person's religion? Is this a sort of fanatic blasphemy (although it sounds
philosophical), or are they actually the reality of such religion? In discussing these

40
41

42
43

!d.
Id at I of part I.
Id. at 4 of part I.
Id. at 6 of part I.
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questions, some terrorist incidents that had taken place in some parts of African
States under review, shall be considered in Chapter two of this dissertation.

It is becoming more glaring, from the above discussions, that most of these national

legislations (discussed supra) are in conflict with the UN requirements for
combating terrorism. How then, is the best way to counter terrorism without
infringing on human rights in Africa?

Chapter two of this dissertation, centres on the scope of terrorism, its' effects to the
stability, economic and security of the States. To be able to properly introduce the
concept of terrorism, the chapter starts by differentiating between Terrorism,
Insurgency and Armed conflict.

Then proceed to evaluate justifications some

people claim for being terrorists and actually deduce if there is any reasonability in
such assertions (though, already mentioned briefly in this present chapter) and the
motives or objectives behind the activities ofthe terrorists.

Further, the same chapter two evaluates terrorism and violation of human rights, for
the purpose of finding the balance between terrorism and human rights. This
discourse is approached from two different perspectives; firstly, from the terrorist
angle; whether the person's act is actually right? If the person has a right to claim
justification under human rights law violation, bearing in mind the equitable maxim
of 'whoever that comes into equity must come with clean hands', on the other side,
from the legal point of view on the side of the terrorist combatants and the legal
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provisiOns on terrorism. The outcome of the evaluation determines if the legal
provisions are in conflict with human rights and humanitarian law? Do they have to
prioritize Human Rights law over combating terrorism effectively?

This leads to the next stage of discussion, though under the same chapter, the
impact of war on terror on African States. How terrorism has affected the security,
economic status of African States, and even their international relations with other

I

countries. That is, an analysis on the scope of terrorism in African States.

Chapter three is on a legal analysis on the existing OAU Convention on Preventing
and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 (Algiers Convention), which seems to be the
main convention for AU in combating terrorism.

Firstly, critical analyses of

definition of terrorism under the Convention are discussed, to determine its scope of
coverage. Its sectional analyzes, such as the roles and jurisdiction of Member States
on

terrorist

Acts,

extradition

of terrorists,

extra-territorial

investigations

(Commission Regoire) and mutual assistance and the reservation provision is made.
Also discussion on the Convention is made in order to actually ascertain if the
convention is in compliance with the UN requirement for combating terrorism.

Further, under the same chapter, the enforcement of the Convention and the
Member States ratification of the Conventions; and then, the effects of the existing
convention on the Member States, are also evaluated in order to ascertain if they
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(Member States) had complied or are yet to comply with the requirements of the
OAU Convention.

Chapter four focuses on a comparative analysis of the OAU Algiers Convention,
1999 with two other Conventions that have some African origin: Arab Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998 and Convention of the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) on Combating International Terrorism, 1999. Most
Members States to the two Conventions are Africans. From the comparative
analysis, the originality of the OAU Algiers Convention, 1999 is extracted and reassessed. Then, it becomes clearer, if it is a duplicate of another Convention or if it
is in the actual sense 'original'.

Finally under this same chapter four, detailed responses to the convention by some
African Member States (Ethiopia, Somali, Kenya, Sudan and Nigeria) is assessed;
to determine if they have already complied with their obligations under those
Conventions and other International Conventions that they are Member States. If
they have not, then what are they doing and what approaches do they use for
combating terrorism in their respective national states. How effective are these
approaches, if any, and how has it helped to curb terrorist acts in their national
countries.

Chapter five is the conclusion and recommendation. As stated before, this
dissertation asserts that terrorism should be better fought or combated as one, in

23

International or Regional (because AU is region) Level than on a national level in
Africa, mainly, due to its' economic undeveloped power, corruption, partiality, lack
of resources and most especially for avoidance of conflict with humanitarian and
human rights law.

Under the same chapter five, recommendations on how practicable and effective the
thesis of criminalizing and penalizing terrorism or combating terrorism jointly on
regional level, instead of on national level is made. Also, it is important to note that,
it can be practicably achieved so far in African Union, since the OAU Algiers
Convention 1999, has a provision for amendment and agreements in the
Convention. 44 More so , there is a universal acceptable definition of terrorism in
the Convention by the Member States, and the fact that, terrorist act as defined in
Art.l (3) of the OAU Algiers Convention, 1999, is the violation of the criminal laws
of a state party, which is committed in any other person's state. AU already has a
multilateral agreement for extradition and extra territorial investigations and mutual
assistance, 45 which can be conveniently handled by a centralized judicial body for
the Union.

44
45

OAU Algiers Convention., Supra note 26 at Art.21.
ld., at Art.7, Parts IV and V.
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1.4. CONCLUSION.

This dissertation is unique in so many ways from that of previous scholars because
as stated before, most scholars had not suggested that combating terrorism in Africa
should be effectively done in regional level as opposed to the current national level.

Also, recommendations and practical procedures through which to achieve this
thesis are the author's sole initiatives. None of the previous published studies had
examined the possibility of approaching combating terrorism at a regional level in
Africa as a union, instead of the national level, as mentioned supra, by amending
the OAU Algiers Convention to include a central court, vested with jurisdiction on
combating terrorism. Solidarity as enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act should be
maximized to the fullest for better result, not just for effectiveness of combating
terrorism, but, also for other issues that needs urgent attention in AU.

To re-emphasis agam, m order to avoid conflicts and find the proper balance
between counter-terrorism and Human Rights law in Africa, there should be a
Universal Court vested with terrorist jurisdiction.
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CHAPTER TWO.

SCOPE OF TERRORISM AND ITS DANGER TO THE STABILITY
OF STATES.

2.0. INTRODUCTION.

Before 9/1 1, terrorism was not considered a significant threat to the security of
Africa, despite the US embassy bombings at Kenya and Tanzania. African
Countries' were not considered as a safe haven for terrorist activities, although it
was seen as a potential breeding ground for terrorism.

46

The modem terrorism differs from that in the 1960's. It poses great danger to the
world as a result of different religious affiliations mixed with political ideology and
geo-political goals.

The ongm of the word 'terror' (terrere ), which means 'frighten' was first
introduced by French in the fourteenth (14th) century and was used by the English in
1928.

47

The French Legislature led by Maximilien Robesspierre, concerned about

the aristocratic threat to the revolutionary government, ordered the public execution

Ted Dagna. Africa and the war on terrorism. 2002, CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Re~earch
Service.
47
Reuven Young. Defining Terrorism: The evolution of terrorism as a legal concept in international law
and its influence on definitions in domestic legislation. 29 BCICLR 23 at 3.
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of seventeen thousand ( 17 ,000) people, ("regime de !a terreur ") to educate the
citizenry of the necessity of virtue. 48

After World War II, terrorism developed a new methodology. Terrorist hijackings
of civil aviation aircraft became common. The international community responded
with series of treaties. 49 The UN also responded with the same enactment of
treaties, such as International Convention Against taking of Hostages, 1979 and so
on.

Certainly, there are many treaties, conventions and laws both internationally and
nationally on prevention of terrorism, but the static point is that, enacting those
treaties, conventions and laws alone are insufficient; the effectiveness of enforcing
same to prevent terrorist occurrences is the trivial point.

For better understanding of the term 'terrorism', the author shall attempt to
distinguish it between insurgency and armed conflict, to clear the ambiguity
between the terms in this chapter, especially, for the fact that some scholars are
using the terms interchangeably as if they are one and the same terminology.

Further, the perturbing question as regards the possibility of justification of
terrorism will be discussed in this chapter, so also the conflict between combating
terrorism and violation of human rights.

48
49

Id.
Id.
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The effects of these terrorist acts m the security, economic stability and
international relations of States cannot be over-looked.

2.1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TERRORISM, INSURGENCY AND
ARMED-CONFLICT.

"The search for a legal definition of terrorism in
some ways resembles the quest for Holy Grail:
periodically, eager souls set out, full ofpurpose,
energy and self confidence, to succeed where so
many others before have tried andfailed" 50.

Till date there is still lacuna in international law because of the absence of universal
acceptable definition of the word 'Terrorism'. Trudy Govier comments that "the
United Nations has been trying to define terrorism for some thirty years, and has
given up in its quest for a definition that everybody can agree upon. A major
problem is that Western governments wanted to make sure that state agents could
never be considered terrorist, while Islamic countries wanted to make sure that
national liberation movements in the Middle East and Kashmir could never be
considered terrorist. 51

Further, the human rights voices said that the reason for UN's inability to have a
definite definition of the term is due to the standoff with the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC).
"The Arab Terrorism Convention and the Terrorism
50
51

Geoffrey Levitt. Is 'Terrorism' worth defining?; 13 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 97, 1986.
Trudy Govier. A Delicate Balance: What philosophy can tell us about.
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Convention of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) defined terrorism to exclude
armed struggle for liberation and self-determination.
This claim purports to exclude blowing up certain
civilians from the reach of international law and
organizations. It is central to interpreting every
proclamation by states which have ratified these
conventions in any forum purporting to combat
terrorism". 52

Therefore, internationally, terrorism may be difficult to define because it has so
many emotions attached to it. The absence of the universal definition of terrorism
has made possible none existence of terrorism in international level. It would
simply be a
"phenomenon which is denounced as shameful and
reprehensive by all but understood by none. Its legal
value will be instrumental and incantatory, yet
. ·fjiZClent.
.
,53
zne
11
"It would merely be a word of art meant to
brand one's enemies, a label used loosely,
selectively and invariably pejoratively
.... where the defining elements of terrorism are
often confused with value judgements about those
accused of it ". 54

The absence of its definition in international level has also led to the unceasingly
international acts of terrorism, especially on the ground that some States harbour
terrorists. Investigation and prosecution on the basis of a crime of terrorism alone
would likely violate the precepts of certainty and legality if it were to be concluded

52

See the Human Rights Voices; There is No UN definition of terrorism.

www .bumanrightsvoices.org/E YEontheUN/un-1 0 l /factd/?p=6l
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Jean Marc Sorel. Some questions about the definition of terrorism and fight against its financing; 14(2)
Eur.J.INT'l L. 365, 2003 at 370.
54
Robert P. Bamidge, Jr. Non-State Actors and Terrorism. Applying the law of State Responsibility and
the Due Diligence principle. T.M.C.Asser Press. 2008 at 15.
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that customary international law has not yet sufficiently defined the term
'terrorism' .55

States define terrorism to mean what they think is the best definition for it within
their territory. That is to say, what may constitute a terrorist act in one country may
not be so in another country. How it is perceived depends on who the terrorist is,
where the terrorist act is committed and who is at the receiving end. Some terrorize

I

their states in the name of freedom fighters. It is not a question of unwillingness by
a majority of nations to define terrorism, but rather a question of the obstacles to
reaching agreement as well as scepticism about using any universal definition for
narrow purposes. 56 Professor Bruce Ackerman stated that:

"terrorism is a 'product (~f the free market in the
world of high technology' and even with peace
and democracy around the world, fringe groups
would still have the capability to undertake
acts of terrorism. "57

Although, there were some early proposed definitions of terrorism at international
law, but none has been accepted as the universal definition of the term under the
international law. It therefore, remains a nebulous concept for the international legal
system.

Terrorism was first used as a legal term in 1931 at the third conference for
unification of penal law of Brussels; they tried to define an act ofterrorism as:
55

\d. at 16.
Upendra D. Acharya. War on terror or Terror war: The problem in defining terrorism. 2009. 37
DENJILP 653 at 12.
57
Bruce Ackerman. Before the Next Attack. 2006 at 14.
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"The intentional use of means capable ofproducing
a common danger that represents an act of terrorism
on the part of anyone making use of crimes against
life, liberty or physical integrity ofpersons or directed
against private or state property with the purpose
. l z'deas .... ,58
... socza

Later the sixth conference of Copenghen m 1935 adopted a text that defined
terrorism in its Article I as:
"International acts directed against life, physical
integrity, health or freedom of a head of state, as
well as crown princes, members of government,
people enjoying diplomatic immunity, and members
of the constitutional, a legislative or judicial
bodies[if a perpetrator creates] a common danger,
or a state of terror that might insight a change or raise
an obstacle to the functioning ofpublic bodies or a
59
disturbance to international relations. "

Following the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French
Foreign Minister in 1934, France proposed an "International measures" to be
taken. 60

In the 1937 Terrorism Convention, acts of terrorism were defined as:
"Criminal acts directed against a state and
intended or calculated to create a state of terror
in the mind ofparticular persons, a group of
persons or the general public". 61

58

M.K. Nawaz & Gurdip Signh, Legal Control oflnternational Terrorism, 17 Indian J. Int'L, 66, 1977,
Reuven Young. Supra note 47 at 7.
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The UN General Assembly always adopt resolutions condemning acts of terrorism
but never reached a consensus on what 'acts' constitutes terrorism. A universally
accepted definition is paramount for the unification of combating terrorism. Before,
9/11, the General Assembly in 1995, defined terrorism as:
"Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public, a group of
persons or particular persons for political purposes
are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be
invoked to justifY them. "62

In Security Council Resolution, 1566 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at the
5053rd session , the UN while condemning the act of terrorism, still did not define
the term 'terrorism', they only condemned acts of terrorism;
"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations,
1. Condemns in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism
irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by
whomsoever committed, as one of the most serious treats to
.
,63
peace and secunty; ...

It seems that general/universal definition of terrorism will limit some powerful

countries' unilateral power to handle terrorist acts the way they deem fit. Overuse
has made terrorism a 'politicized and emotive' term. 64 But the universal acceptable
definition remains the solid foundation in combating terrorism.

62

See the General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 1995.
See 1 of Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004 ).
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Ben Saul in his article, 'the Challenge of defining Terrorism', Chapter 7, confirms
that, an ultimate successful definition of terrorism will have to reconcile political
with international law. 65

To both academics and lawyers alike, a consistent

definition of terrorism has remained 'increasingly elusive' and unsuccessful efforts
to draft one have consumed much ink. 66 The definition will also enhance
intelligence sharing and international co-operation. 67

Interestingly, although there is no universal definition in international level, some
regions, such as the ones under review in this dissertation (OAU, OIC & The Arab
Conventions), succeeded in having a universal definition of terrorism in its'
different Conventions.

OAU defined Terrorist 'acts' in its Article 1 (3) of OAU Convention on The
Prevention And Combating of Terrorism, 1999 as:
"(a): any act which is a violation of criminal laws
of a State Party and which may endanger the life,
physical integrity orfreedom of. or cause serious
injury or death to, any number or group of
persons or causes or may cause damage to public
or private property, natural resources,
environmental or cultural heritage and is
calculated or intended to:
(i): intimidate, put fear, force, coerce or
induce any government, body, institution,
the general public or any segment thereof,
to do or abstain from doing any act, or
to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or
to act according to certain principles; or
(ii): Disrupt any public service, the delivery
65

Ben Saul. Defining terrorism-How far Have We come? 17 Sept. 2012. www.isn.ethz.ch
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of any essential service to the public or
create a public emergency; or
(iii): create general insurrection in a State.
(b): any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to,
command, aid, incitement, encouragement,
attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement
of any person, with the intent to commit any act
referred to in paragraph (a)(i) to (iii)". 68

The Organisation of Islamic Conference Convention On Combating International
Terrorism, 1999, defined Terrorism and terrorist crimes respectively in its Articles
1(2), (3) as follows:
" 2. ''Terrorism" means any act of violence or threat
thereof notwithstanding its motives or
intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or
collective criminal plan with the aim of
terrorizing people or threatening to harm
them or imperilling their lives, honour,
freedoms, security or rights or exposing
the environment or any facility or public or
private property to harzards or occupying
or seizing them, or endangering a national
resource, or international facilities, or
threatening the stability, territorial integrity,
political unity or soverignity of independent States.
3 "Terrosist Crime" means any crime executed, started
or participated in to realize a terrorist objectives
in any of the Contracting States or against
its nationals, assests or interests or foreign
facilities and nationals residing in its
.
. ha ble by zts
. law. "69
terntory
pums

Also, the Arab Convention for The Suppression of Terrorism, 1998, defined
terrorism and terrorist offence in its Article 1(2) & (3) accordingly as follows:
"2. Terrorism
68

See Article 1 of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism; supra note 26.
See Article 1(2) & (3) ofThe Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International
Terrorism, which is an Annex to Resolution No: 59/26p of the organization.
69
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Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives
or purposes, that occurs in the advancement
of an individual or collective criminal agenda
and seeking to sow panic among people, causing
fear by harming them, placing their lives, liberty
or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage
to the environment or to public or private
installations or property or to occupying or
seizing them, or seeking to jeorpardize a
national resources.
3. Terrorist offence
Any offence or attempted offence committed
in furtherance of a terrorist objective in
any of the contracting States, or against their
nationals, property or interests, that is punishable
by their domestic law. The offences stipulated
in the following conventions have not been
ratified by Contracting States or where offences
have been excluded by their legislation, shall
also be regarded as terrorist offences:
(a) The Tokyo Convention on offences and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, of 14 September 1963;
(b) The Hague Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure ofAircraft, of 16 December
1970;
(c) The Montreal Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, of 23 September 1971, and the protocol
thereto of 10 May 1984;
(d) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including DiplomaticAgents, of
14 December 1973;
(e) The International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, of 17 December 1979;
(f) The provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 1982, relating to piracy on the high
seas. 70

70

See Article I (2) & (3) of The Arab Convention For The Suppression of Terrorism, 1998.
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Despite the existence of the definition of terrorism in the above mentioned national
Conventions, the staring question still remains, how effective are the application of
these laws to combating terrorism in those nations?

At certain situations, the two concepts, 'insurgency' and 'terrorism', are in play at
the same time. Some terrorists hide under the cloak of insurgency to terrorize a
state. Such acts are usually in violation of criminal laws of that state; concurring
with President of the United States of America, Barack Obama who labelled
terrorism "a human-caused disaster". 71 In such a situation, insurgents are not
exempted from their terrorist acts; immunity under insurgency cannot veil them for
their terrorist actions. An example of such situation can be attributed to Al-Shabaab
group in the East Africa that is linked to the notorious Al-Qaeda, Islamic extremist
group, which continues to wage war against the government of Somalia in the name
of insurgency.

Also, the fact that National Liberation Movements have complicated the legal
regulation of internal conflict, terrorism has become entangled with the right to self
determination as per international law. 72 Some nations have anchored on the
provisions of the United Nations Charter on inherent right to self determination73 to
free themselves from being labelled as terrorists.
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Insurgency (sometimes called 'guerrilla warfare') can be viewed as a revolution,
usually legitimate, which involves physical violence as war, but specifically for
political and military gains rather than for private benefits. 74 In other words,
insurgency is strictly for political reasons, advancement into government or to
overthrow the government, unlike terrorism that is for selfish reasons. The principle
is always to prevent the government forces from employing its full might in the
contest. 75

Insurgency has also been defined as;
"a protracted struggle conducted methodically,
step by step, in order to attain specific
intermediate objectives leading finally to
· • order n76
the overthrow OJ,.( the ex1stzng

Terrorists are seen as unrepresentative and abnormal outliners in society while
msurgency 1s the manifestation of deeper, widespread issues in society. 77
Insurgency is usually a small war used as an auxiliary form of fighting, especially
behind enemy lines. 78 The tactics employed by the insurgents can be best described
as 'hit and run'.
"Insurgency is a struggle between a non-ruling
group and ruling authorities in which the
non-ruling group consciously uses political
resources .... And violence to destroy, reformulate,
or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more
. . ,79
aspects OJ.-rpo 11t1cs.
741d.
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Although both insurgents and terrorists neither wears uniform nor carry arms
openly and induces fear and violence; but terrorism is different in the sense that its
use of force is directed at non combatants. 80 The major difference between
insurgency and terrorism is that the former tries to establish physical control for a
territory unlike the later. 81 Insurgency is confined within the national boundary and
it is directed against one's own government. On the other hand, terrorism can cross

I

over the national boundary and it may be directed against one's own or other
countries. Insurgents advocate ideologies, pay individuals to conduct operations,
employ violence and intimidation, and exploit local grievances such as communal
or sectarian conflicts. 82
The weapons usually used by terrorists are most sophisticated than that of the
insurgents that use infantry-type light weapons but sometimes artillery pieces as
well. 83 The insurgents main targets are the political opponents, military and police,
while the terrorists' targets both political opponents and the public at large. 84

The major purpose of terrorist acts is to obtain publicity, by attacking targets that
represents what they oppose and they feel mission accomplished when the public
and government reacts to their attacks. They (terrorists) do not usually challenge the
government forces openly, rather, they aim at changing the perception as to the
effectiveness or legitimacy of the government itself. Terrorism is seen as either a
ld.
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82
Ganesh Sitaraman. Supra note 76.
83
Ariel Merari. Supra note 75 at II.
84 Id.
80
81

38

law enforcement or military problem, rooting out a few bad apples, while

insurgency is a social problem, requiring mobilization of all elements of
government power. 85

An Armed conflict (some scholars refers to armed conflict as 'Conventional war')
is usually a direct clash with the government and the military. The conflict is
normally between different military branches on uniform. They use more
sophisticated weapons (air force, armour, artillery) than terrorists. 86

Currently, just like terrorism, there is no specific definition of "armed conflict" in
international law, although the term 'armed conflict' is used in the Geneva
Convention(s) and the Additional Protocols. 87 Under the Geneva Convention,
armed conflict is classified into two (2): International armed conflict and NonInternational armed conflict, but the terminology "armed Conflict" was not defined
in the convention. 88 Although Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not explain
the term, armed conflict, but it excluded situations of political unrest accompanied
by nothing more than sporadic acts of violence. 89 Also Article 1(2) of Additional
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Additional Protocol II: Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions; 1949 and Relating to The
Protection of Victims ofNon-lnternational armed Conflict; 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
88 Id.
89 !d.

86

39

Protocol II affirms this interpretation because it excludes from the 'material field of
application' of the protocol 'situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts. 90
Article 3 ofthe Geneva Convention, 1949 states thus:

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international
Character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, each party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
(l)Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
Including members of armed forces who have
laid their arms and those placed hors de combat
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause,
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth,
or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following
acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture,·
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of
executions without previous judgement pronounced
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guaranteeswhich are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and
cared for. An impartial humanitarian body,
such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its services to
the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the
conflicts should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreement, all or part
of the other provisions of the present Convention.

I
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The application of the preceding provisions shall
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

Insurgency has been defined as:
"A general overarching concept that refers to a
Coriflict between a government and an out group
or opponent in which the latter uses both political
resources and violence to change, reformulate,
or uphold the legitimacy of one or more offour
. ,9/
key aspects o1.-rpo l.ztzcs.

I

In Prosecutor V Dusko Tadic, the court explained the existence of armed conflict
thus:
" .... exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between states or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and
. d arme d groups .... ,92
organzze

Insurgency and Armed conflicts adhere to international norms regarding the law of
war in achieving their goals, but terrorists are simply committing crimes under both
civil and military legal codes. 93

Insurgency is neither terrorism nor armed conflict, though the three concepts share
the same use of force to achieve political ends with different scales of violence.
Both terrorism and insurgency needs support and finance to succeed, or else both
will eventually succumb to the efforts of the State but insurgency has a distinct
characteristic of support and mobilization from local populace which is a
91
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prerequisite for their success unlike terrorism. 94 The supportive local populace
provides the insurgents with intelligence, recruits and shelter. 95

From the above analysis, one can be both a terrorist and a freedom fighter. The
person can fight for freedom and adopt terrorism as a method of fighting. 96
Therefore, the lacuna of acceptable definition of terrorism in International law in
contradiction to freedom or resistance fighters is clearly one of the contributing

I

factors that encourage violence in the name of higher theological and ideological
. . 1es. 97
prmc1p

2.2. DOES TERRORISM HAVE JUSTIFICATION?

Apart from the absence of universal acceptable definition of terrorism m
international law, another perturbing question m the mind of average legal
personnel is 'the justification of terrorism'. The members of the Security Council
stated and reaffirmed, while commenting on attack in Somalia, that: 98
"terrorism in all its fOrms and manifestations
constitutes one of the most serious threats
to international peace and security, and
that any acts of terrorism are criminal and
unjustifiable regardless of their motivation,
wherever and whenever and by whomever
committed. "
v

<
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Some terrorists claim justification on moral grounds, especially, Islamic extremists,
who claim to be fighting just war in the name of jihad, re-echoing the cliche that
'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'.

In order to understand their point of view and actually deduce if there is any
justification from their view, a brief summary of origin of just war and jihad may

I

clarify what forms the intention or underlying motives of Islamic extremists in
morally justifying terrorism.

2.2.1. ORIGIN OF JUST WAR AND JIHAD.

The theological challenges presented by modern terrorists, especially the Islamic
extremists, like al-Qa'ida, justifying unlimited use of force against "enemies of
God,"99 has made the globe to re-think about the fearful strategic dangers of the
clash of civilization as demonstrated by the 'just war,' 'jihad' concepts and their
relevancy to the 'battle of ideas' between the culture of life and the culture of
death. 100

The beginning of just war theory may be linked to the Romans. It originated in the
Middle Ages as Christian theologians, such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas,
sought to determine under what conditions it would be morally right to engage in

99

!d. at xviii.
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State violence war. 101 It was an outgrowth of the association of religions with
international relations. The performance of such religious rites was assigned to the
collegium fetaialium, the priests or fetiales were entrusted with the task of deciding
if a foreign country had failed to perform its duties toward the Roman State. 102 If a
foreign state subject to Roman rule refused to perform the specified religious rites,
and no settlement was reached within an allocated period for negotiation and
deliberation, a just cause of war was said to exist, and the matter was placed before
the senate. 103 Subsequently, Saint Augustine justified Christian participation in war
on such grounds as injury to the country, or unjustified occupation of territory.
While punishment out of all proportion to the act would be considered unjust, the
redress of grievances was justifiable, the ultimate purpose of war being the
achievement of peace. 104

It was Thomas Aquinas who laid down three criteria for the justified initiation of

war: First, it must be authorized by the prince; second, there must be a just cause for
it, such as un-redressed grievances; and third, the belligerents must attempt to
achieve a just peace. This theory was both used to curb feuds within a state and
applied to conflicts between independent states. 105

In the Middle Ages, Spanish jurists such as Francisco Victoria (circa 1480- 1546)
held that not only is self-defense justifiable, but also defense of one's friends or
101
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required to aid the belligerent whose cause was "just". Also, Emmerich de Vattell
(1714- 1767) held that the theory of a "just war" was moral, and did not affect the

legality of the war. 109 By the beginning of the 19th century, the concept of a "just
war" underwent a period of disuse. The theory that a war could be considered legal
or illegal was discarded. It was replaced by the concept of supreme sovereignty. To
judge the legality of a war would necessitate the deliberation and judgement of
sovereignty by a third party, and this would be considered an impairment, as states

I
I

were considered equal. This did not mean that violence was sanctioned, but rather,
that the doctrine of "just war" no longer met the needs of the political actualities of
Europe in the 19th century. Methods were adopted in an attempt to restrict the worst
consequences of conflict, such as political alignments and the formulation of rules
of warfare to reduce widespread destruction. 110

The 20th century brought a revitalization and reformulation of the "just war"
doctrine developed in earlier periods. It condemned certain wars and condoned
others. It returned to the theory that wars of aggression were illegal, while selfdefense was justifiable. This theory was implemented in the Versailles Peace Treaty
of 1919. 111 The opinion of the Allies is clearly illustrated by George Clemenceau in
the letter to the president of the German Delegation covering the Reply of the
Allied and Associated powers:
"In the view of the Allied and Associated powers,
the war which began on 1 August 1914, was the
greatest crime against humanity ... that any nation ...
109
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has ever consciously committed ... not less than
several million dead lie buried inEurope ...
Because Germany saw fit to gratifY her lust for
tyranny by resorting to war ... the Allied and
Associated Powers believe that they will be false
To those who have given their all to the freedom
of the world if they consent to treat this war on
any other basis than as a crime against humanity
and right". 112

But certain wars were still considered to be just. Negotiations for the ratification of
the Pact illustrated that the right to self-defense was not denied. In the words of US
Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg: "Every nation is free at all times to defend its
territory from attack or invasion, and it alone is competent to decide whether
circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." A signatory of the Pact of
Paris could engage in a "just war" and yet remain within its terms. 113

The "just war" doctrine was invoked before the Second World War to justify
American aid to the Allies, and after it to justify the punishment of those allegedly
responsible for starting it. In 1945, the concept of "just war" had been embodied in
the Charter of the UN. Although the Charter provides for arbitration and
adjudication, the right of self-defense has been maintained. Article 51 provides thus:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective
se(f-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a member of the UN, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security".

1121d.
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The UN thus recognized 'just' wars begun in self-defense against armed aggression.
These are, however, divergent opinion as to what constitutes "self-defense." The
UN has been reluctant to recognize cases that may expand the definition of selfdefense. 114

It is against the foregoing background of mostly "Western" perspectives and
experiences of the "just war" concept that the "Jihad" doctrine must be understood.
According to numerous Islamic scholars, it is apparent that Muslims have
consistently used theologically based criteria for distinguishing between "just" and
"unjust" violence. For instance, violence was justified to defend an Islamic society
from "religious impurity" threats or from a foreign invading army. "Jihad"
therefore, represented a sanctified form of resistance force directed against
disobedience to the command of Allah. "Jihad's" comprehensive meaning thus
represents a struggle for personal and public faithfulness rather than an inevitable
call for war. In fact, Muslim communities are duty-bound to explore every peaceful
means available for conflict resolution before resorting to violence. And then when
hostilities are undertaken, the Muslims are obligated to utilize measured and
proportional responses to threat. Their fighters are obligated during battles not to
kill civilians, including women and children, and to treat prisoners of war
humanely. 115

114
115

!d.
ld. at Xxii.

48

Regardless of record, for militant Islam as graphically illustrated by al-Qa'ida's
declared intentions and actions, the concept of "jihad" has projected a new ominous
level of brutalization against humanity. Its ideological foundation has been
nourished by radical Islamic concepts, doctrines, and interpretations. For example,
the Middle Age school of Salafiyya (the venerable forefathers) in advocating that
Islam had been corrupted by idolatry and therefore must be purified has influenced
al-Qa' ida's thinking.

I
A more profound impact on al-Qa'ida's theological radicalization was made by
Islamic scholars in the 20th century who argued that Islam was in real danger of
being destroyed by Western influences. The teachings, for instance, of Maulana
Maudoodi and Rashid Rida who developed the theory that modern Western culture
represented the pre-Islamic period Gahiliyya) coupled with the assertions of Sayyid
Qutb that the US is Islam's most challenging spiritual adversary have particularly
impacted al-Qa'ida's extremist attitudes and violent actions against America and its
friends and allies. 116

Jihad organizations refer to the concept "jihad" as a religiously sanctioned military
confrontation in a revolutionary sense. 117 In his book, 'Mu'Alin Fi Al-Tariq',
Sayyid Qutb gave to the concept 'Jihad' a new revolutionary meaning: 'Jihad'
religious war against Muslim leaders who fail to fulfil the tenets of Islam and are
therefore to be considered infidels. The idea of jihad in this sense was first espoused
1161d.
117

Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon. Terrorism in Africa. Centre for International Political
studies(CIPS) at 5.

49

by the Islamic liberation party but was developed into a general concept and modus
operandi by Muhammad Abd-Salarn Farji, the Jihad organization's ideologist, who
assassinated Sadat in November, 1981. In his book, 'Al-Farihda Al-Ghayba' Farji
explains the revolutionary meaning of jihad. 118 He accuses the religious sages of
neglecting Jihad and sees it as the only way of reinstating Islam to its former glory,
through: Using force against governments perceived as heretic, particularly because
those in power neglected the duty of Islam in renewing the image of Islam;
Establishing an Islamic state based on their interpretation of Islam; Giving higher
priority to war against infidel Muslim leaders rather than war against foreign
imperialism based on the assumption that imperialism sterns from the infidel rulers
themselves; Organizing underground conditions into a military framework; Making
a special effort to penetrate security power bases - the army and security forces - in
order to acquire weapons and useful means to fight the particular regirnes. 119

The afore-mentioned characteristics of the activities of Islamic extremism could be
presented as: attempts to implement the Shari'a or Islamic Law and to tum
countries into Islamic Republics. 120 These demands have been voiced in Nigeria,
Senegal, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sornalia. 121 Already adopted by Sudan and in part,
by Nigeria; an attempt to destabilize the traditional orthodox establishment on all
levels. This has been the case in Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Kenya, the
manipulation of racial and social ferments based on sense of discrimination and

118 ld.
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deprivation of Muslims. In Tanzania, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda social
ferment led to violence and riots. 122

2.2.2. JUSTIFICATION OF TERRORISM.

It is becoming obvious that some people, who try to justify terrorism seems to

discuss insurgency in the name of terrorism. This is in accordance with the fact that,
the terminologies "terrorism" and "insurgency" are often misused by some scholars,
forgetting the fact that the two have distinct meanings.

Igor Primoratz attempts to morally justify terrorism on two ethical theory of moral
philosophy,

namely;

Consequentialism

and

Non-Consequentialism.

Consequentialism advices to judge human action solely in terms of its
consequences. When its consequences are good (on balance), an act or policy is
right; when they are bad (on balance), it is wrong. Nothing is right or wrong,
obligatory or prohibited, in itself, but only in the light of its consequences. The
goodness or badness of consequences is understood in terms of how they affect
those whom they affect.

Terrorism, too, is judged in terms of its consequences, and in these terms only. 123
A consequentialist justification of an act or policy of terrorism must show three
things: that the aim sought is good enough to justify the harm inflicted; that the aim
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will indeed be achieved by terrorism; and that it cannot be achieved in any other
less costly way; example, liberation. 124

The objection of consequentialism is that terrorist acts against innocent victims are
justified because of moral defense put up by terrorists. Terrorism cannot be strictly
judged by its consequences because it is wrong intrinsically for the fact that it is a
violation of basic rights and a gross injustice. Actions should be judged by their

I

consequences. In bringing hope, popular recognition, and ultimately relief to the
plight of a group, terrorism is aimed at laudable objectives and can achieve
sufficient good to outweigh the evil of its methods. The end does not justify the
means. The consequences of any action are by no means clear. The success of
terrorism is not guaranteed; it is an immoral gamble to kill people in the hope of
achieving something else. And even if the goal was realised, the price paid is
literally incalculable.

Non-consequentialist theory is not of the opinion that consequences do not matter,
but that, in addition, other considerations, such as justice and fights matters. Also
that some acts or lines of action are right or wrong themselves, independently of
their consequences. From their point of view, terrorism does appear as never, or
hardly ever, morally justified. 125

124
125
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Two central non-consequentialist objections to moral justification are: firstly,
terrorism violates the fundamental moral principle of respect for persons. This
principle of respect for persons can be interpreted in three ways; it enjoins respect
for the core of individuality of each and every person, a concern for seeing things
from the point of view of the other person, in terms of her character or "ground
project." This is opposite of the impersonal, objective, calculating way in which
terrorists consider, and treat, their victims. On another interpretation, respect for
persons demands recognition and respect for certain basic human rights of every
human being, which safeguard a certain area of personal freedom. Persons are to be
respected as holders of rights. Terrorists cannot show this type ofrespect. 126

On a third interpretation, showing respect for persons can be understood as not
treating individuals as mere means.

The second maJor non-consequentialist objection to terrorism is basic moral
distinction which is the distinction between responsibility and lack of it, or between
guilt and innocence. Its import is that hostile treatment of another human being
must be justified by the fact that the person is responsible for some wrongdoing
whose gravity is proportionate to the gravity of the response. Those who are not
responsible for such wrongdoing should not be subjected to hostile treatment, and in
particular must not be subjected to violence. 127
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All human beings are immune to start with; our right not to be attacked is a feature
of normal human relationships." 128 Yet, terrorists deliberately attack, kill, and
otherwise severely harm innocent people; thus, the aim of intimidation and coercion
they seek to achieve in this way, makes them terrorists. Terrorism is not wrong
because it has bad consequences (on balance), and accordingly only insofar as it has
such consequences. It is rather wrong in itself, because of what it is. Moreover, it is
extremely morally wrong in itself.

I
Igor rejects the consequentialist v1ew that terrorism is justified whenever its
consequences are good (on balance), and gave two conditions under which
terrorism may be justified. In certain extreme, terrorist acts may be defended on
account of the moral disaster they prevent or stop. The two conditions are: (a) in the
face of a moral disaster, understood in a special, highly restrictive sense as an
imminent threat of extermination or ethnic cleansing of an entire people; and (b)
when there are good reasons to believe that terrorism is indeed the only method
available and likely to succeed in preventing the disaster, stopping it in its tracks, or
. a w1'de range o f'1ts consequences. 129
reversmg

Some scholars also argue that, it is legitimate and justified in extreme cases to resort
to terrorism when peaceful and democratic methods have been exhausted. In cases
of repression and suffering, with an implacably oppressive state and no obvious
possibility of international relief, it is sometimes necessary to resort to violence to
128
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defend one's people and pursue one's cause. Therefore, terrorism is justified by its
success in achieving results when peaceful means have failed.

Some moral prohibitions are central to our moral experience, so deeply entrenched
in it, that they "function in our moral thinking as a sort of touchstone of moral and
intellectual health." 130 Accordingly, the suspension of such a prohibition would
"bring about an upheaval in the moral perspective." Its rejection would lead to "an
imbalance and incoherence in moral thought and practice." 131 The prohibition of
deliberately killing and maiming innocent people, against which the terrorist
offends, is one such prohibition. Therefore, rejection of terrorism ought to be
absolute. Igor concludes by saying that the correct position on the morality of
terrorism, is that terrorism is almost absolutely wrong. 132

Another interesting v1ew on justification of terrorism, apart from moral
justification, is the issue of freedom fighters. It is argued that, terrorism can be
justified on the ground of freedom fighters employing terrorism as a method of
securing the liberation. Terrorist groups normally group themselves as National
Liberation Movement Fighters against social, Economic, Religious, or Imperialist
operation, or any combination of these. 133
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Those who think that terrorists are freedom fighters may be right, but they fail to
acknowledge the fact that some of these freedom fighters commit terrorist acts,
thereby becoming terrorists. It is important to point out again that freedom fighters
fight for freedom, but terrorists commit acts of terror. Obviously, freedom fighters
and terrorists do exactly the same thing, 'fight'. How can one justify whether the
cause is good or bad in order to deduce a terrorist act from that of freedom fighter.
According to Hafiz al-Asad, former president of Syria,

I

"a terrorist is a mercenary who is motivated by
desire to kill, while those who struggle are
freedom fighters who have a cause, in defense
of which they exert all their spiritual and
• l ert£or{s " . J34
materza
11

The Arab reality of terrorism and its ability to act under the guise of freedom fighter
negates regional responsibility of terrorists acts, which are aimed at colonial, and
interventionist forces. Sheik Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah said that "they do not
see themselves as terrorists because they do not believe in terrorism, they see
themselves as mujihadeen who fight a holy war for the people". 135 Some people
support what they think is right and will not tag it as terrorist acts, just as one man's
fight is another man's terrorist. The difference is that we might support some causes
and not others because we see them as morally virtuous or vices.

The utilization of the term 'terrorism' is then a moral judgement; and if one party
can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly
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persuaded others to adopt its moral view point. 136 Terrorists do have a mind and
they honestly believe they are pursuing their cause in a justified way. Therefore,
they will do anything humanly possible to obtain their aim, even if it leads to
civilians' death and widespread destruction.

Terrorism is not the monopoly of enemies of freedom. Indeed, many national
liberation movements have made use of terrorism, whether occasionally or in a

I

more systematic way; the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algiers ... 137 This
is in line with the mainstream view in just war theory: one does not lose one's
immunity against acts of war only by fighting in an unjust war, but rather by
fighting in any war. 138

The killing of innocent people in the unjust war is also justified on the ground that
they are not innocent because they are either directly or indirectly responsible for
the appointment or approval of the 'target', whom the terrorists aims to fight. Igor
gave some examples of such incidents as follows: Emile Henry was a French
anarchist who lived in the nineteenth century, but engaged in terrorism of the
twentieth-century type. He planted a bomb at the office of a mining company
which, had it gone off, would probably have killed or maimed a number of people
who were not party to the company's wrongdoings and merely happened to live in
the same building. He also planted a bomb in a cafe that did go off, injuring twenty
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people, one of whom later died of his injuries. When explaining his actions in court,
he said:
"What about the innocent victims? ... The building
where the Carmaux Company had its offices
was inhabited only by bourgeois; hence there
would be no innocent victims. The whole of the
bourgeoisies lives by the exploitation of the
d h ld expzate
. zts
. crzmes
.
un,£
together. " 139
1 ortunate, an s ou
"Those good bourgeois who .... reap their
dividends and live idly on the profits of the workers'
toil, they also must take their share in the reprisals.
And not only they, but all those who are satisfied
with the existing order. who applaud the acts of
the government and so become its accomplices ...
in other words, the daily clientele of terminus and
the other grea t ca1,.{"es. ,/40
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This goes in line with the view of responsibility and liability, justifying that there is
nothing like innocent citizens in terrorist attacks. It says that all members of a social
class-men and women, young and old, adults and children are liable to be killed or
maimed. Some are guilty of operating the system of exploitation, others of
benefiting from this exploitation, and still others of supporting the system. 141

Another example is provided by Osama bin Laden in an interview in the aftermath
of the attacks on September 11, 2001, where he said: "The American people should
remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their
president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Isreal, which
they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a
committee that represents the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the
139
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American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the
atrocities that it is committing against Muslims". 142

The conceptually and morally decisive trait of terrorism is that it is violence against
the innocent; that is, violence against those who, on any credible understanding of
responsibility and liability, are not responsible, or not responsible enough, for the
real or alleged injustice or suffering the terrorist fights against. Given this

I

understanding of responsibility and liability, the victims of terrorist violence will
not be found innocent from the terrorist's own point of view.

143

Considering, this moral (religious) justification of terrorism, the God Almighty, or
Allah (as popularly called by Muslims) will never command anybody to kill another
in His name or in the name of worshiping Him. One of His ten commandments is
that "Thou shall not kill" 144 It is not justifiable in all ramifications that men should
be fighting for God by killing innocent people. God is so magnificent for mere
mortals to fight for Him. Since He is all knowing and all powerful, He knows how
best to fight His battles.

Some scholars approach the question of justification of terrorism through 'Just War
theory. The just war theory inquires into (i) the possible moral grounds for going to
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war which is Jus Ad Bellum and (ii) the manner in which a just war must be carried
out or fought, which is Jus In Bello.

Terrorism is almost universally condemned, whereas violence by states, even when
war has not been declared, is seen as legitimate, if not always justified. 145 For rules
in jus ad bellum to be applicable in a just war, the following conditions must be
present, (1) Just cause, (2) Right intention, (3) Competent authority Public

I

declaration, (4) Last resort, (5) proportionality and (6) probability of success.

A state is deemed to have a just cause when it defends itself against aggression. 146
The just war theory holds that the state has a right to defend itself against the
aggression of other states. 147 The states's moral status is a derivative and not
foundational. It is derivative of the individuals within it. The right that is usually
cited as being the ground for the state's right to defend itself is the right of self
determination. 148

Under some circumstances, some groups enjoy a right to self determination. The
circumstances may include and, or limited to cases of injustice towards the
group. 149 The right may be enjoyed by nations only or by any group within the
territory. It may be that the right of self determination does not automatically grant
a right to political independence, but if some form of self determination cannot be
145
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realized within an existing state, then it can, under these circumstances grant such a
right. 150Groups other than those constituted by the state in which they live can have
a just cause to defend their right to self-determination. 151

The UN definition of 'just cause' recognizes the rights of peoples as well as states.
In Article 7 of the definition of aggression, the UN refers to "the right of self
determination, freedom and independence", as derived from the Charter of peoples
being forcibly deprived of that right. So, both morally and legally, peoples or
nations enjoy right to self determination and when that right is frustrated, they have
the same just cause that states have when the self determination of their citizens is
threatened. 152

Normally, under the just war theory, A state may go to war only if the decision has
been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper process, and made
public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). 153

It therefore, follows that once it is acknowledged that stateless peoples may have

right to self determination, it would render that right otiose to deny that the right
could be defended and vindicated by some non-state entity. 154
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A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its own just cause and can
only resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to
resolving the conflict in question. 155 The condition of probability of success under
the just war theory must needs to be satisfied. If one judges that the end has little
chance of being achieved through violence, the criterion requires that the violence
not be commenced. 156 A state may not resort to war if it can reasonably predict that
doing so will have no measurable impact in achieving the goal of the just cause as

I

required by just war theory's condition ofproportionality. 157

Applying these conditions of jus ad bellum in the present situations, terrorism can
be said to meet some of the conditions, such as just cause, in a situation of radical
self- defense. It may also satisfy the conditions of proportionality and last resort
given that the aggression is unjustified and that standard measures of self-defense
have been tried and failed. 158

But what about the other conditions of jus ad bellum? Andrew Valls is of the
opinion that if modem warfare is sometimes justified, terrorism, in which the
violence is usually on a far smaller scale, can be justified as well. 159

Under the jus in bello, the following conditions are applicable: (1) Proportionality,
(2) Discrimination, (3) Legitimate means and (4) Benevolent Quarantine for POWs.
155
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Unlike the proportionality condition under the jus ad bellum discussed supra, this
proportionality requirement is applied to particular acts within the war. It forbids
conducting the war in such a way that it involves inordinate costs, costs that are
disproportionate to the gains. 160

How will this condition be satisfied by terrorist in order to defend their act? Andrew
Vails argues that, terrorist acts cannot satisfy this condition. Given that the scale of

I

deaths and destruction usually involved in terrorist acts pales in comparison with
that involved in wars commonly thought to be just, it would seem that terrorism
would satisfy this requirement more easily than war (assuming the goods to be
achieved are not dissimilar). So if the means of terrorism is what places it beyond
the

moral

pale

for

many

people,

it is

probably not

because

of its

.
. 1.1ty. 161
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The principle of discrimination holds that Non-combatants should be immune from
attack. However, there is some disagreement as to the moral basis of this
distinction, which creates disagreement as to where exactly this line should be
drawn. While usually based on the notion of moral innocence, non-combatant status
can be said to have little to do with innocence, for often combatants are conscripts,
while those truly responsible for aggression are usually practically, not liable to
attack. 162
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The legitimate means condition ofjus in bello requires that there should be no use
of evil weapons methods, such as rape, genocide and so on. Also prisoners of war
must be treated humanely. While others argue that, there are situations in which it is
morally justified, if not legally. Having laws against use of violence is of course
eminently sensible, but laws can only be deemed legitimate if they serve to protect
everybody, not simply the government itself or a favoured majority. Rebels who use
illegal violence against the police or military in a dictatorship might be morally and
politically justified as a last resort.

I

Andrew Vails concludes that if war can be justified, then terrorism can be as
well. 163 While terrorism often fails to be morally justified, this failure is contigent,
not necessary. Terrorism cannot be defined into a moral comer where we do not
have to worry any more about justification. 164

Another justification of terrorism is that it attracts government's attention. Some
argue that terrorism is justified on the ground that it is the best way to attract the
government's attention if they want to achieve their aim, when the government
ignore them. Though, it may be admitted that, terrorism can raise the profile of a
neglected cause; example, the hi-jackings of the 1970s and 1980s brought publicity
to the Palestinian cause, helping to bring it to the attention of the world.
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But, whatever approach these scholars had tried to justify terrorism, they always
arrive at the conclusion that it can never be justified, after much analysis. How can
terrorism be justified when it deprives people of their basic fundamental human
rights? No one has a right, legally, morally or otherwise to kill and, or destroy
another's property.

2.3. TERRORISM AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

I
Whether the actors are characterized as terrorists or freedom fighters, regardless of
justification or moral equivalence, the acts themselves, directly or indirectly, results
in attacks on human rights. Frequently, the counter-terrorism response is equally
damaging. 165

Absence of universal definition of terrorism has gravely affected the effectiveness
of countering terrorism both in international law and domestic law and at the same
time maintaining and abiding by the human rights obligations.

International criminal law often prohibits conduct which infringes values protected
by human rights law, without proclaiming those values directly. Numerous
resolutions of General Assembly since 1970's and the UN Commision on Human
Rights since the 1990's have asserted that terrorism threatens or destroys
fundamental human rights and freedoms. 166
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The ultimate goal of law is to maintain justice by facilitating human dignity and
worth, while defining substantive aspects of rights and duties of individuals and
nations in the international legal context. 167

One of the AU's primary concerns for combating terrorism is that terrorism violates
basic human rights, particularly freedom of expression, freedom from fear, the right
to life, right to development, the right to practice religion and the right to security.
Terrorism also stands on the way of the aspirations of African peoples, particularly
those envisaged in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and in other
continental common frameworks. In adopting the 1999 Algers Convention, African
Leaders were convinced that terrorism constitutes a serious violation of human
rights, such as the right to physical intergrity, life, freedom and security. 168

The members of the Security Council, while commenting on the terrorist attack in
Somalia, reminded States that they must ensure strict adherence to their obligations
under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and
humanitarian law. 169

In as much as human rights and humanitarian laws are also necessary in terrorism
cases, regardless, priority should be given to social stability, than securing an
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individual's right at a very critical moment, especially when the individual is the
perpetrator of the terrorist act.

Human Right Law (HRL) is applicable at all times, including during armed
conflicts, while International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is applicable only during
armed conflict. The two bodies of law, while complementary in some respects,
often conflict with each other. 170 IHL developed to address war between states-

I

international armed conflicts. However, by Common Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions, basic protections have been extended to situations of noninternational-armed conflict, that is, where one of the parties is not a state. These
protections were developed under Additional Protocol II of 1977. 171

Through the United Nations, many resolutions have expressed the international
community's opinion that terrorism is repugnant because it (1) seriously
undermines human rights; (2) jeopardizes political order and peaceful deliberative
politics and (3) can threaten international peace and security. 172 Kalliopi Koufa, the
Special Rapporteur for the U.N sub-Commission on the promotion and protection
of Human Rights (Special Rapporteur) has stated, "There is probably not a single
human right exempt from the impact of terrorism." Not only do terrorist groups
deprive individuals of their human rights, they drive states to take counter-terrorism

170

Natasha Balendra. Defining Armed Conflict. 29 CDZLR 2461 at 2.
See International Council on Human Rights. Talking about terrorism risks and choices for human
rirhts organisations, at 30.The report can be found at www.ichrp.org/files/reports/35/129 report en.pdf
17
Ben Saul. Supra note 65.
171

67

measures, which also serve to denigrate human rights. Thus, the pervasive impact of
terrorism to human rights can be seen both directly and indirectly. 173

The direct impact of terrorism is clearly illustrated by its immediate consequences.
These consequences usually fall into three categories of violations: the right to "life,
liberty, and dignity of human individual; the right to a democratic society; and ...
rights relating to social peace and public order." 174

I

Terrorist acts include, but not limited to, murder, kidnapping, and seriously injuring
innocent parties, which all deny victims their human rights to life, liberty, and
dignity. Terrorists seek to impose their will not only on states but also upon the
individuals in those states. 175 The unwillingness of terrorists to submit to the
democratic process and their attempts to thwart or disrupt that process are attempts
to overthrow the democratic rights of the individuals in that state. The actions of
terrorists not only deprive individuals of their rights to life, liberty, dignity, and
democracy, but also foster an atmosphere of fear and dread that devastate social
peace and public order. In this atmosphere, countermeasures and other precautions,
which are perceived as safeguards, impede the essential functions of the social order
and lead to inefficiency, lower standards of living, mutual distrust, and a fearful,
brutish lifestyle. 176
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The indirect impact of terrorism sterns from overly intrusive, reactionary, counterterrorist measures. Terrorist acts frequently provoke states into overreacting by
implementing serious breaches of human rights and freedoms. 177 Moreover, it
should be remembered that an equitable maxim states that 'whoever comes into
equity must come with clean hands'; therefore terrorists have no equitable
justification of claiming breach of their fundamental right in combating their acts.

I

Within the military paradigm, provisions of military aids to nations with a common
goal of eradicating terrorism is a valid practice for developing states preventive
capacity, but not if the aid is to be used to perpetrate greater human rights abuses

. 1ate greater resentment. 178
and st1rnu

2.3.1. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS.

The fight against terrorism is no longer a domestic criminal matter, but a global
human rights issue. 179 In 1993, the Vienna Declaration served a junction between
international counter-terrorist law and human rights law. Paragraph 17 of the
Vienna Declaration explicitly linked terrorism with human rights and reflected
emerging acceptance of greater international scrutiny and state responsibility. 180
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In addition to dramatic advances in human rights law, this emerging worldview
recognizes terrorism as an international scourge against human rights and allows for
a global response that imposes greater scrutiny and state responsibility.
Unfortunately, the domestic response to terrorism has been largely based on the law
enforcement and military models, frequently at the cost of human rights. 181

In contrast, Article 27 of the Convention of the Islamic Resistance Movement,

I
I

Hamas states, "We will become its soldiers and fuel for its fire that will bum the
enemies." 182 Therein lies the dichotomy; one side possesses unprecedented power
and wealth that it refuses to relinquish, whereas the other possesses the desperation
of peoples with nothing left to lose, and where compromise equals death. In this
postmodern lion's den, it is understandable how consensus has eluded the United
Nations. 183

The UN counter-terrorist activity resulted from the remarkable world conference on
human rights of Vienna Declaration of 1993. Paragraph 17 of the Vienna
Declaration explicitly asserted the link between terrorism and human rights for the
first time by affirming that terrorist acts "aim at the destruction of human rights,
fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of
states and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments." 184 This assertion
mandates that terrorism is a political and international issue and no longer merely a
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domestic criminal matter. Some of the conventions and resolutions ratified during
this period reflect a more sophisticated approach to terrorism, such as the
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism and the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing ofTerrorism. 185

Notable development during this period was the proliferation of conventions
adopted by the regional orga.'lizations in developing area, such as the League of

I

Arab States and the OAU, now known as the African Union (AU) . The
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) is one of the few treaties to specifically
address the act of assassination. Article 4 recognizes a number of principles,
including provision for "respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and
rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive
activities." The impact ofthe Constitutive Act of the AU is limited, however, by the
relatively small number of AU member states, and the fact that it is currently the
only regional treaty that specifically addresses acts of assassination. 186

But discourse on counter terrorism and human rights have become more interesting
since the establishment of Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) in Security Council
resolution 1373, 2001. The Security Council Resolution 1456, 2003 and later
resolutions, stated that "States must ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism must comply with all their obligations under International Law and should
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adopt such measures in accordance with International Law, particularly
International Human Rights, Refugee and Humanitarian Law".

After the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council passed Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and
the General Assembly adopted Resolution A/56/1. Resolutions 1368 and 1373
designated acts of international terrorism threats to international peace and security
as defined in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Articles 41 and 42 of that Charter

I

authorize the Security Council to call on states to severe diplomatic ties, to impose
economic sanctions, and to intervene militarily in response to threats to the peace.
In addition, Resolution 1368 stresses the responsibility of states that host terrorist
organizations, stating,
"Those responsible for aiding, supporting or
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and
sponsors of these acts will be held accountable ... "

Resolution 1373, 2001's Preamble, reaffirms the need to combat by all means, "in
accordance with the Charter of lJN" threats and International peace and security
caused by terrorist acts.

Security Council Resolution 1963, 2010, re-emphasis that counter-terrorism
measures are more effective when there is respect for human rights. The resolution
also emphasizes that respect for rule of law is necessary for effective combating of
terrorism. 187 While categorically condemning terrorism and recognizing the duty of
States to protect those living within their jurisdictions from terrorism, the UN has
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placed a priority on the question of protecting human rights in the context of
counter-terrorism measures. 188

Any measure taken to counter terrorism must be equal to our democratic value. In
particular, laws designed to protect people from the threat of terrorism and
enforcement of these laws must be compatible with people's right and freedom. 189

I

It is essential to note that, although, immediately after September 11, 2001,

emergency laws were passed which allowed for the indefinite detention of foreign
nationals who were suspected of being terrorists without arraignment or conviction
of the crime, but following the Counter review, most of such laws had been
scraped. 190

The human rights activists opines that most state governments hide under the cloak
of combating terrorism and infringe on people's fundamental human rights, more
especially for their political gains. Usually, members of the opposing political party
are often denied their fundamental rights to freedom of speech and freedom of
movement. This scenario can be clearly seen in the issue of Ethiopian journalists'
trials that are subject of discussion for the human right activists.

Terrorist acts constitute grave violations of human rights. Our responses to
terrorism, as well as our efforts to thwart it and prevent it should uphold the human
188
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rights that terrorists aim to destroy. Human rights, fundamental freedoms and the
rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism; not privileges to be
sacrificed at a time of tension.

Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, opined
that in the long run, "a commitment to uphold respect for human rights and rule of
law will be one of the keys to success in countering terrorism, not an impediment

I

blocking our way." 191 These observations suggest that rather than fall victim to
terrorism, human rights should be used affirmatively to conquer it. 192

In 2004, the High- level panel proffered "a new vision of collective security for the
21st century" in a report that included 101 recommendations for revitalizing the

United Nations in order to make it capable of addressing modem threats and how to
combat it without infringing on human's right. The key recommendations were
contained in Secretary General's keynote speech at the International Summit on
Democracy, Terrorism, and Security on March 10, 2005, in his article of five
strategies, which he called the "five D's."

The five D's are shared into 3 models. The first model, military intervention in
response to terrorist acts or imminent threat, is grounded in Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations. Law enforcement, the second model, is grounded in
international criminal law and extant core anti-terrorism conventions. The third
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model, human rights, consists primarily of preventive measures and is grounded in
applicable international and humanitarian law, as well as human rights conventions
and jurisprudence. It addresses the causes of terrorism in order to "dissuade the
disaffected from choosing terrorist tactics" and "defend human rights in the struggle
against the scourge of terror." The High level Panel specifies numerous social and
political justice issues, past grievances, and poverty issues that must be addressed in
order to foster a new sense of tolerance in communities currently given to

I

extremism. 193

A human rights approach consists of a two-part initiative: stand-alone and
integrated. The first initiative, a stand-alone approach, is designed to relieve the
underlying suffering that foster terrorism. The second initiative, an integrated
approach, calls for establishing human rights norms as an integral component in the
other two models. To be effective, the law enforcement and military models must
place primacy on human rights norms or the reaction to these models will multiply
resistance.

The 3 models of the five D's depend on each other for its effectiveness. Each model
cannot stand alone on its own. Each model is less effective by itself; alone, the
military model lacks prevention and moral certainty, the law enforcement model
lacks strength to act globally against state-sponsored terrorism, and the human
rights model lacks enforcement capability. 194 The human rights model implied by
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the High-level Panel's recommendation increase the effectiveness of the other
models and represents a break from traditional counter-terrorism policy. It does so
by ensuring that both law enforcement and military actions are performed in
accordance with accepted human rights norms, thus limiting the negative
consequences. 195 Conscientious and compassionate performance of duty by law
enforcement and military personnel helps to avoid the conditions that promote
terrorist recruitment. Because the integrated human rights initiative not only

I

engenders more widespread human rights practices, but also serves to defuse anger
and prevent the resort to extremism, it is integral to the struggle against terrorism. 196

Kofi Annan, Secretary General, said that, "While we certainly need vigilance to
prevent acts of terrorism,... it will be self-defeating if we sacrifice other key
priorities, such as, human rights in the process. 197

The United Nations has recognized that the solution to terrorism is more complex
than an artificial prohibition and the use of a military or law enforcement approach.
The High-level Panel's observation and recommendations make this recognition
apparent. Terrorism is a human rights issue, and the model for a solution should be
grounded in a human rights approach using human rights techniques, sensitivities,
and jurisprudence. 198 Terrorism has a tremendous effect on human rights, both
directly and indirectly and thus, the moral, if not legal, jurisdiction of the human
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rights mechanism is manifest. Without a counter-terrorism solution grounded in
human rights, the cure will result in greater depravation of civil liberties and in a
Pandora's Box of atrocities. Developments in the "war on terror" support this
prediction. 199

Additionally, a human rights approach is consistent with the emergmg
understanding that massrve human rights abuses may justify piercing national

I

boundaries. Increased globalization creates a greater ripple effect with respect to
human rights violations. 200 Universal adherence to human rights norms and two
generations of human rights efforts have resulted in increased international scrutiny
and allow for jurisdiction over egregious human rights depravations. The recent
convergence of human rights instruments with counter-terrorism instruments further
cements the link between human rights and terrorism and allows for jurisdiction
over state sponsors of terrorism and the activities of non-state actors. Thus, there is
a legal, intellectual, moral, and historical grounding for human rights approach to
.

counter-terronsm.

201

One of the most sustained critiques of the practice of human rights groups was
made in Algeria during the 1990s, where rights and advocates were felt to have
failed to respond adequately to massive abuses by armed group. 202 Human rights
organisations are more concerned with the behaviour of the authorities than they are
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with the crimes of the terrorists, and they fail to acknowledge that states have
legitimate security concems.

203

A subordinate criticism is that human rights

organisations are obsessed by government and by government abuses of power.
This blinds them to the fact that states have a clear duty to protect the security of
those living within their jurisdiction and also play an essential role in protecting
rights and freedoms. 204

When democracies fight terrorism, they are defending the proposition that their
political life should be free of violence. But defeating terror requires violence. It
may also require coercion, secrecy, deception, even violation of rights. How can
democracies resort to these means without destroying the values for which they
stand? ... 205 But thinking about lesser evils is unavoidable. Sticking too firmly to the
rule of law simply allows terrorists too much leeway to exploit our freedoms.
Abandoning the rule of law altogether betrays our most valued institutions?06

Resolutions 13 73 and 1624 both implicitly give fighting terrorism precedence over
protecting human rights. Resolutions 1373 contains no language recalling states'
human rights obligations and Sir Jeremy Green-stock, the first chairman of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee created to monitor compliance with the resolution,
initially made statements to the effect that making sure states continued to meet
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their obligations under international human rights conventions while implementing
the resolution was beyond the Committee's mandate? 07 The UN Security Council
has recently, mandated that Boko Haram should be held accountable for what may
amount to crimes against humanity and hinted at sanctions against the Islamist
extremists. The statement approved by all 15 council members was the strongest by
the UN' s most powerful body on terrorist attacks in Nigeria. The above statement
obviously shows that, the Boko Haram' s act in Nigeria is also against the

I
I

infringement of human rights. In such a situation for instance, why would
combating Boko Haram be in adherence to human right while, they already violated
same?08

From the above analyses, it is safer to combat terrorism by all means, rather than
adhere strictly to the human rights law. Many of the terrorist movements that have
recently emerged are influenced by ideological assumptions that differ markedly
from those governing the conduct of states, or those that inspire human rights
law? 09 Human rights groups have experience of trying to influence the behaviour of
non-state armed groups unlike most of these terrorist groups that are not aware of
human rights. Their organisational structure is less compatible with models of
human rights accountability. 210If there is seriously and genuinely concern about
human rights, civil liberties and fundamental freedoms, priority is to be given to the
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eradication ofthe root causes ofterrorism. 211 "Terrorists" themselves are in breach
of the said human rights when they deprive innocent people of their fundamental
human rights. Strict application of human rights law will not be effective m
combating terrorism. Equal or higher force measures should be applicable m
combating terrorists' attacks. Therefore, human rights should not be prioritized over
combating terrorism. Securing social stability of a State should always be
paramount over securing an individual's fundamental human right when they do not

I

even equitably deserve it.

2.4. THE IMPACT OF WAR ON TERROR ON AFRICA STATES AND
THEIR SECURITY.

Africa has experienced various forms of terrorist acts. The 1998 embassy bombings
in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, which killed over 240 Africans
and several thousands of others injured, remains the major act of terrorism in the
continent. 212 And it is not as if the continent had not been doing anything to combat
terrorism.

The increasing spread of extremism in Africa is the result of the socio-political
ferment born out of poor socio- economic conditions, which has characterized
African countries ever since independence. African countries are confronted by
corruption, worsening these conditions are their government's inability to deal with
211
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extremism. These conditions made African regimes unable to offer solutions to
every-day socio-economic conditions, again contributing to instability? 13

Terrorism has legal implications and serious impact on African countries. It has
complicated their relations with neighbouring countries, forcing upon the former an
agenda that may not always be compatible with regional peace and stability. 214

I

Terrorists have damaged infrastructure. Not only do they create anxiety in a
targeted audience, but also disrupt the economy. Terrorists hope that economic
costs when combined with human losses from economic-damaging attacks will
pressure besieged governments to concede to their political demands. 215 Evaluating
the cost of terrorism in terms of loss to human life; international acts of terrorism,
Africa recorded 5932 casualties out of 194 acts of terrorism between 1995 to 2001,
making Africa the second continent after Asia, with the most casualties. Direct
costs, in terms of devastation to infrastructure and indirect costs, through the
withdrawal of investors and tourism, one of Africa's biggest industries cannot be
calculated. 216

Terrorism negatively influences a targeted country's economic growth through a
number of channels: First, foreign investors will not be at peace investing in a
terrorist country, they will rather divert their investments to a safer country. There
213
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are grounds for anticipating that transnational terrorism will be more detrimental
than domestic terrorism on growth. When a terrorist event kills a foreigner or
destroys property, there is a greater chance that this will negatively impact foreign
assistance and, or foreign direct investment, which then reduces growth. Terrorists
deliberately target assets to affect the country's economy adversely. 217

Second, augmented security outlays by a targeted government may crowd out

I

productive public and private investment. Third, terrorist attacks may dampen
growth by destroying or degrading social overhead capital that facilitates commerce
and daily routines. Disruption to transportation, communication, and electricity
infrastructure may have short- term dire economic consequences. 218

Consequently, Terrorist attacks in Africa have the potential to disrupt crucial supply
lines to the industrial world, especially Nigeria, in West Africa that has rich crude
oil growth. 219

Summarily, terrorism has led to large-scale political and social destabilization in
gee-strategically sensitive regions; the impossibility of sustainable social and
economic development; new divisions of society and political systems-internally
and externally along religious, racial, ethnic lines; economic deprivation of the
masses in the affected regions; marginalization of existing international structures.
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It also has serious impact on the sovereignty of states and citizens alike, on national
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Both terrorism and internal and external conflicts adversely affect income per capita
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growth m
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2.4.1. SOME TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES
UNDER REVIEW.

Africa is now a known continent for war on terrorism, since after 9/11. Sudan and
Somalia are perceived as breeding ground for terrorists.

222

But before 9111, despite

the bombing of US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya on August, 1998 that killed two
hundred and thirteen (213) people, twelve (12) out of the 213 people were US
citizens, as well as bombing of the same US Embassy in Dar Es Salaam Tanzania
that killed 11 people223 , terrorism was not seen as a major threat to African's
security.

In June, 1995, some members of an Islamic Brotherhood allegedly originating in
Egypt tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The
weapons used in the assassination attempt were flown into Ethiopia by Sudan
Airways. According to a UN report, the passports used by the terrorists were also
220
221
222
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prepared in Khartoum? 24 Ethiopian Security forces killed five (5) of the failed
assassins and captured three. Sudan refused to hand over the remaining terrorists
when Ethiopia tried to secure their extradition per bilateral diplomatic channels in
. them to JUStice.
. . 225
order to brmg

Ethiopia took the case to UN Security Council. The UN Security Council passed
three resolutions demanding the extradition of the three suspects to Ethiopia, yet,

I

they did not comply. In April 1996, the UN Security Council imposed series of
sanctions on the government of the Sudan. 226 The sanction was lifted in September
2001.

Today, Africa rates as one of the major significant area in war of terrorism. Hom of
Africa States and some sub-Sahel States of Africa are the major concerns of these
terrorist activities.

Three mam notorious terrorist groups m operation in Africa are the different
Islamic sects known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Meghreb, Boko-Haram and AIShabaab. There are also other Islamic extremists that claim affiliation to either of
these groups. Each asserts its justification for terrorizing the states in the name of
'religion'. The havocs that had been caused and are still causing by these groups in
different countries of Africa cannot be undermined. This Islamic resurgence is, in

!d.
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essence, a response to the confusion and anxiety of modernity and can be described
as a socio-political resistance movement based on religious concepts. 227

2.4.1.1. ETHIOPIA:

The Islamic extremism in Ethiopia is mainly found in the Ogaden area in Eastern
Ethiopia, among the groups of Somali and Oromo. Tribes resorted to terrorism and
harassment against government targets and against civilians in the Ogaden area,

I

preventing the orderly implementation of government in the area. Most radical
Islamic activities in Ethiopia are being carried out by the following three
organizations: Al-Itihad Al-Islami, whose origin and major infrastructure are in
Somalia; The Islamic Liberation Front of Oromo (ILFO), its primary objective is
self-determination for the Oromo and for transformation of Oromia to an Islamic
State; and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which is considered to
be a relatively moderate Islamic movement. The latter, however, formed a militant
c:
•
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In October 2000 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) formally
announced the reunification of the Islamic Liberation Front of Oromo (ILFO), the
Oromo Liberation Council (OLC), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Oromo
People's Liberation Organization (OPLO) and the United Oromo People's

227
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Liberation Front (UOPLF), and the formation of the joint United Liberation Front
of Oromiya (ULF0)?29

In 2007, five (5) Europeans and thirteen (13) Ethiopians were kidnapped in Afar.
Ethiopia accused Eritrea of masterminding that kidnapping, but Eritrea blamed an
Ethiopian rebel group. All of those hostages were released, though some of the
Ethiopians were held more than a month. 230

I
There had been burning of more than fifty-nine (59) churches and displacement of
three thousand (3,000) Christians in Ethiopia. On March 2, 2011, the Muslim
youths attacked the community around Asendabo, near the capital of Ethiopia,
Addis Ababa and killed one (I) Christian. The prime minister blamed the incidence
on Muslim. He said that "elements of Kaiwarja sects and other extremists" had been
preaching religious intolerance. 231

In January 2012, gunmen attacked a group of European Tourists in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, killing five (5), wounding two (2) and kidnapping two (2). Two (2)
Germans, two Hungarian and an Australian are the five (5) tourists that were shot.
The Ethiopian government called the attack "an act of open terrorism" and said the
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gunmen carne from neighboring country, Eritrea. Eritrea government refuted this
claim by saying that it was Ethiopians' internal problern. 232

In mid October 2013, suspected Al-shabaab members in Addis Ababa tried to carry
out terror attack against Ethiopian fans who were gathered to watch World Cup
qualifier against Nigeria. However, their bomb blew up while they were making it
killing two (2) of them. The victims were Somalia citizens. Police then took three
(3) suspects into the custody_233

There is also the presence of Al-lttihad al Islarniya (AlAI) terrorist organization in
Ethiopia. In the mid 1990's, this group initiated several attacks against Ethiopian
Security forces in Ethiopia and Ethiopian government fought them back. 234

2.4.1.2. SOMALIA:
Somalia's Muslim population is predominantly moderate, but since the breakdown
of state authority with the fall of Mohammed Siad Barre's regime in January, 1991
and the political void that it created, an opportunity has been presented to Islamic
extremists to step up their activities. Radical Islamic organizations, which had
previously operated in a limited and clandestine manner, began to function in the
open. These organizations favour the spread of Islam, the conversion of Somalia
into an Islamic Republic and support a stricter observance of Islamic law known as
232
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'Shari'a' as a means of instilling some form of law and order. 235 Therefore, the
origin of terrorism in Somalia started from political instability in the country, which
gave birth to lack of recognised governance and the emergence of different
. the same country. 236
governments m

Somalia has played specialized roles in the activities of Islamic terrorism?37 It has
primarily served as a transit point for the movement of people and materials through
their unsecured and corrupt boarder between Somalia and Kenya, which has been a
. o f terronst
. attac k .238
pre f'erre d s1te

Al-lttihad Al Islamiya (AlAI), which is based in Somalia, and indigenous local
groups including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), 239 the militant wing of the
Ogden Liberation Front and now quiescent Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Oromo had carried out kidnappings, assassination attempts, mining of roads and
bombing of bars, hotels and public buildings. 240 AlAI distinguished itself by its
development of an armed force and its focus on recruiting urban semi-educated
youth. It also had plans to establish both a national and regional network including
the Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia. It was responsible for several bombing
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attacks in Ethiopia and Somalia. The state labelled AlAI a terrorist organization in
1996. 241

AlAI's political platform is the imposition of an Islamic government in all
Somalia-inhabited zones of the region, including Eastern Ethiopia. AlAI's aim is to
integrate into local communities to avoid presenting itself as an easy target. It has
adopted a long term strategy to prepare Somalia for Islamic rule by building up its

I

activities in education, media, judiciary and commerce and has de-emphasized use
of violence as a tactic? 42 Some business owners are suspected of being sympathetic
to members of AlAI. It is also possible that a few of the Islamic charities in Somalia
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Somalia is also home for Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab literally means 'the youth' ?44
Al-Shabaab originated when it began its insurgency in late 2006, in opposition to
Somalia government and it is one of the Africa's most fearsome militant Islamist
groups. It contains much of the southern Somalia and has waged an insurgency
against Somalia's transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters since 2006.

It claims affiliation to Al-Qaeda. 245 The leader of the group is Ahmed Abdi Godane,
known as Sheik Mukhtar Abdirahman Abu Zubeyr. They have been terrorizing the
Somalia public, chopping off hands, stoning people to death and banning
241
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televisions, music and even bars. They are so determined to turn Somalia into
seventieth-century style Islamic State. Their acts caused full blown famine in some
parts of the country and even blocked starving people from fleeing the country. 246
In February, 2008, the United States labelled the group terrorist group. 247

It had claimed responsibility for several suicide attacks, including the February

2009, which killed eleven (11) Burundian soldiers in the deadliest attack on AU

I

peacekeepers since their deployment. And following the lethal U.S attack on Saleh
Ali Nabhan, a top leader of al-Queda, Al-Shabaab launched a suicide attack that
killed seventeen (17) peacekeepers and a number of civilians. 248

In October 4, 2011, an enormous truck bomb was detonated right outside a highly
fortified government compound in one of the few Mogadishu neighbourhoods that
Somalia's transitional government actually controls. Dozens of people, of which
many of them were students, standing around waiting for their results were killed,
sending the signal that Al-Shabaab may be making a comeback after several months
of losing grounds? 49 Two weeks later, Kenya sent hundreds of troops into Southern
Somalia. 250

On 4 April, 2012, The National theatre of Magadishu, where the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) Prime Minister and other government officials were
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attending a meeting was bombed, killing eight (8) people. 251 In 12 September of the
same year, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud survived an attempted assassination
during a press conference with Kenya's foreign minister. Several AMISOM and
TFG were killed in the suicide attack? 52

In January 1, 2014, two car-bombs exploded outside Jazira hotel in Mogadishu,
capital city of Somalia, killing six (6) people and wounding eight (8). The said hotel

I

is often used by foreigners and government officials. Two (2) men who appeared to
be suicide bombers also died in the attack as they were shot by security forces when
tried to force their way into the hotel. 253 It was in this same hotel that an
assassination attempt of Somalia's president took place in September, 2012, on his
second day in office. 254

In February 21, 2014, Nine (9) Al-Shabaab militants wearing military fatigues
attacked President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, at presidential residence in
Mogadishu, Somalia. The president was unharmed but two (2) government officials
were killed, the former intelligence commander and an aide to the prime minister.
The attack was in form of car bombs explosion in the compound of president and
prime minister, which ended up killing the whole nine (9) terrorist group that came
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for the attack. 255 Weapons meant for the Somalia army could have been used by the
. the attack .2S6
m1"1"1tants m
·

In May 4, 2014, a remote controlled device was detonated on a crowded street in
Mogadishu, killing six (6) people, including the targeted government officials; and
injuring many. Suffice it to note also that, in the mid-April, two (2) Somali
parliamentarians were killed in separate incidents of shooting and car bombing? 57

I
2.4.1.3. KENYA:

Kenyan government admitted in May, 2003, that a key number of the al Qaeda
terror network was plotting attacks on western targets, confirming al-Qaeda's
presence in Kenya. 258 The trial of four men linked to the bombing of US Embassy
in Kenya, discussed above, revealed a terror network that had grown in Kenya,
because of the poor immigration and security laws. 259 Two thousand (2,000)
members of AlAI, the most powerful radical group in the Hom of Africa, was
funded by Al-Qaeda in the past. 260 Late Osama Bin Laden stated that261 'the 1998
August terrorist bomb which destroyed the US embassy in Kenya and killed more
than two hundred (200) Kenyans was a punishment by Al-Qaeda for Kenya's link
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with the US? 62 Terrorist bombing of Paradise Hotel in Mombasa in 2002 by
members of Al-Qaeda was to punish the country for its link with the Israeli and the
choice of hotel was not accidental because it was being owned by an Israeli. 263

Al-Shabaab staged attacks in Kenya since Nairobi sent troops into Somalia in
October 2011, as mentioned supra, to pursue the group. The bomb blast incidence
of March 31, 2012 at Coastal City, Mombasa in Kenya, killed one (1) person and
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injured thirty one (31 ). The attack was linked to Al-Shabaab terrorist group in
Somalia. 264 Tanzania is also being terrorized by this same Al-Shabaab group in
Somalia.

In September 21, 2013, the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia attacked
Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack lasted for three days. About
sixty two (62) people were killed and many more injured by gun shots.

On 4 May, 2014, bombs simultaneously exploded on two (2) buses travelling on
Thika highway in Nairobi, leaving three (3) dead and sixty-two (62) injured? 65
Before this incidence, there was another incidence of bombing the previous day at
Coastal town of Mombasa, that killed four (4) people. 266
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2.4.1.4. SUDAN:

Sudan was the first African country to become deeply enmeshed in international
terrorism. 267 The main reason for terrorism in Sudan is its geographical location,
insufficient government control and a young Muslim population faced with
inadequate socio-economic conditions, presents a breeding ground for extremism as
well as a transit point for external elements into Africa? 68 The Sudanese
government has used its territory to provide safe haven, training bases and staging

I

areas to numerous terrorist organisations, including Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic
Jihad (EIJ), Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Abu Nidal and
Gama'at al Islamiyya. 269

The country is on the United States of America (US) list of States that sponsor
terrorism, since 1993, because it openly harbored Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda from
1991 to 1996,270 and had been sanctioned by the UN. Most of the terrorist attacks of
the 1990's were linked, directly or otherwise to Sudan. 271

Late Osama Bin Laden lived in Khartoum, Sudan, where he was given authority to
establish twenty-three (23) military training camps and bases of operation. 272 Sudan
had been regarded as a safe haven for terrorist. Three major factors that militate
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against effective combating of terrorism in Sudan are, the country's strategic
location, tolerant environment and porous borders. 273

Also, there are humanitarian crises in Darfur, Sudan. Terrorist groups in operation
in Sudan are Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, The Abu
Nidal Organization, Jamaat Al-Islamiyya and Egypitian Islamic Jihad. 274

I

In September 2, 2010, at the city of Tabra, Janjiweed militia on camels swept
through a market and slaughtered over seventy (70) people including eighteen (18)
children; and in August 23, 2012, at least one (1) person was reported killed when
Arab militia invaded an African refugee camp in Kassab city and raped dozens of
women and injuring twenty (20). Also, in October 28, 2012, the Islamic Republic of
Sudan aerial bombed several Christian villages in Delami city, killing a one (1) year
old baby, injuring nine (9). In November 2, 2012, Janjaweed militia attacked Sigili
village and killed over a dozen residents and injured five (5). Same, in November
17, 2012, three (3) Christian villagers were killed in two targeted bomb attacks by
the Islamic republic.

275

The second time, the US administration said in May 2014, that it was including
Sudan on its list of countries aiding and abetting terrorism including Ugandan
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rebels ofthe Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). 276 The US accused the government in
Khartoum of Harbouring 'multinational foreigner terrorist' bases in Sudan which
serve as logistics centres. It also said that, Sudan is involved in terrorist activities in
Somalia, Mali, Kenya and other parts of the world and that many militants groups
with Sudanese nationals are active members who fought in recent conflicts in West
Africa, Somalia and Afghanistan. 277

Notably, in 2011 South Sudan got its independence. It is one of the least developed
country, and recovering from twenty-two (22) years of civil war.

2.4.1.5. NIGERIA:

Nigeria has been rated as the fifth country with highest terrorist attack of the ten
most countries with terrorist attacks. 278 There are two types of terrorism going on
in Nigeria and they can be best described as: Religious motivated terrorism on
ethnic borders between Muslims and Christians. Kaduna in northern Nigeria forms
the basis of conflict between Christians and Muslims; Economic motivated
terrorism for control of oil reserves, particularly in southern Nigeria, directed
against multi-national corporations, 279 popularly known as 'Niger-Delta crises'.
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Therefore, Nigeria is beset by militant raids in Niger-Delta, by sectarian violence
and by radical Islamist attacks in the Northern part of the country for some years
now. However, these violent activities going on in the country did not make the
country internationally recognized as a terrorist country, but now it is one of the
most focused countries that have terrorist activities going on in it.

The country became more conspicuous as a terrorist country on 25 December,

I

2009, when 'the underwear suicide bomber', Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab280 , a
Nigerian citizen, attempted to explode Northwest Airline 253 en route Amsterdam
to Detroit, Michigan. The fact that the underwear suicide bomber, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab got his terrorist training in Yemen, and links with Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, does not remove Nigeria from the terrorist watch list because he
is a Nigeria citizen.

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab stated, before his sentencing, that "he was proud to
kill in the name of God; today is a day of victory and God is great". He also said
that "Al-Qaeda would one day be victorious" and that acts like his will continue

280
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University. He got his multiple visa entry to US from the US Embassy in United Kingdom in 2008. Later
on in July of2009, he attended University of Wollongong in Dubai and in August the same year, he
attended lman University, known to have links with al-Qaeda. On December 25, 2009, he boarded
Northwest Airline 235 en route Amsterdam to Detroit and attempted to explode the flight with 76 grams
ofpentaerythritol tetra nitrate, plastic explosive sewn in his underwear. He was arrested and arraigned in
the federal High court of Detroit. He pleaded guilty to the charges and convicted of eight counts and
sentenced to life imprisonment on Febuary 16,2012 at Federal High court Detroit.

97

until "the righteous servants of Allah inherit the world." He actually saw his failed
suicide mission as a divinely inspired and continuous mission. 281

Also, the Islamic sect in the Northern Nigeria known as Boko-Haram is terrorizing
the country, with their continuous bombing of people, places, especially Christian
Churches, massacre of innocent citizens, especially Christians, continuous threat to
the government, arsons, to name but a few. 'Boko-Haram' as the name implies,
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means "western education is a sacrilege". It is a jihadist terrorist organization based
in Northern Nigeria, founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2001. Mohammed Yusuf
was killed in 2009, since then; there is no known leader of this Islamic terrorist sect.
They have been known as "faceless" group of people.

Boko-Haram became internationally known due to sectarian violence in Nigeria in
2009. It is considered to be a major potential terrorist threat affecting Nigeria and
other countries and believed to have link with Al-Qaeda. Boko-Haram claims to be
prosecuting a holy war Gihad) against infidels on behalf of their god. One of their
notorious terrorist acts was the trunk bomb planted by them in Ahuja, capital of
Nigeria, in August 26, 2011, which killed dozens of people and destroyed much of
UN country headquarters in Ahuja. This Islamic terrorist sect had vouched to
continue their violence activities until the country is ruled by Sharia law. 282 Boko
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Haram rates second out of the ten perpetrator groups with the most attacks world
wide, 2012? 83

In April 26, 2012, a suicide bomber drove into the office of THISDA Y Newspaper
in Jabi district of Ahuja, the Nigerian capital, killing two (2) private security men
and himself. The bomb blast affected some part of the building and that of the
NIGERIAN-TRIBUNE Newspaper, located beside their building. More so, exactly

I

the same day, at about the same time, another suicide bomber drove car into the
office of the same THISDA Y Newspaper in Soji Plaza on Kontagora road in
Kaduna State, Nigeria, killing three (3) passers-by and wounding several others.Z 84
The reason behind the terrorists targeting media houses are yet to be known. The
president nevertheless stated unequivocally that Nigeria will continue to encourage
freedom of speech in the country.

In May, 2013, the Nigerian Government declared a state of emergency in some
states of the country, namely, Bomo, Yobe and Adamawa because of the incessant

I

attacks of this Islamic extremist.

The worst of all terrorist attack by Boko Haram is the raiding and abduction of two
hundred (200) girls from girls school in towns of Chibok and Gamboru Ngala in
283
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Nothern Nigeria, in April15, 2014 and threatened to sell them off as slaves. In May
12, they released a video showing one hundred and thirty (130) of the girls that has
being forcefully converted to Muslims, wearing Islamic clothing.

285

A man

claiming to be Shekau, said in the video released, 'I abducted your girls. I will sell
them in the market, by Allah. There is a market for selling humans. Allah says I
should sell. He commands me to sell. I will sell women. I will sell women. '

I
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In 2006 however, a new group, calling itself the Taliban, launched an attack in the
northeast city of Borno. In April 2007, the same group launched a more serious
attack in Kano, killing thirteen (13) policemen and wounding five (5) more. 287

In 2013, the US State Department included the Nigerian extremists, Boko Haram on
its official list of terrorist groups and placed seven million dollars ($7) bounty on
the head of the leader Abubakar Shekau. 288

Again, in early May, 2014, the same Boko Haram attacked a boarding school in
Northern Nigeria and slaughtered more than fifty (50) male students between the
ages of 16 and 18. They let the female students go free and ordered them to get
married. Also, a week before this attack, they set off suicide bombs at a bus
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terminal in Abuja, Capital territory of the country and attacked several major
buildings. 289

In May 4, 2014, Boko Haram bombed a bridge linking the town of Gamboru to the
Barno state capital, Maiduguri, the headquarters of the Nigeria Military offensive,
killing about three hundred (300) people. This attack was commited on their way
back from the attack on Gamboru's main market, where at least fifty (50) bodies

I

have since been discovered from debris of burnt shops. 290

There emerged a new Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria, since 2012, known as
Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguard for the protection of Muslims in
Black Africa); commonly called 'Ansaru'. 291

They are also based in Northern

Nigeria and broadly aligned with al Qaeda. They stated that their targets fur the
attacks are the British and Western interests. Since 2012, they have kidnapped at
least eight (8) hostages, mainly Europeans and are believed to have killed a good
number of hostages, including two (2) British nationals. 292 The group claimed
responsibility for the attack on a detention facility of the police special AntiRobbery Squad (SARS) in Abuja on 26 November 2012?93

Some of the Ansaru's kidnap attacks in Nigeria are as follows:
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Scott Johnson. Nigeria's abducted girls are the latest victims of the country's religious divide.
www.takepart.com
290
America officials in Nigeria to help find kidnapped girls as report says government had warning of
attack. wVvw.Foxnews.com
291
Terrorism ..www.Gov.uk
292ld.
--·-293 ld.

101

-A British construction worker, held hostage in Nigeria and other six(6) foreign
nationals in Bauchi State in Febuary 2013.
- A French national worker kidnapped m his residence m Katsina State, m
December, 2012, but he escaped in Noverneber 17, 2013.
-The kidnapping and killing of Lebanese nationals in 2012 at Kaduna State.
-Kidnapping and killing of a German national in January 2012.

I

Furthermore, the long standing Niger-delta crises in Nigeria has turned that part of
the country into terror. The killing and kidnapping of both foreign and indigenous
citizens are on the increase. Nigeria is made up of thirty six (36) states and nine (9)
states out of the thirty six states are known as the Niger-delta. The states are Abia,
Akwa !born, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Irno, Ondo and Rivers.

The area is characterized by ethnic pluralism as inhabited by Andoni, Bekwara,
Bini. Efik, Egberna, Ekoi, Ibibio, Igbo, Ijaw, Isoko, Itsekiri, Ogoni, Urhobo and
several others? 94

The crises in Niger-Delta can be regarded more as a political act. They involve in
hostage taking of oil and oil related multinational company staff (both foreign and
local), sabotage of company property, pipeline vandalisation, bombing of oil
installations, kidnapping for ransom, sea piracy and robbery on the waterways. It is
more or less conflict between local patriots and freedom fighters.
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The Nigerian State formulated fiscal policies and laws such as the Petroleum Act,
which gives the Federal Government the exclusive ownership of oil resources in
Nigeria; the Land use Act which vests the ownership of lands on State
Governments; The exclusive Economic Zone Act by which federal Government has
exclusive right over all resources within 200 nautical miles from the coast to the
sea, thus the dichotomy between on-shore and off-shore oil and so on. These laws
and their operation are perceived by the ethnic group owners of their territories to
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be oppressive, derivational, and alienating. These views and experiences form the
basis of agitation for demand over resource ownership and control by the people of
the Niger Delta.

The region produce over 90 percent of income to the country and yet they are not
developed. Their resources are being used to develop the capital territory and places
outside their own territory, to finance bureaucracies and personalised individual
conspicuous consumption, official and non-official corruption. This infuriates the
Niger Delta.

The most serious kidnapping incident occurred on 31 July, 2000, when armed
youths attacked two oil-drilling rigs and took one hundred and sixty five (165)
hostages, including seven (7) US citizens and five (5) Britain. All hostages were
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released unharmed on 4 August. 295 They destroyed Gbaramutu Kingdom, expensive
new king's palace in Ijaw and other community property in 2009. 296

On the other hand, fighting continued between two ethnic groups: Itsekiris and Ijaw
residents of the Niger Delta. Tensions between the Itsekiris and the Ijaw
communities remained high in 2003, with intermittent reports of violence. Tribal
clashes in March 2003 forced the withdrawal of major oil companies from the area.
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Ethnic clashes in the region led to dozens of death, and forced multi-national oil
giants to curtail operations in the area. Oil companies were forced to shut down 40
percent of the country's output as the Ijaw and Itsekiris traded gunfire. Ethnic
fighting resurfaced in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta in mid-August 2003. This was
the most serious fighting in the area since March. But in October 2003, James Ibori,
the then governor of Delta State, brought the warring Ijaw and Itsekiri communities
together to agree a fragile peace. Fighting between the two groups killed more than
two hundred (200) people during 2003 and forced the government to send in troop
reinforcements to restore order.

What is now known as the Nigerian Oil Crisis began on 25 September, 2004 when
the Niger Delta people's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) threatened to attack oil
facilities and infrastructure in the Delta region. Royal Dutch Shell responded the
next day by evacuating two hundred and thirty five (235) personnel from its oil
fields. The NDPVF threatened to declare an all-out war against Olusegun
295
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Obasanjo's government (the then president of Nigeria), on October 1, and told oil
companies and their foreign workers to leave the Delta. Obasanjo entered into
negotiations with the group and a ceasefire and disarmament plan were declared in
September 29.

By October, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, the leader of the NDPVF, withdrew
from disarmament obligations. The rest of October was punctuated by a series of oil
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workers strikes and fluctuations in the global price of oil. In October 28, the
NDPVF began to tum its weapons over to the government.

In November, strikes continued and by the 151h, the government agreed to lower
domestic oil prices. The unions suspended their strikes the next day. Unfortunately,
fighting began anew when members of the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) attacked
the Okirika region. The NDPVF responded by dropping out disarmament plans. In
November 30, the Nigerian government revealed that over one million barrels of
crude were lost each week during November.

I
In January 2006, a new militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta (MEND), entered the fray. MEND is closely linked to the NDPVF and
is demanding among other things the release of Asari, who was arrested for treason
on 20 September 2005 and $1.5 billion in compensation from Sell for the pollution
they claim it caused.
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MEND's first significant act was an attack on Italy's Eni SpA petroleum company.
The deaths of nine (9) Eni officials forced the company to evacuate its staff and
contractors from the area. Along with further kidnappings and another withdrawal
of Shell workers, it was estimated that the instability had resulted in a ten percent
(10%) drop in Nigerian oil production. 297

2.5. CONCLUSION.

I
The incessant terrorist acts' going on in most parts of African States has led to
instability of security and economy in the continent. There is no justification for
terrorism from whatever angle it is evaluated. A terrorist cannot claim an
infringement of fundamental human right while he is also guilty of violation of
human rights. The equitable maxim of 'whoever that comes into equity must come
with clean hands" should not be dispensed with'.

Under insurgency and armed conflicts, strict adherence to human rights should be
adhered to but not in combating terrorism.

Terrorist acts in Africa have seriously deterred the economic growth of the
continent despite its natural resources. Most investors no longer consider some
States in the continent safe enough to invest their money or establish business. In
addition, the security laxities of some States in the continent are a deterrent factor to
combating terrorism effectively, though, acceptable that poverty greatly affects
297
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security measures of a State. The challenge of terrorism in Africa is to balance a
legitimate program of security improvements with a continuing and sustained attack
on poor governance, poverty, and deprivation of human rights.

Therefore, the focus should be in devising means of achieving the most effective
method to combat and put to an end the increase of incessant terrorist acts in most
African states, starting by re-viewing or re-assessing the existing laws on combating

I

terrorism in Africa.
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CHAPTER THREE.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE OAU CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND
COMBATING TERRORISM.

3.0. INTRODUCTION.

The continent of Africa has a long history in making efforts to prevent and combat
terrorism, which gave birth to the OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating
Terrorism of 1999. It marked the first major comprehensive legislative approach to
addressing the scourge of terrorism in Africa. The OAU Algiers Convention of
1999 forms the major pillar for the enactment of other OAU (AU) legislations on

peace and security in Africa.

The AU at its 28th Ordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal in 1992, adopted a
resolution on the strengthening of cooperation and coordination among African
States. 298 Also, in its 30th Ordinary Session held in Tunis, Tunisia, in June 1994, it
adopted the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African relations, 299 in
which it rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism, whether under the pretext of
sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion. The declaration also condemned as

298
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criminal, all terrorist acts, methods and practices, and expressed its resolve to
enhance cooperation to combat such acts. 300

The OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 also states its believe in the principles of the
International law, Charter of OAU and UN in combating terrorism. It provides thus:

" ... Believing in the principles ofinternational
law, the provisions of theCharters of the
Organization ofAfrican Unity and of the United
Nations and the latter's relevant resolutions on
measures aimed at combating international terrorism
and, in particular, resolution 49160 of the General
Assembly of9 December, 1994; together with
the annexed Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism as well as resolution 511210
ofthe General Assembly ofl7 December, 1996 and
Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
annexed thereto; " 301

I

The Convention further reaffirms the "legitimate right of peoples for selfdetermination and independence pursuant to the principles of international law and
the provisions of the Charter ofthe Organizations of African United Nations as well
as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights." 302

OAU (AU) is also convinced that "terrorism constitutes a senous violation of
human rights and, in particular, the rights to physical integrity, life, freedom,
security, and impedes socio-economic development through destabilization of

300
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States." 303 It is also convinced that terrorism has no justification and should be
combated by all means, which they are determined to do.
"Convinced further that terrorism cannot be
justified under any circumstances and, consequently,
should be combated in all its forms and
manifestations, including those in which states are
involved directly or indirectly, without regard to
its origin, causes and objectives. ,.Jo4

The 1999 OAU Algiers Convention is divided into five (5) main parts with 23
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Articles and many paragraphs. Part I is the 'Scope of application' comprising of
Articles 1 - 3. Part II is 'Areas of Cooperation' subdivided into Articles 4 and 5.
The next part which is Part III deals with 'State jurisdiction and contains Articles 6
and 7. Part IV is the 'Extradition' part, containing Articles 8- 13. Next to it is Part
V which is the 'Extra-territorial investigations (Commission Rogaroire) and mutual
legal assistance' that is subdivided into Articles 14 - 18. The final part is VI, 'The
final provision' which is again subdivided into Articles 19

23. Then Annexed to

the Convention is the list of international instruments.

These Parts ofthe 1999 OAU Algiers Convention shall be the focus of discourse in
this chapter, followed by OAU (AU) compliance with the international law (UN)
requirements for combating terrorism and the effects of the existing convention on
the Member States in combating terrorism so far.

303
304

Id.
Id.
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3.1. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF OAU ALGIERS CONVENTION OF 1999.

3.1.1. DEFINITION OF TERRORISM UNDER THE 1999 OAU ALGIERS
CONVENTION.

The starting point for many definitions of terrorism is a violent act committed with
the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government to do or

I

abstain from doing something. Thus, the basic concept of the definition in the OAU
Algiers Convention 1999 rests on two pillars: first, the commission of an act that
causes or may cause death or injury; second, that the act was intended to intimidate
the government, the population or disrupt any public service. 305

In the OAU Algiers Convention 1999, terrorist act is defined in its Article 1 (3) (a)
-(b) as:

"(a) any act which is a violation ofthe criminal
laws of a State Party and which may endanger
the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or
cause serious injury or death to, any person,
any number or group ofpersons or causes
or may cause damage to public or private
property, natural resources, environment or
cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
(i)intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce
any government, body, institution, the
general public or any segment thereof,
to do or abstain from doing any act, or to
adopt or abandon a particular standpoint,
or to act according to certain principles; or
305
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(ii)

(iii)

disrupt any public service, the delivery of
any essential service to the public or to create
a public emergency; or
create general insurrection in a State.

(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to,
command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt,
threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement
of any person, with the intent to commit any act
referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii). " 306

This definition can as well be construed under two arms: firstly, the terrorist act

I

must be in "violation of criminal laws" of a State Party and secondly the terrorist
act "may endanger the life, physical integrity .... " In other words, the two elements
must be present for it to amount to a terrorist act. If the crime is not in violation of
the criminal law of a nation, then it is not a terrorist act.

How effective and justifiable will cooperation among State Parties be attained,
when it is obvious that their respective national criminal laws are not the same? Is it
not obvious that extradition may not be that easy among the Member States
especially if the offence of which the extradition of a person is requested is not in
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violation of the criminal law of that nation? The definition should not include a
prerequisite that an action must first be a violation of criminal law in order for it to
amount to 'terrorist act'. Clear and specific obligations to adopt mandatory
procedures to establish criminal jurisdiction are then needed to indict or extradite
perpetrators. 307
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Further, the Convention in its Article 3, explicitly differentiated between acts that
should be regarded as 'terrorist acts' from the ones that are 'liberation and self
determination'. It states thus:
"(I) Notwithstanding the provisions ofArticle 1,

the struggle waged by peoples in accordance
with the principles of international law for their
liberation or self-determination, including armed
struggle against colonialism, occupation,
aggression and domination by foreign forces shall
. acts. ,3olf
not be const.dered as terrorzst

I

This exclusion is limited by the immediate following provision, which states that
'Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall
not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act. ' 309

The broadness and vagueness of the definition of acts of terrorism needs attention
and cannot be seen to be a legitimate limitation of rights. A basic tenet of the
principle of legality is that legislation should not be vague and should define with
reasonable precision the ambit of prohibited conduct. Under the definition of OAU
Algiers Convention 1999, a strike by teachers or municipal workers, an action that
could be interpreted as being 'calculated' to 'disrupt a public service' in the cause
of which some incidental damage is caused to public or private property, could be
construed as a 'terrorist act' .310
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Nevertheless, some scholars had praised the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 as one
of the best regional conventions on combating terrorism with a clearer definition of
terrorist acts. No doubt the Convention provides a useable definition, but what
seems like a noticeable pitfall from the definition is that the particular criminal act
must already be defined as a crime under the national law, as stated in the beginning
sentence of definition of terrorist act, in its Article 1 (3) (a), before it can qualify to
be classified as a terrorist act.

I
3.1.2. ROLES AND JURISDICTION OF MEMBER STATES ON
TERRORIST ACTS.

The Convention sets out detailed obligations of Member States for the purposes of
the objectives set forth in the Convention. Article 2 of Part I of the OAU Algiers
Convention 1999 stipulate what State Parties are required to do in compliance with
the Convention. It states that they undertake to:

I

''(a) review their national laws and establish
criminal offences for terrorist acts as
defined in this Convention and make
such acts punishable by appropriate penalties
that take into account the grave nature of
such offences;
(b )consider, as a matter ofpriority, the signing or
ratification o.f or accession to, the international
instruments listed in the Annexure, which they
have not yet signed, ratified or acceded to; and
(c)Implement the actions, including enactment
of legislation and the establishment as
criminal offences of certain acts as required in
terms ofthe international instruments referred
to in paragraph (b) and that States have rattfied
and acceded to and makes such acts punishable by
appropriate penalties which take into account
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the grave nature of those offences;
(d)Notifo the Secretary General ofthe OAU
of all the legislative measures it has taken
and the penalties imposed on terrorist acts
within one year of its ratification of, or
accession to, the convention. "

Notably, "State Party" is defined in its Article 1 (2) as "any Member State of the
Organization of African Unity which has ratified or acceded to this Convention and
has deposited its instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary general

I

ofthe Organization of African Unity".

Part II of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 provides for areas of counter-terrorism
cooperation among State Parties. Article 4 of the Convention states that Parties
undertake to refrain from acting in such a way as to support the commission of
terrorist acts, including the issuing of visas and travel documents; and are required
to adopt legitimate measures to prevent and combat terrorism in accordance with
their national structure and the provisions of the Convention, emphasizing on what
they shall do in Article 4 (2). In the Convention's exact words, it provides thus:
"(I) State Parties undertake to refrain from any

acts aimed at organizing, supporting, financing,
committing or inciting to commit terrorist acts
or providing havens for terrorists, directly
or indirectly, including the provision of
weapons and their stockpiling in their
countries and the issuing of visas and travel
documents.
(2)State Parties shall adopt any legitimate measures
aimed at preventing and combating terrorist
acts in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention and their respective national
legislation, in particular, they shall do
the following:
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(a) prevent their territories from being
used as a base for planning, organization
or execution of terrorists acts or for
the participation or collaboration in these
acts in any form whatsoever;
(b) develop and strengthen method of
monitoring and detecting plans or
activities aimed at illegal cross-border
transportation, importation, export, stockpiling
and use of arms, ammunition and explosives
and other materials and means of
committing terrorists acts;
(c) develop and strengthen methods or
controlling and monitoring land, sea and
their borders and customs and immigration
check points in order to pre-empt any infiltration
by individuals or groups involved in the
planning, organization and execution or
terrorist acts;
(d) strengthen the protection and security
ofpersons, diplomatic and consular
missions, premises or regional and international
organizations accredited to a State Party,
in accordance with the relevant
conventions and rules or international law;
(e) promote the exchange of information
and expertise acts and establish data bases
for the collection and analysis of
information and data on terrorist
elements, groups, movements and organizations;
(f) take all necessary measures to prevent
the establishment terrorist support networks
in any form whatsoever;
(g) ascertain, when granting asylum, that the
asylum seeker is not involved in any terrorist act;
(h) arrest the perpetrators of terrorist acts and try
them in accordance with national legislation,
or extradite them in accordance with
the provisions of this Convention or
extradition treaties concluded between
the requesting State and the requested State
and, in the absence of a treaty, consider
facilitating the extradition ofpersons suspected of
having committed terrorist acts; and
(i) establish effective co-operation between domestic
security officials and services and the citizens of
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the State Parties in a bid to enhance public
awareness of the scourge of terrorist acts and the
need to combat such acts, by providing guarantees
and incentives that will encourage the population
to give information on terrorist acts or other acts
which may help to uncover such acts and arrest
. perpe t ra t ors. ,3/1
thezr

Therefore, summarily, State parties must refrain from encouraging terrorism in any
form and shall adopt measures to prevent and combat terrorism by doing the

I

following: Securing their boarder and territories from being used as a terrorist base
or activities; Protect and strengthen their boarder control; Strengthen the security
and protection of foreign diplomats in their nation in accordance with International
Law; Promote exchange of information and ways of collecting and analysing
information collected; Discourage establishment of any network that will encourage
and support terrorism; Make sure that an asylum seeker is not a terrorist; Arresting
and prosecuting a person alleged of committing terrorist act in accordance with the
national law or extradite the person in accordance with the provisions of the OAU
Algiers Convention 1999; Create awareness and effective cooperation among
domestic security and citizens for combating terrorism.

Under Article 5 ofthe same Part II ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999, Member
States are encouraged to cooperate among themselves in preventing and
combating terrorism in accordance with their national laws, strengthening their
exchange of information by revealing terrorist groups, their leaders, camps and so
on; communicating the modus oprandi used by the terrorists.

311
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" I. State Parties undertake to strengthen the
exchange of information among them regarding:
(a) acts and crimes committed by terrorists groups,
their leaders and elements, their headquarters
and training camps, their means and
sources offunding and acquisition of arms,
the types of arms, ammunition and explosives
used, and other means in their possession;
(b) the communication and propaganda
methods and techniques used by the terrorist
groups, the behaviour of these groups,
the movement of the leaders and elements,
as well as their travel documents. "312

I

Member States shall also exchange information leading to the arrest of any person
charged with terrorist act against any State Party or the nation; secure and
confiscate the arms and ammunitions used by the terrorist.
"I. States Parties undertake to exchange any
information that leads to:
(a) the arrest of any person charged with a
terrorist act against the interest ofa
State Party or against its nationals,
or attempted to commit such an act or
participated in it as an accomplice or an
instigator;
(b) the seizure and confiscation of any type
of arms, ammunition, explosives, devices
or funds or other instrumentalities of crime
used to commit a terrorist act or intended
for that purpose. "313

I

The Member States undertakes also to keep all the information received and
exchanged confidential within the nations and only the concerned Member States.
The paragraph states that the 'State Parties undertake to respect the confidentiality
of the information exchanged among them and not to provide such information to

312
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another State that is not party to this Convention, or to a third State Party, without
the prior consent of the State from where such information originated.' 314

Member States are further encouraged to cooperate with one another in regard to
arresting and prosecuting terrorist acts in accordance with the national law.
"4. State Parties undertake to promote co-operation
Among them and to help each other with
regard to procedures relating to the investigation
and arrest ofpersons suspected of, charged
with or convicted of terrorist acts, in conformity
with the national law of each State.
5. State Parties shall co-operate among themselves
in conducting and exchanging studies and
researches on how to combat terrorist acts
and to exchange expertise relating to control
of terrorist acts. "3 rs

I

Member States are also required to cooperate among themselves in providing
technical assistance to one another. The Article provides that 'State Parties shall cooperate among themselves, where possible, in providing any available technical
assistance in drawing up programmes or organizing, where necessary, and for the
benefit of their personnel, joint training courses involving one or several State
Parties in the area of control of terrorist acts, in order to improve their scientific,
technical and operational capacities to prevent and combat such acts.d 16

Article 5 above focuses mainly on respective Member States' national laws in
combating terrorism. What then is the fate of Member States that are financially
incapacitated to follow the necessary procedures for prosecuting terrorist acts
314
315
316
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effectively in their nations? Or what about nations, whose functioning arms of
government are greatly affected by presence of terrorist groups in their nation (for
instance, Somalia discussed in chapter 2 supra)? Why is it not necessary that a
general regional procedures and Court be created to help such Member States
combat terrorism effectively, rather than leaving it at national levels while
encouraging other Member States to help? These questions need to be addressed by
AU, if it really desires to combat terrorism effectively.

I
Part III of the same Convention deals with jurisdiction of trial of the terrorist
offence, how and when a state has the power to adjudicate on a terrorist offence.
Article 6 ( 1) (a)-( c) provides for direct territorial jurisdiction of a Member State. It
states thus:
"1. Each State Party has jurisdiction over terrorist
acts defined in Article 1 when.' the act is
committed in the territory ofthat State
and the perpetrator of the act is arrested in
its territory or outside it if this is punishable
by its national law;
(a) the act is committed on board a vessel
or a ship flying the flag of the State or
an aircraft which is registered under the
laws of that State at the time the
offence is committed; or
(b) the act is committed by a national or group
of nationals of that State. "

While, Article 6 (2) (a)-(e) covers instances where a state shall have the power to
assume jurisdiction in trial of terrorist offence, stating that:
"2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction
over any offence when:
(a) the act is committed against a national of
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that State; or
(b) the act is committed against a State or
government facility of that State abroad,
including an embassy or other diplomatic
or consular premises, and any other
property, of that State;
(c) the act is committed by a stateless person who
has his or her habitual residence in the territory
ofthat State; or
(d) the act is committed on board an aircraft which
is operated by any carrier of that State; and
(e) the act is committed against the security of
the State Party."

I

Further, State Parties are mandated in Paragraph 3 of the same Article 6, to notify
the secretary general of the jurisdiction taken in accordance with sub-section 2 of
this Article 6. 'Upon ratifying or acceding to this Convention, each State Party shall
notify

the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity of the

jurisdiction it has established in accordance with paragraph 2 under its national law.
Should any change take place, the State Party concerned shall immediately notify
the Secretary General. ' 317

State parties are also mandated to establish jurisdiction over the acts set forth in
Article 1 of the Convention where extradition is not required. Paragraph 4 of Article
6 provides that:
"Each State Party shall likewise take such measures
as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over the acts set forth in Article I in cases where
the alleged offender is present in its territory and it
does not extradite that person to any of the State
Parties which have established their jurisdiction in
accordance with paragraphs I or 2. "318

317
318

!d. at Article 6 (3).
!d. at Article 6 (4).
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Article 7 of the same Part III provides for procedures a State Party shall undertake
to investigate the presence of a person alleged to have committed any terrorist act. It
states thus:
"1. Upon receiving information that a person who has
committed or who is alleged to have committed
any terrorist act as defined in Article 1 may be
present in its territory, the State Party concerned
shall take such measures as may be necessary
under its national law to investigate the facts
contained in the information.
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so
warrant, the State Party in whose territory the
offender or alleged offender is present shall take
the appropriate measures under its national law so
as to ensure that person 's presence for the purpose
.
,J/9
q{ prosecutzon.
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The alleged person's rights are also stipulated under Article 7(3) (a)-(d) and which
said rights shall be exercised in accordance with the national law of the state in
which the person is present as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the same Article 7;
"3. Any person against whom the measures referred
to in paragraph 2 are being taken shall be
entitled to:
(a) communicate without delay to the nearest
appropriate representative of the State of
which that person is a national or which is
otherwise entitled, to protect that person's rights
or, if that person is a stateless person, the
State in whose territory that person
habitually resides;
(b) be visited by a representative of that State,·
(c) be assisted by a lawyer of his or her choice;
(d) be informed of his or her rights under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c).
4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 shall be
exercised in conformity with the national law of
the State in whose territory the offender or
alleged offender is present; subject to the
provision that the said laws must enable full
319

!d. at Article 7 (l) & (2).
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effect to be given to the purposes for which
the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are
intended. "320

The Convention, in enacting paragraph 3 of Article 7, escapes accusation of
infringement on fundamental human right of an accused person under domestic and
international law.

I

3.1.3. EXTRADITION OF TERRORISTS.

Under international law, extradition is a necessary element of international
cooperation in combating international terrorism. Extradition is generally described
as "the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a crime under the
laws of one state is arrested in another state and returned to the former state for a
trial or punishment"321 • Since there is no universal rule binding states to extradite
accused offenders, the practice of extradition is predominantly founded upon the
notion of mutuality. In theory, alleged criminals, including terrorists, would not be
able to flee prosecution by escaping to another state?

22

General international law prohibits a State in the absence of a treaty, from taking
measures on the territory of another State to enforce its national laws without the
consent of the latter. One State may not arrest a person or serve summons on him or
320

Id at Article 7 (3) & (4).
Black's Law Dictionary 623. 81h Ed. 2004.
322
Carol A. Bahan. International terrorism: the legitimization of safe harbour states in international
law; 2009/2010. 54 NYLSLR 333.

321
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execute an order for the production of documents on the territory of another except
under terms of a treaty or other forms of authorization. This flows from the
proposition that jurisdiction is territorial and remains the best foundation for
internationallaw. 323 A State cannot demand the surrender of an alleged criminal as
of right, subject of course to the exception of crimes under international law, such
as war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace. States must
depend on the cooperation of other States to obtain surrender of suspected or
convicted criminals who are or have fled overseas. 324

The principles of extradition law provide the procedure to regulate such mutual
cooperation, based, in part, on reciprocity. Globalisation has not changed this rule;
on the contrary, it has made it more relevant. The Convention, thus, confers on each
Member State the right to request for the extradition of persons alleged to commit
offences falling within the ambit of the Convention. 325

The Convention, thus, serves as the legal basis for Member States to make
extradition request from each other irrespective of whether or not there has been a
previous extradition treaty between them. 326 Member States are also requested
under Article 9 of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999, to incorporate terrorist acts
covered by the Convention into their national laws as extraditable offences.

323

Nsongurua J. Udombana. Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa's Anti-corruption Convention,
2003. 7 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 447.
324 ld.
325 Jd.
326 Jd.
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Acceding to a request for extradition is not automatic. Thus, where there is a
request for extradition, a requested State may, if it has within its territory any
person charged with or convicted of offences, refuse to extradite the person on the
ground that it has jurisdiction over the offences. 327 Where that happens, then the
requested State shall, without fail and delay, submit the case to its competent
authorities for prosecution unless otherwise agreed with the requesting State.

I

Under Part IV, Article 8 ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999, Member States shall
extradite any person charged or convicted within the territory of terrorist act in the
territory of another Member State if the State requests and it shall be in accordance
with this Convention or extradition agreement between the Member States, if any.
Article 8 stipulates that:
"1. Subject to the provision ofparagraph 2 and 3
of this article, the States Parties shall
undertake to extradite any person charged
with or convicted of any terrorist act carried
out on the territory of another State Party
and whose extradition is requested by one
of the State Parties in conformity with the
rules and conditions provided for in this
Convention or under extradition agreements
between the State Parties and within the
. . qf therr
. natzona
. llaws. ,328
l rmrts

Member State has a right to enact a legislation under which extradition shall be
granted in its nation and transmit same to the Secretary General, who shall circulate
same to all Member States as stated in paragraph 2 of the same Article 8 that;
"2. Any State Party may, at the time of the deposit
of its instruments of ratification or accession,
327
328

!d.

Article 8 (1) ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26.
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transmit to the Secretary General of the OA U
the grounds on which extradition may not be
granted and shall at the same time indicate the
legal basis in its national legislation or
international conventions to which it is a
party which excludes such extradition. The
Secretary General shall forward these grounds
to the State Parties. "329

Article 8 (3) stipulates limitations to granting extradition as follows:
"3. Extradition shall not be granted iffinal
Judgement has been passed by a competent
authority of the requested State upon the person
in respect of the terrorist act or acts for which
extradition is requested. Extradition may also
be refused if the competent authority of the
requested State has decided either not to institute
or terminate proceedings in respect of the same act
or acts."

A Member State is bound to prosecute the alleged offender without delay if
extradition was not granted by it. 'A State Party in whose territory an alleged
offender is present shall be obliged, whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution if it does not extradite that person. ' 330

I
Member States are mandated to include 'terrorist act' as defined in Article 1 of this
Convention as an extraditable offence in its national law. 'Each State Party
undertakes to include as an extraditable offence any terrorist act as defined in

329
330

Id. at Article 8 (2).
Id. at Article 8 (4).
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Article 1, in any extradition treaty existing between any State Parties before or after
the entry into force of this Convention. ' 331

Article 10 provides for means of exchanging extradition request between Member
states. It states that 'exchange of extradition requests between the State Parties to
this Convention shall be effected directly either through diplomatic channels or
other appropriate organs in the concerned States.'

I
Article 11 further stipulates procedures and contents of extradition request as
follows:
"Extradition requests shall be in writing, and
shall be accompanied in particular by the
following:
(a) an original or authenticated copy
of the sentence, warrant of arrest or
any order or other judicial decision
made, in accordance with the procedures
laid down in the laws of the requesting
State;
(b) a statement describing the offencesfor
which extradition is being requested,
indicating the date and place of its
commission, the offence committed,
any convictions made and a copy of
the provisions of the applicable law;
and
(c) as comprehensive a description as possible
of the wanted together with any other may
assist in establishing the person's identity
and nationality. "

Article 12 provides for method of extradition under urgent cases. The competent
authority may in urgent cases request for the arrest of the alleged offender in
331

Id. at Article 9.
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writing for reasonable period in accordance with the national law of the requesting
state. It states thus:
" In urgent cases, the competent authority of
the State making the extradition may, in writing,
request that the State seized of the extradition
request arrest the person in question provisionally.
Such provisional arrest shall be for a reasonable
period in accordance with the national law of the
requested State. "
Furthermore, in a situation where a Member State receives requests from different

I

Member States for extradition of a particular person, the Member State shall decide
which of the Member States to extradite the alleged offender to, considering the
dates of request and shall in addition deliver to the state the funds and materials for
the commission of the offense. The Art. provides that:
" 1. Where a State Party receives several
extradition requests from different States Parties
in respect of the same suspect and for the same
or different terrorist acts, it shall decide on these
requests having regard to all the prevailing
circumstances, particularly the possibility
of subsequent extradition, the respective dates
of recipt of the requests, and the degree of
seriousness of the crime.
2. Upon agreeing to extradite, States Parties
shall seize and transmit all funds and
related materials purportedly used in the
commission of the terrorist act to the requesting
State as well as relevant incriminating evidence.
3. Such funds, incriminating evidences and
related materials, upon confirmation of
their use in the terrorist act by the requested
State, shall be transmitted to the requesting
State even if, for reasons of death or escape
of the accused, the extradition in question cannot
take place.
4. The provisions in paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of this
Article shall not affect the rights of any of
the States Parties or bonafide third Parties
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regardin~

above. "

the materials or revenues mentioned

3 2

Generally, extradition treaties intend to play a particularly important role in the
cooperative efforts to combat terrorism. Yet, their effectiveness has been hampered
by the fact that the political offence exception contained in all extradition treaties,
protects from extradition of political offenders of all types, non-violent and violent
alike, including terrorists. 333 Practice has shown that extradition is far from perfect,
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as various obstacles can prevent the successful extradition of criminals. With regard
to international terrorism, extradition can be hindered by a number of obstacles
including the principle of aut dedere aut judicare 334 , the political offence exception
and state-sponsored terrorism. 335

332

See Article 13 (I)- (4) of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26.
Antje C. Petersen. Extradition and the Political offense exception in the Suppression ofterrorism;
1992,67 Ind. L.J. 767.
334
The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is the duty to extradite or prosecute. It is a component of
extradition. The principle permits a custodial state, which has established jurisdiction over the
offense, to exercise its sovereignty by either extraditing the alleged offender to a requesting state or
prosecuting the alleged offender under its domestic laws. Although the principle is based in treaty
law as it is included in at least seventy seventy international treaties and conventions, there is an
ongoing debate as to whether it should qualify as a norm of customary international law. As pertains
to universal jurisdiction for international crimes ( example, war crimes and crimes against
humanity), the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare is compulsory for all states regardless of their
legal obligations or the source of law for the designated crimes treaty or customary international law.
Currently, the international law commission (ILC) has undertaken an effort to investigate whether
aut dedere aut judicare may qualify as such norm. Yet states seem hesitant to extend the binding
obligations of customary international law to aut dedere aut judicare due to its predominant
formulation by treaties. Hence aut dedere aut judicare has yet to gain the requisite status under
customary international law to bind states regardless of their treaty obligations or lack thereof. See
Carol A. Bahan; Supra note 322.
With regard to international terrorism, the principle aut dedere aut judicare is a significant obstacle
to the effective enforcement of the multilateral conventions. The framework of principle as applied
to terrorist acts was first established in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, also known as The Hague Convention or the Unlawful Seizure Convention. See Carol A.
Bahan; Supra note 322.
335
Carol A. Bahan. Supra note 322.
333
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Therefore, the problem with extradition in this OAU Algiers Convention 1999 as
well as international law is that some States that have interest in that particular
terrorist act committed by the alleged offender may refuse to extradite the offender
and opt to try the offender by itself as required under Article 8 (4) of the
Convention. The law is that, the contracting state in the territory of which the
alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory,
to submit the case to the appropriate authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that state. 336

Although, the theory of extradition is that no terrorist can escape prosecution by
fleeing to another Member State because that State would have the obligation to
prosecute him if it chooses not to extradite him, regardless of the state's reason for
refusal, but that is not obtainable in practice. The requirement under Article 8 ( 4) of
the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 is that the State should immediately submit to
competent authority for prosecution. There is no indication that the case must
proceed past the investigative inquiry stage, as the investigation will be dictated by
domestic evidentiary and procedural law. Another problem is that there will
probably be insufficient evidence available in the state seeking prosecution. 337 So,
despite the principle of good faith present in all international treaties, two legal

336
337

See Article 7 of Convention for Suppression of Unlawful seizure of Aircraft, 1971.
Carol A. Bahan. Supra note 322.
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scholars have essentially labelled aut dedere aut judicare in its current application
as 'little more than a fayade of justice'. 338

In other words, no matter how cooperative Member States are required to be among
them by the Convention, extradition is not free from bias, especially in cases of
State sponsored terrorism. It can thus be rightly said that extradition can as well
create safe haven for terrorists. Basically, an offender who succeeds in placing

I

himself outside the territory of the state where he committed the crime also places
himself beyond the reach of the law that he violated. 339

3.1.4. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL INVESTIGATIONS (COMMISSION
REGATOIRE) AND MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE.

Commission Regatoire is a French word which literally means "letter of request". It
means a formal request from a court to a foreign court for some type of judicial

I

assistance. Extra-territoriality is jurisdiction exercised by a nation in other countries
by treaty or by its own ministers or consuls in foreign lands. Impliedly, domestic
law can be applied beyond the State's geographical boundaries. This concept stems
from the writings of French legal theorist and jurist Pierre Ayrant, who proposed
the theory that certain persons and things, while within the territory of a foreign
sovereign state, remained outside the reach of local judicial process.

Id.
Christopher C. Joyner. International extradition and global terrorism: Bringing international
criminals to justice; 2003. 25 Loy. L.A Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
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The Letter of request or commission regatoire usually contains:
Names of the Member State requesting its execution and the Member State
requested to execute.
The names and addresses of the parties to be investigated and their
representatives.
The nature of the investigation that 1s required, g1vmg all necessary
information in the regard thereto.
Other evidence to be obtained or other judicial act to be performed.
The questions to be put to the person to be investigated or a statement of the
subject-matter about which they are to be investigated
The document or other property, real or personal to be inspected.
Any requirement that the evidence is to be given on oath or affirmation.
Any special method or procedure to be followed. 340

Part V, Articles 14-18 of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 provides for Extra-
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territorial investigations (Commission Regatoire) and mutual legal assistance like
its counterparts in counter-terrorism legislations. Member States has a right to
request each other's assistance and cooperation in allowing the State to come into
the latter's territory to investigate any judicial proceeding concerning an alleged
terrorist offender while recognising the sovereign rights of the State Party. The
Convention provides thus:

340

See A 0 Advocates. Obtaining evidence in Guernsey: Commission regatoire. 2011.
www.Lexology.com/library/detail!asp1'
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"Any State Party may, while recognizing the
Sovereign rights of States Parties in matters
of criminal investigation, request any other State
Party to carry out, with its assistance and
cooperation, on the latter's territory, criminal
investigations related to any judicial proceedings
concerning alleged terrorist acts and, in particular;
(a) the examination of witnesses and transcripts
of statements made as evidence;
(b) the opening ofjudicial information.
(c) the initiation of investigation processes;
(d) the collection of documents and recordings or,
in their absence, authenticated copies thereof;
(e) conducting inspections and tracing of
assets for evidentiary purposes;
(f) executing searches and seizures; and
(g) service ofjudicial documents. " 341

I

Article 15 provides for grounds on which commission regatoire may be refused. It
states that:
"A commission rogatoire may be refused:
(a) where each of the State Parties has to execute
a commission rogatoire relating to the same
terrorist acts;
(b) if that request may affect efforts to expose
crimes, impede investigations or the indictment
of the accused in the country requesting the
commission rogatoire;
(b) if the execution of the request would affect
the sovereignty of the requested State, its
security or public order. "

I

The Extra-territorial investigation shall be in accordance with the requested state's
national laws and principles of bank's confidentiality shall not be a ground for
refusing such commission. 'The extra-territorial investigation (commission
rogatoire) shall be executed in compliance with the provisions of national laws of
the requested State. The request for extra-territorial investigation (commission
rogatoire) relating to a terrorist act shall not be rejected on the grounds of the
341

Part V, Article 13 ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26.
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principle of confidentiality of bank operations or financial institutions, where
applicable. " 342

Articles 17 and 18 provides for more cordial cooperation needed by Member States
for effective Extra-territorial investigation. The Articles stipulates that:
"The State Parties shall extend to each other the
best possible mutual police and judicial assistance
for any investigation, criminal prosecution or
extradition proceedings relating to the terrorist
acts as set forth in this Convention. "343
"The State Parties undertake to develop, if necessary,
especially by concluding bilateral and multilateral
agreements and arrangements, mutual legal assistance
procedures aimed at facilitating and speeding up
investigations and collecting evidence, as
well as cooperation between law enforcement
agencies in order to detect and prevent terrorist
acts. n344

Therefore, extra-territoriality can also be seen as the right or privilege of a state
to exercise authority in certain circumstances beyond the limits of its territory.
Its investigation involves concurrent jurisdiction, which inevitably produces
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occasion of tension. The manner in which some Member States will respond to
it often impedes the effectiveness of extra- territorialism.

Generally, commission regatoire is time consuming. When a prosecutor wants a
particular piece of evidence for use at a trial that is set for a date certain,

342
343
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ld. at Article 16.
Id. at Article 17.
Id. at Article 18.
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chances are that the prosecutor may not get the evidence on time before the trial
date that had been set.

3.1.5. FINAL PROVISION.

The final part of the Convention which is Part VI, provides for procedures for

I

Member States' ratification or accession to the Convention, method of
withdrawing their membership and enforcement of the Convention. It provides
thus:
"1. This Convention shall be open to signature,
ratification or accession by the Member
States of the Organization ofAfrican Unity.
2. The instruments of ratification or accession to
the present Convention shall be deposited with
the Secretary General of Organization ofAfrican
Unity.
3. The Secretary General of the Organization of
African Unity shall inform Member States of
the Organization of the deposit of each
instrument of ratification or accession.
4. No State Party may enter a reservation
which is incompatible with the objects and
purposes of this Convention.
5. No State Party may withdraw from this
Convention except on the basis of a written
request addressed to the Secretary General
of the Organization ofAfrican Unity. The
withdrawal shall take effect six months
after the date of receipt of the written request
by the Secretary General of the Organization
ofAfrican Unity. "345

I

345

Id. at Article 19 (1)

(5).
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Article 20 provides for effective date of the Convention entering into force and
State's effectiveness to membership after ratification as follows:
"I. The Convention shall enter into force thirty
days after the deposit of the fifteenth
instrument of ratification with the Secretary
General of the Organization ofAfrican Unity.
2. For each of the States that shall ratify or
accede to this Convention, shall enter into
force thirty days after the date of the deposit
by that State Party of its instrument of
ratification or accession. "

The Convention was adopted on 14 June 1999 and entered into force on 6
December, 2002 in accordance with Article 20 (1) ofthe Convention stated supra.

Article 21 is what shall be called the 'special provision' that provides for the
amendment of this Convention if need arises. It also provides steps or procedures
for such amendment.
"I. Special protocols or agreements may, if
necessary, supplement the provisions of this
Convention.
2 This Convention may be amended if a State Party
makes a written request to that effect to the
Secretary General of the Organization ofAfrican
Unity. The assembly of Heads of State and
Government may only consider the
proposed amendment after all the States
Parties have been duly informed of it at least
three months in advance.
3 The amendment shall be approved by a simple
majority of the State Parties. It shall come into
force for each State which has accepted it in
accordance with its constitutional procedures
three months after the Secretary General has
received notice of the acceptance. "
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Article 21 is 'special' in the sense that it creates the avenue under which the thesis
of this dissertation can be achieved by amending the Convention to include a
universal Court for trial of terrorist acts, rather than leaving it on the hands of
domestic courts of Member States.

The Convention stipulates, in Article 22, how the contents of this Convention shall
be interpreted. It provides that the Convention shall not be interpreted as derogating
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from the general principles of international law and African Charter. If there is any
dispute between Member States in interpreting this Convention, it shall be amicably
settled between them by direct agreement. Failure to reach a consensus by the
Member States, they can then refer to International Court of Justice for
interpretation of the Convention. The wordings of the said article are:
"1. Nothing in this Convention shall be
interpreted as derogating from the general
principles of international law, in particular
the principles of international humanitarian law,
as well as the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights.
2. Any dispute that may arise between the
States Parties regarding the interpretation or
application of this Convention shall be amicably
settled by direct agreement between them. Failing
such settlement, any one of the State Parties may
refer the dispute to the International Court of
Justice in conformity with the Statute of the
Court or by arbitration by other States
. to th"zs conventzon.
. 346
Partres
Article 23 provides different official languages of the OAU (AU) Member
States, in which the original version of this Convention was written and
deposited with the secretary general of the Organization.
346

!d. at Article 22 (1) & (2).
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"The Original of this Convention, of which the
Arabic, English,French and Portuguese texts
are equally authentic, shall be deposited with
the Secretary General of the Organization of
African Unity. "

The Convention ends with an Annex, containing the list of all international
instruments. 347

3.2. OAU (AU) COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBATING TERRORISM.

Is the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 in compliance with the UN requirements? In
2001, a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was created by Resolution 1373 to
monitor all member states counter terrorism ratification as required by UN.

The OAU Algiers Convention 1999 is a regional treaty, which finds its basis in the
numerous United Nations Conventions and Resolutions that deal with counter-

347

(a) Tokyo Convention of Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963;
(b) Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation
of 1971 and the Protocol thereto of 1984; (c) New York Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes against International Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents of 1973;
(d) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 1979; (e) Convention on the Physical
Protection ofNuclear Materials of 1979; (f) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
1982; (g) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1988; (h) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf of 1988; (i) Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Maritime Navigation of 1988; G) Convention on the
Making of Plastic Explosives of 1991; (k) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Explosive Bombs of 1997; (I) Convention on the Prohibition of the use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1997. See Annex ofOAU Convention
on Preventing and Combating Terrorism.
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terrorism measures. The OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 states categorically
among other preambles that,
"Believing in the principles of international law,
the charter .... and the latter's relevant resolutions
on measures aimed at combating international
terrorism and, in particular, resolutions 49/60 of
the General assembly of 9 December, 1994 ...
as well as resolution 511210 of the General
Assembly ... "348

On the 84th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the resolution 49/60, known
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as Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, held on December 9, 1994349 ,
urged all United Nations Member States in accordance with the provisions of the
Declaration, to take all appropriate measure at the national and international levels
to eliminate terrorism with immediate effect. 350 In its Annex, it recalls and is
concerned by the increase in many regions of the world, of acts of terrorism based
on intolerance and extremism, firmly determined to eliminate international
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations; 'Convinced also, that the suppression
of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are directly or
indirectly involved, is an essential element for the maintenance of international
. ,351
peace and secunty

The resolution also declares that:
"States must also fulfill their obligations under
the Charter of the United Nations and other
provisions of international law with respect
to combating international terrorism and are
348

See the preamble ofOAU Convention on preventing and Combating ofTerrorism, 1999.
See A/RES/49/60
350
Id., at 4.
351
See the Annex of A/RES/49/60.
349
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urged to take effective and resolute measures
in accordance with the relevant provisions of
international law and international standards
of human rights for the speedy andfinal
. . . oif.znternatzona
. l terrorzsm
. .... ,352
el zmznatzon

Additionally, in Resolution 511210, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,
the General Assembly at its ggth plenary meeting of 17 December, 1996, recalled its
resolution 49/60, supra. It recalled that in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, the General Assembly "encouraged States to review
urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention,
repression and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the
aim of ensuring that there was a comprehensive legal framework covering all the
aspects of the matter." 353 It also reaffirmed the declaration on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism contained in the annex to resolution 49/60. 354

These two resolutions and other international legal provisions formed the core basis
for enacting the OAU Algiers Convention, 1999. Also, wordings of Article 22 of
the OAU Convention stated above, shows that OAU Convention is an instrument
enacted in accordance with the requirements of international law in combating
terrorism and should not be interpreted as derogating from the general principles of
international law, particularly principles of international humanitarian law and
African charter on Human and peoples' right.

352

!d., at 5.
A/RES/51/21 0.
354
!d., at 7.

353

140

Therefore, suffice it to say that the enactment ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999
is in compliance with the United Nations requirement for combating terrorism.

3.3. EFFECTS OF THE OAU ALGIERS CONVENTION 1999.

The main point lies not in enactment of the law, but the enforceability of the
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enacted law. As far back as 1985, on the 401h anniversary of the signing of the UN
Charter, the then Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar stated that:
"Mere condemnation of .... terrorist acts is
insufficient. Effective international action
is required. Resolutions and conventions have
been adopted in the past ... These provide a vital
framework for countermeasure. It is tragically
evident, however, the new, multilaterally coordinated
efforts are urgently required to deal with the terrible
phenomenon, which is beyol}d the capacity of any one
country to handle alone. "35 )

Did Javier Perez de Cuellar's statement supra make any impact in enactment of
counter-terrorism laws in UN and at world at large? How has the OAU Convention
impacted Africa in preventing and combating terrorism?

The UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was created in 2001 to monitor the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 13 73. The CTC Consists of all 15
members of the Security Council. They took the unprecedented step of imposing
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uniform obligations on all UN Member States 356 and enforce Member States to
ratify all existing UN and regional legal instruments on terrorism and to enact
domestic legislation necessary for their enforcement.

Then, as a result of concern, that the 1999 OAU Algiers Convention had inherent
weaknesses which could impair its implementation by the Union, the AU enacted
Protocol to the OAU Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism for the
effective implementation of the Convention in 2004.

The preamble of the Protocol states that the Union is:
"Gravely concerned at the increasing incidence
of terrorist acts worldwide, including in Africa,
and the growing risk of linkages between
terrorism and mercenarism, weapons of mass
destruction, drug trafficking, corruption,
transnational organized crimes, money
laundering, and the illicit proliferation of arms;
Determined to combat terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations and any support thereto in Africa;
... Guided by the principles and regulations enshrined
in international conventions and the relevant decisions
of the United Nations (UN) to prevent and combat
terrorism, including resolution 1373 adopted by the
Security Council on 28 September 2001, and relevant
General Assembly resolutions;
Reaffirming our commitment to the OA U Convention
for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, adopted
in Libreville, Gabon, in July 1977;
... Reaffirming our commitment to OA U Convention on
the Prevention and Combating of terrorism adopted by
356

Eric Rosand. Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the fight
against terror; 2003, American Journal of International Law 97 at 333.

142

the 35th OA U Summit in Algiers, Algeria, in July 1999;
... Further Recalling the plan ofAction for the
Prevention and Combating ofTerrorism adopted by
the intergovernmental High Level meeting of
Member States of the African Union, held in Algiers,
Algeria, in September2002;
.... Stressing the imperative for all Member States of
the African Union to take all necessary measures to
protect their populations from acts of terrorism and
to implement all relevant continental and
international humanitarian and human rights
instruments; and

I

Desirous ofensuring the effective implementation of
the OA U Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism. "357
Apparently, the main purpose of the protocol 1s to enhance the effective
implementation of the Convention and to give effect to Article 3(d) of the Protocol
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the
African Union, on the need to coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the
prevention and combating of terrorism in all its aspects, as well as in the
implementation of other relevant international instruments. 358 The Protocol also
provides for the mechanism for implementation of the OAU Algiers Convention
1999 in its Article 4 (a)-( f), which states thus:

"The Peace and Security Council (PSC) shall be
responsible for harmonizing and coordinating
continental efforts in the prevention and
combating of terrorism. In pursuing the endeavor,
the PSC shall:
(a) establish operating procedure for information
gathering, processing and dissemination;
(b) establish mechanisms to facilitate the
357

See the preamble of the protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism.
358
Id at Article 2 (2).

143

exchange of information among States Parties
on patterns and trends in terrorist acts and
activities of terrorist groups and on successful
practices on combating terrorism;
(c) present annual report to the Assembly of the
Union on the situation of terrorism on the
continent;
(d)monitor, evaluate and make recommendations
on the implementation of the Plan ofAction and
programmes adopted by the African Union;
(e) examine all reports submitted by States Parties
on the implementation of the provisions of this
Protocol; and
(f) establish an information network with national,
regional and international focal points on terrorism. "359

I

The PSC is the supreme organ of the AU charged with the responsibility to prevent
and combat terrorism in Africa. Article 7(i) of the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the PSC gives it the power to ensure the implementation of the
Algiers Convention and other relevant international, continental and regional
conventions and instruments, as well as harmonise and coordinate efforts at the
regional levels to combat international terrorism.

International concern about Africa has more to do with its weak states providing
safe haven for terrorists, from which to finance and launch terrorist attacks or hide
from international retribution? 60 The most glaring omission from the OAU Algiers
Convention of 1999 is any reference to monitoring or compliance mechanisms. The
Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act ofthe African Union, 2000, closes this gap, in
theory, by providing for sanctions against a Member State which "fails to comply

359
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with the decisions and policies of the Union". In practice, however, the AU has no
precedent and little power to enforce compliance.

The AU Plan of Action is premised on the need to strengthen the capacity of
African

States

through

intergovernmental

co-operation

and

co-

ordination. 361 Ratification and implementation of the OAU Algiers Convention,
1999 is the first undertaking of the Plan of Action. A primary objective of the AU

I

Commission and the Institute for Security Studies (who were partners in the
project) in convening the Algiers Senior Officials' Meeting was to build up
momentum for the 15 ratifications required for the Convention to enter into force.
This target was met and exceeded at the said Algiers meeting of 2002, with South
Africa being the 15th Member State to ratify the Convention.

Although it is not mandatory, the plan of Action specifically sets out a monitoring
and enforcement role for the new Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the
commission of the AU. Under Article 7 of the Protocol relating to the
Establishment of the PSC, adopted at the AU Summit in Durban, July 2002, the
PSC is specifically charged to ensure the implementation of the Algiers Convention
and other relevant international, regional and sub-regional instruments to combat
terrorism. 362 The PSC (or the existing Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution) shall request all Member States
to report annually on the steps they have taken to prevent and combat terrorism, and
361
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specifically, to implement the Algiers Convention, 1999; present an annual report
on terrorism to the Assembly or the Union; and monitor and make
recommendations on the implementation of the AU Plan of Action on the
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The AU Commissioner in charge of Peace
and Security will also examine and follow up on the reports submitted by Member
States, and "provide advice on matters pertaining to counter-terrorism action
including preparation of model legislation and guidelines to assist Member

I

States". 363

Another important proposal which was accepted in the meeting is the establishment
of African Research Centre on Terrorism; therefore, the African Centre for the
Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established through the AU plan of
Action meeting, 2002. The ACSRT provides forum for interaction and cooperation
among Member States and Regional mechanism. The centre is considered part of
the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission and plays an important
role in guiding the AU's counter-terrorism efforts and implementing the AU

I

counter-terrorism framework. It works in collaboration with a number of regional
and international partners to ensure coherent and co-ordinated counter-terrorism
efforts in the continent. 364

363
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The mandate of the ACSRT is to centralize information, studies of and analyses of
terrorism and terrorist groups, as well as to initiate research and develop training
programmes by organizing training schedules, meetings and symposia with the
assistance of international partners, with the view to raise maximum awareness,
prevent and eliminate the threat of terrorism in the continent. The ACSRT is
envisaged to provide the AU with the necessary expertise for realising the AU's
Counter-terrorism objectives as well as translating the continental and international

I

.
.
.
365
commitments
of the Member States mto
concrete actiOns.

Paragraph 17 of the OAU Plan of Action and Article 5 of the Protocol to the OAU
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism specify the
responsibilities of the AU Commission as well. Their duties includes: the provision
of technical assistance on legal and law enforcement matters, including matters
related to combating the financing of terrorism; the preparation of model laws and
guidelines to help Member States to formulate legislation and related measures for
preventing and combating terrorism; and follow-up with Member States and with
regional mechanisms on the implementation of decisions taken by the PSC and
other organs of the AU on terrorism- related matters.

Despite the Protocol and AU's Action Plan for the effective implementation of the
1999 OAU Algiers Convention 1999, there are still incessant terrorist acts going on
in Africa. The current debacle in Somalia may have dragged the AU into an
untenable situation that could fundamentally undermine the promise of that
36s

Id.
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organization as a force for peacemaking and improved governance. 366 The main
challenge remains the full implementation of the counter-terrorism instruments and
relevant decisions of the AU policy organs.

Funding is necessary for more effective compliance with the OAU(AU) Convention
on counter-terrorism especially among the weak states. Economic instability is the
major factor that affects effective implementation of counter terrorism legislations.

I

Another major challenges encountered by the AU in implementing its counterterrorism agenda is the lack of adequate human and financial resources. While this
problem is not peculiar to counter-terrorism, it is, however, a severe stumblingblock to fully and timely realise the AU's counter-terrorism objectives, especially if
the Union is to be proactive in its response to terrorism. 367

The AU is also unable to verify which Member States are complying with or
actually implementing the AU and international counter-terrorism regimes and
which ones are not. Though Member States are required to report to the chairperson
of the commission on their activities, many are still reluctant to do so, complaining
and reporting fatigue. 368

The AU still lacks the capacity to develop a list of perpetrators of terrorist acts as
provided for in the Plan of Action. This is compounded by lack of a regional or

366
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continental arrest warrant which could permit the AU to investigate arrest and
. persons accuse d or suspected of terronst
. acts. 369
detam

Though, OAU (AU) needs to be praised for drafting the Convention for preventing
and combating of terrorism, but implementation of the said convention is still
ineffective for combating terrorism in the continent.

I
3.4. CONCLUSION.

In as much as priority should be given to effective combating of terrorism over
human rights law, however, in-depth review of this Convention shows that
combating terrorism will likely clash with principles of international humanitarian
law, notwithstanding that Article 22 of the Convention states otherwise.

The OAU Algiers Convention 1999 requires States Parties to proscribe terrorist
acts, punish them with penalties taking 'into account the grave nature of such
offences'. Some human right activitists argue that, while acts of terrorism may be
very grave, States should bear in mind that the death penalty is an extreme
exception to the right to life and should be applied only to the most serious
crimes. 370

369
370
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But these human right activists should also bear in mind that terrorist is a serious
crime that deprives people of their basic fundamental human rights as well.
The OAU Algiers Convention 1999 entrench the principle of 'extradite or punish'.
The extradition provision of the Convention have the potential to clash with the
human rights commitments by states not to extradite alleged offenders to
jurisdictions where they could face the death penalty. 371 Therefore, even on paper,
the Convention is not in all ramifications, compliance with the requirements of

I

international law in combating terrorism, same as the applicability of the stated
Convention.

The Convention mandates Member States to enact their national legislations in
combating terrorism as required by the UN Security Council, without actually
considering how some poor Member States will effectively combat such grievous
offense as terrorism. What then happens to such Member States that does not have
capability of prosecuting and convicting terrorists due to its economic power? Why
should the continent not provide a universal court vested with terrorist jurisdiction
for the AU and mandates all State Members to refer such offence to the court?

Notably, the AU's Charter stated among other objectives, that their union will
promote unity and solidarity of African States, co-ordinate and intensify their
cooperation and efforts to achieve better life for people of Africa. Article 5 of the
OAU Algiers Convention of 1999, focuses on Member States' cooperation in
preventing and combating terrorist acts in their national levels; which could be so
371
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easily attained in regional level since the region already has an agreed and
acceptable definition of "terrorist acts". This definition is binding on all the
Member States that have ratified the Convention in accordance with Article 1(2) of
the convention and shall not make any national law contrary to this regional
convention.

Certainly, some Member States are economically down and enmeshed with terrorist

I

activities (for example Somalia), how can one expect an effective prevention and
combating of terrorism in that state, when the arms of government are already
suffering, or in Senegal and Mozambique that are overwhelmed with the
catastrophic effects of genocide, drought and HIV/Aids? If only the OAU/AU can
establish a regional court, it will be easier for such weak nations, such as Somalia,
Senegal, Mozambique, etcetera, to combat terrorism more effectively.

Therefore, what has been provided so far in Africa regional counter-terrorism
instruments remains largely to be translated into action.

I
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CHAPTER FOUR

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OAU CONVENTION ON
PREVENTING AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM AND SOME OTHER
CONVENTIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM WITH SOME AFRICAN
ORIGIN.

4.0. INTRODUCTION.

So many countries adopted similar laws in such a short time after 9111 because of
the development of legal resemblance of anti terrorism laws that has a different
cause. For the first time in history and at a fastest speed, legal systems around the
globe adapted to a changed world by responding to the same threat, for the same
reason, all States were ordered to fight terrorism in a common template forged by
international organizations; and most States actually did. 372

But this is not the case for African continent; long before the 9111 incidence, Africa
as a region and some organizations with Africa origin already adopted antiterrorism legislations. Some of the laws are: Arab Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, 1998, known as 'Arab Convention', which is chronologically the first
out of the three Conventions to be discussed in this chapter. The Arab Convention
was adopted in April, 1998 at Cairo by the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice and
was later revised on 28 March, 2008. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic

372
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Conference on Combating International Terrorism came next in 1999. It is known
as 'OIC Convention' and was adopted at the 26 session of the Organization of
Islamic Conference of foreign ministers at Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in July,
1999; then followed by the OAU Convention on the Preventing and Combating of
Terrorism, 1999, adopted in Algiers, Algeria on 14 July 1999 as discussed in
previous chapters.

I

These three Conventions (Arab Convention, OIC and OAU Algiers Conventions)
have so much in common with the UN Security Council and General Assembly
declarations on terrorism. They also share common elements with the international
conventions and protocols. All the three Conventions , explicitly or implicitly,
condemn terrorism to be a criminal act that is not to be considered a political crime;
state the aim of multilateral co-operation; make provision for preventive measures;
call for the exchange of information and co-operation for preventing and combating
terrorist crimes; and establish common prosecution and extradition procedures. The
most noticeable differences relate to their definitions (or lack of formal

I

definition(s)) of terrorism and the extent to which they make provision for
exceptions relating to the right to self-determination. 373

This chapter begins with a brief history of the Arab League Organization and
Organization of Islamic Conference, followed by discourse on their respective antiterrorism Conventions before making a comparative analysis of the three

373
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Conventions in order to ascertain the originality of the OAU Algiers Convention
1999 or to otherwise conclude that it is a duplicate of the Arab Convention and OIC
Convention.

Further, under this same chapter, some State Party's (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya,
Sudan and Nigeria) response to the Convention is assessed to certify compliance
with their obligations under the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 ; and to determine
the effectiveness of approaches they are using (if any) in combating terrorism in
their respective nations.

4.1. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ORGANIZATION
OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

4.1.1. ARAB LEAGUE:

The Arab League officially called 'The League of Arab States', is a voluntary
association of countries whose peoples are mainly Arabic speaking or where Arabic
is an official language. The League of Arab States was created to "strengthen the
close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States" and "direct their
efforts towards the goal of the welfare of all Arab States ... [and] the guarantee of
their future and the realization of their aspirations," and today, primarily serves to
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promote political, economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation among Arab
states. 374

The idea of the Arab League was mooted in 1942 by the British, who wanted to
rally Arab countries against the Axis powers. However, the league did not take off
until March 1945, just before the end of World War II. At that time the issues that
dominated the League's agenda were freeing those Arab countries still under
colonial rule, and preventing the Jewish community in Palestine from creating a
Jewish state.

The Organization started off with six (6) members namely, Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan
(renamed Jordan in 1949), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Currently, the League
has 22 Member States namely; Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
Syria's participation has been suspended since November 2011, as a consequence
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of their government's repression during the ongoing uprising and civil war.

The highest body of the league is the Council, composed of representatives of
Member States, usually foreign ministers, their representatives or permanent
delegates. 375 The daily affairs of the league are coordinated by the General
Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General. The General Secretariat is the

374
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administrative body of the league, the executive body of the council and the
specialized ministerial councils. 376

4.1.2. ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC):

The OIC is an inter-governmental organization, comprised of Islamic states with its
headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is the second largest inter-governmental
organization, after the United Nations, with membership of fifty seven (57) States
spread over four continents. 377 OIC was founded on 25 September 1969, following
an appeal from the former Mufti of Jerusalem to all Islamic States to join the First
Islamic Summit at Rabat, Morocco.
The summit was held in response to the August arson attack on the holy al-Aqsa
Mosque in Jerusalem. This historic meeting was instrumental in the formation of
the OIC, and Islamic Solidarity became the framework to increase cooperation and
exchange among the Islamic states. In 1971, the Islamic Foreign Ministers'
Conference formally established the OIC by approving the Charter, which a
majority of Member States had ratified by February 1973. 378

The present Charter of the Organization was adopted by the 11th Islamic Summit
held on 13 and 14 March 2008 which laid down the objectives and principles of the

376
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organization and fundamental purposes to strengthen Islamic solidarity and
cooperation among the Member States. Over the last forty (40) years, the
membership has grown from its founding members of twenty five (25) to fifty
seven (57) states. 379

Although not clearly defined by the Charter, the term 'Muslim State' implies where
Muslims are majority. To become an OIC member, a Muslim State submits an
application expressing its willingness to adopt the Charter. One of the main goals of
the OIC is to reduce the gross inequalities among Islamic Member States. 380

The Member States are:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,

Bangladeshi, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote
d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgystan, Lebanon, Libya,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria,
Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sudan, Surinam, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen; although Nigeria renounced its
membership in 1991, the OIC has not recognized this decision.

Some of the objectives among others under the OIC charter are to strengthen
Islamic solidarity among Member States; to consolidate cooperation in the political,

379
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economic, social, cultural and scientific fields; to safeguard the dignity,
independence, and national rights of Muslim people; to safeguard the Holy Places
and support the struggle of the Palestine people; to eliminate racial discrimination
and all forms of colonialism; and, to promote cooperation and understanding
between Member States and others. 381

In order to realize these objectives, Member States shall act in accordance with the

I

following principles:
All Member States commit themselves to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations Charter; All
Member States shall settle disputes through peaceful
means and refrain from use or threat of use offorce
in their relations; All member States undertake
to respect national sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity of other Member States and
shall refrain from interfering in the internal affairs
of others; Member States shall uphold and promote,
atthe national and international level, good
governance, democracy, human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law. 382

The principal institutional framework of the OIC is comprised of three parts. First,
the Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government defines the strategy
for Islamic policies. Second, the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers examines
the progress on implementing the Islamic Summit's decisions. Finally, the General
Secretariat is the executive organ of the OIC and headed by a Secretary General,

381
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who executes the decisions of the Islamic Summit and the Islamic Conference of
Foreign Ministers? 83

The Organization of Islamic Conference changed name into Organization of Islamic
Cooperation in June 2011, at the 38th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
"OIC" as an acronym remains in use? 84

I

4.2. ARAB CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM,
1998 (ARAB CONVENTION)

4.2.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARAB CONVENTION:

The Arab Convention is divided into four (4) main parts and the parts are further
divided into chapters, sections, 42 Articles and paragraphs. Part I is the 'Definition
and General Provision' that comes after the Preamble. It is subdivided into Articles
1 and 2.

Part II concentrates on the 'Principles of Arab Cooperation for the Suppression of
Terrorism'. It is divided into two (2) Chapters with five (5) sections which are
further subdivided into Articles and paragraphs. First Chapter focuses on 'The
security field' and Section I of Chapter I is on 'Measures for the Prevention and

383
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Suppression of terrorist offences, containing Article 3; Section II is on 'Arab
Cooperation for the Prevention and Suppression of terrorist offences containing
Article 4 with sub-headings and paragraphs. Chapter II of Part II centres on 'The
judicial field' and contains five (5) Sections. Section I is on 'Extradition of
Offenders' containing Articles 5-8; Section II is the 'Judicial Delegation'
containing Articles 9-12; Section III is on 'Judicial Cooperation' containing
Articles 13-18; Section VI is the 'Seizure of assets and proceeds derived from the
offence' containing Articles 19 and 20 and; Section Vis on 'Exchange of evidence
containing only Article 20.

Part III focuses on 'Mechanism for Implementing Cooperation'. It is divided into
three (3) major Chapters. Chapter I is the 'Extradition Procedures' containing
Articles 22-28; Chapter II is on 'Procedures for Judicial Delegation containing
Articles 29-33 and Chapter III is the 'Measures for the Protection of Witnesses and
Experts containing Articles 34-38. The final part is Part Four, titled 'Final
Provision' containing Articles 39-42.

4.2.2. REVIEW OF THE ARAB CONVENTION:

The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (the Arab Convention) was
the first comprehensive attempt by Arab states to legislate collectively against
terrorism. Like other regional agreements, the Conventions are designed to improve
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the cooperation between Member States; nevertheless it did not overlook the
importance of reaching out, participating and consolidating forces in the
international efforts to combat terrorism. 385

Its preamble states among others thus:
" .... promote mutual cooperation in the suppression
of terrorist offences, which pose a threat to the security
m1d stability of the Arab Nation and endanger its vital
interests,

I

Being committed to the highest moral and religious
Principles and, in particular, to the tenets of
the Islamic Sharia, as well as to the humanitarian
heritage of an Arab Nation that rejects all forms of
violence and terrorism and advocates the protection
of human rights, with which precepts the principles
of international law conform, based as they are on
cooperation among peoples in the promotion ofpeace;
Beingfurther committed to the Pact of the Arab
States, the Charter of the United Nations
and all other international convents and instruments
to which the Contracting States to this Convention
.
,386
are partzes. ....

Article 1( 1) defines 'Contracting Parties' as 'Member States'. The Arab Convention
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further set out a definition of 'terrorism' in Article 1(2) as discussed in chapter two
supra, while Article 1(3) defines 'Terrorist Offence' as also cited in the same
Chapter two of this dissertation? 87 It is important to note that this Article 1(3)
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incorporated the definition of terrorism in the mentioned Conventions as definition
of terrorist offences too, therefore, making the definition cumbersome.

The definition is immediately followed by an article that expressly excludes acts
that are undertaken as part of a struggle against foreign occupation. That exclusion
is underlined in the preamble, which affirms the rights of peoples to combat foreign
occupation and aggression by any means, including armed struggle, in order to
liberate their territories and secure their right to self-determination and
independence. However, that right must be exercised in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN and with the UN' s resolutions but
it does not exclude "any act prejudicing the territorial integrity of any Arab
State". 388 These references to the right to armed struggle against oppression suggest
where some of the difficulties may lie in achieving a universal definition of
'terrorism' .389

Article 3, Part II of the Convention deals with obligations and duties of Contracting
States. It is divided into two major paragraphs. Paragraph I calls on the Contracting
States to take preventive measures against perpetrating of terrorist acts in its
territory and ensure safety of diplomats in its territory. Paragraph II which is on
measures of suppression mandates Contracting States to arrest, investigate,
communicate and prosecute terrorist offences in accordance with the national law or
extradition in accordance with the Convention.
388
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Article 4 requires the Member States to cooperate for prevention and suppression of
terrorist offences in accordance with their national law by exchanging information,
investigations and exchange of expertise. 390

Article 5 provides for extradition, just like in the 1999 OAU Algiers Convention's
extradition section. It states thus; "Contracting States shall undertake to extradite
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those indicted for or convicted of terrorist offences whose extradition is requested
by any of these States in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated in this
convention". Article 6 stipulate conditions and circumstances under which
extradition shall not be granted. 391

Article 9 focuses on mutual legal assistance between Member States, while Article
10 discusses grounds on which legal assistance may be refused. Article 11 provides
that such request shall be granted in accordance with the municipal law of the
requested State and at a convenient time for the requested State to execute the
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request.

Articles13-17 urges Member States for judicial cooperation by assisting each other
for investigations and prosecutions relating to terrorist offences and Article 18 states
that this judicial cooperation shall not hinder the victim of the offence from
claiming his civil law rights.

390
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Article 19 further buttress extradition proceedings. It states that in an extradition
request, the requested state shall extradite alongside with the alleged offender, all
property and money relating to the commission of the terrorist offence for which the
victim is being extradited. One of the concerns raised by Amnesty International is
that the Convention includes wide extradition powers, "there is a risk that
individuals might be returned to countries where they will face serious human rights
abuses, including being subjected to torture, unfair trials, or the death penalty."392
Article 20 immediately limits the provision of Article 19 by providing reasons
under which assets and proceeds derived from the offence cannot be handed over to
the requesting .State. Then, Article 21 encourages Member States to exchange
information by commission Rogatoire.

Part III provides generally for rules in application of legal mutual assistance
between Member States. Part III, Chapter I, Articles 22-28 stipulates the
requirements and procedures for extradition. Article 26 specifically provides that
persons may be detained without trail for up to sixty (60) days pending
extradition. 393 Prolonged detention without charge or trial is drastic erosion into the
right to liberty and must be seen as a measure of last resort. Under any
circumstances, compelling reasons needs to be presented before resorting to
detention without trial because of its potential for the use of torture. 394
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Article 11 of the Convention Against Torture and Other cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Punishment requires States Parties to keep under 'systematic review
interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for
the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest and detention
with the aim of preventing any cases of torture. The Human Rights Committee,
commenting on Article 9 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), has stated that the period of custody before an individual must be brought

I

before court may not exceed a few days. 395

Also, the Human Rights Committee, addressing the question of derogations from
rights under Article 4, held that: "State Parties may in no circumstances invoke
Article 4 of the Convenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian
law or pre-emptory norms of

international law, for instance ... through arbitrary

deprivations of liberty or by deviating from fundamental principles of a fair trial,
including the presumption of innocence". 396

I

Further, the committee underlined that for non derogable rights to be upheld,
recourse to a court to decide the legality of detention had to be preserved when a
State decided to derogate from the Convenant. 397

Chapter II, Articles 29-33 of the Arab Convention provides for judicial delegations
and requirements the requesting State need to provide, while Articles 34-38 which
395
396
397
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focuses on measures for protecting the witnesses and experts in requesting States'
territory, provides that, if a requesting State requests for an appearance of a witness
and expert from a requested State, the former shall undertake to pay for travel and
subsistence expenses. Article35 states that if a witness refuses to appear despite the
summons, he shall not be guilty of any offence and if he decided to appear on his
own accord in the requesting State, he should be bound with the domestic
legislation of that state. Further, Article 36 provides for the immunity an expert or a

I

witness acquires while in the requesting State, which the said immunity lapses thirty
(30) days after his presence is no longer required in the requesting State's
territory. 398

Under Part IV, the final provisions, Article 39 discusses the ratification of the
Convention by Member States, while Article 40 stipulates how and when the
Convention shall enter into force. Article 40 states thus:
"1. This convention shall enter into force on the
thirtieth day after the date as of which
instruments of ratification, acceptance or
approval have been deposited by seven Arab
States.
2. This Convention shall enter into force for any
. other Arab State only after the instrument of
ratification, acceptance or approval has been
deposited and 30 days have elapsed from
the date of that deposit. "

Article 42 provides that "no Contracting State may make any reservation that
explicitly or implicitly violates the provisions of this Convention or is incompatible
with its objectives".
398
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Arab League received numerous criticism due to the Convention, no wonder it took
a long time for it to enter into force.

In March 2002, in an additional effort to further the effectiveness of the
Convention, the Arab League Council decided to include the following acts within
the scope of the Convention: Incitement and applauding terrorism; Printing and
distribution of documents supporting terrorism; Collecting charity contributions for
the benefit of terrorism; The acquisition and usage of property for terrorism.
Consequently, a drafting committee formulated an amendment to the Convention
that corresponds with the Council's decision and that was finally adopted; but, the
adoption of the Convention in 1998 presented an outstanding example for regional
cooperation in combating terrorism, paving the way for other regional organizations
to realize the possibility of achieving such levels of cooperation and thus being
encouraged to follow. 399

I

Nevertheless, the Arab Ministers of interior during their meeting on measures to
combat terrorism in January, 2004 at Tunis, Tunisia, noted that "many of the
provisions of the Convention do not conform with the obligations of Member States
of the Arab League under the UN Charter and international human rights law. The

399
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Convention also fails to recognize and maintain many other rights and obligations
enshrined in human rights and humanitarian law". 400

Further, the Amnesty International called for amendment of the Arab Convention
and raised so many concerns with the existing Convention. Among the concerns
raised by Amnesty international are:

I

"The definition of 'terrorism' in the Convention is so broad that it lends itself to
wide interpretation and abuse."

Other terms in the Convention, including

"violence", "terrorist purposes", and "terrorist groups" are not defined. 401

Some provisions of the convention clearly threaten the right to freedom of
expression, including those measures that, according to the Convention, aim to
strengthen the "media services" of the security forces. In the absence of a clear
definition of these measures, there is a serious risk that they could be interpreted to
allow for censorship and interference with freedom of expression, imposed or
required by the respective authorities in the region, on the pretext of"security". 402

The Convention does not require judicial review or prior judicial authorization
when surveillance and monitoring measures are used against individuals and
groups. The authorities, therefore, would be collecting and exchanging information

400
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about people who are otherwise engaged in peaceful legitimate activities, and where
the methods used to collect information may violate the right to privacy. 403

There are no safeguards in relation to surrender of individuals or extradition in the
Convention. Amnesty International believes that surrender and extradition must not
be carried out to a jurisdiction where alleged suspects would become prisoners of
conscience, subject to the imposition of death penalty, or torture, cruel, inhuman or

I

degrading treatment or punishment. The organization insists that alleged
perpetrators should have a fair trial. Although the Convention details measures for
the arrest and trial of accused persons, it is totally silent about guarantees for fair
trial for those accused of crimes of "terrorism", and in some cases includes
provisions that actually undermine such safeguards. 404

The Convention fails to incorporate safeguards for the rights of detainees, including
guarantees for the right to be promptly brought before a judge, and to be tried
within a reasonable time, or released. It does not include a prohibition of arbitrary
detention, or a clear prohibition torture. There are no provisions to allow for
challenging the lawfulness of detention.

405

Under the pretext of punishing crimes of

"terrorism", the convention widens the scope of the death penalty in many countries
and does not prohibit its imposition against minors, pregnant women and mentally
handicapped persons. Amnesty International opposes the death penalty in all cases

Id.
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as it violates the right to life and is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading
punishment. 406

Some provisions in the Convention could provide impunity for perpetrators of
certain crimes, including the crimes that fall clearly under the responsibility of the
international community to investigate, and where there is sufficient evidence;
prosecute on the basis of universal jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Convention specifically does not allow for extradition in cases
when an amnesty has been issued covering the perpetrators of these crimes in the
requesting State. 407 Arab league still need to review their existing Convention on
Terrorism to ensure its compliance with international law and UN requirements.

4.3. CONVENTION OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE ON COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
(OIC).

4.3.1. AN OVERVIEW OF THE OIC CONVENTION:

It will not be an understatement to say that OIC is simply a replica of Arab

Convention. It is similar to the later in all ramifications except for some wordings
which are differently construed but resultantly almost the same, if not same.
Analysing all the parts of the OIC tantamount to repeating already discussed Arab

406
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Convention supra, nevertheless it will still be briefly discussed especially on areas
that portray slight difference with the later.

Like the Arab Convention, OIC also has four (4) major parts, sections, 42 Articles
and paragraphs. Part I which is the 'Definition of General Provisions' follows the
preamble. The part contains Articles 1 and 2 with paragraphs.

Part II is the 'Foundation of Islamic Cooperation for Combating Terrorism' and is
subdivided into two (2) Chapters, Divisions, sections, Articles containing
paragraphs. Chapter I of the part is the 'Field of Security' that is divided into two
(2) divisions. Division I is on 'Measures to prevent and Combat Terrorist Crimes';
it contains Article 3(A) and (B) with paragraphs. Division II is on 'Areas oflslamic
Cooperation for preventing and combating terrorist crimes' containing Article 4
with its sub-paragraphs. Chapter II of the same Part II focuses on 'the Judicial
field'. It contains five (5) sections. Section I is on 'Extraditing Criminals' which is
made up of Articles 5-8; Section II is on 'Rogatory Commission' containing
Articles 9-13; Section 3 is the 'Judicial Cooperation', which contains Articles 1418; Section 4 is on 'Seized Assets and Proceeds of the Crime' containing Articles
19 and 20. Section 5 is 'Exchange ofEvidence' which contains Article 21 only.

Part III centres on 'Mechanism for Implementing Cooperation' which is further
divided into three (3) Chapters, Articles and paragraphs. Chapter I is the
'Extradition Procedures' containing Articles 22-28; Chapter II is on 'Mechanism
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for Rogatory Commission' with Articles 29-33. Chapter III is on 'Measures for
protecting Witnesses and Experts' and Articles 34-38 makes up the Chapter.

Finally, Part IV is the 'Final Provisions containing Articles 39-42.

4.3.2. ANALYSIS OF THE OIC CONVENTION:

In 1999, the OIC adopted "the Convention of the Organization of Islamic
Conference on Combating International Terrorism". The Convention entered into
force in 2002 after the deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification in
accordance with Article 40 of the Convention. The Convention contains two
particular points of friction with general international law on terrorism. One is the
broad definition of terrorism and the second is the exemption of certain causes for
terrorism which the OIC endorses. 408

Article 1 of OIC Convention follow the same way in its definition of terrorism as
that of Arab Convention except that it additionally defined 'Terrorist Crimes' while
the later defined 'Terrorist Offences'. The preamble confirms the legitimacy of the
right of peoples to struggle against foreign occupation and colonialist and racist
regimes by all means, including armed struggle'. Some part of the preamble
provides as follows:
" .... Adhering to the principles of International Law
408
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and the United Nations Charter as well as all
relevant UN resolutions on procedures aimed
at eliminating international terrorism, and
all other conventions and international instruments
to which states acceding to this Convention are
parties and which call, inter alia, for the observance of
the sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity,
political independence and security of states
and non-intervention in their international
affairs;
Desiring to promote cooperation among them
for combating terrorist crimes that threaten the
security and stability of the Islamic States and
endanger their vital interests;
Being committed to combating all forms and
manifestations of terrorism and eliminating
its objectives and causes which target the
lives and properties ofpeople; .... "

I

'Terrorism' is defined in Article 1(2) and goes on to extend the elements of such a
plan to include also harming people's honour, freedoms, security or rights, exposing
the environment or any public or private property to hazards, occupying or seizing
property, endangering national resources or international facilities, or threatening
the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of any state.

409

The definition of 'terrorism' in the Convention is extensive but inadequately
defined. For example, the notion of harm to people's rights or of exposure of the
environment to hazards are extraordinarily vague and do not adequately describe
acts of violence. The inclusion of threats to the political unity of a state would
encompass separatist movements regardless of their peaceful means, pre-judging

409
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the legitimacy of political motivation. Thus, in addition to being vague, the OIC
Convention definition has a steep political slant and is not objective. 410

The OIC Convention provides a separate definition of a 'terrorist crime' and also
stipulates that crimes against UN terrorism-related conventions are considered to be
'terrorist crimes' .411 It defines "terrorist crime" more broadly as any crime
perpetrated, commenced or participated in to realize a terrorist objective in any

I

Contracting State or against its nationals, assets, interests or foreign facilities,
punishable by its national laws. The prerequisite of criminality under the national
legislation of the OIC Convention Contracting Parties also renders the definition
. . 412
sub~ectiVe.

Struggle, including .armed struggle, by people against foreign occupation,
aggression, colonialism and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination
in accordance with the principles of international law, is not to be considered a
terrorist crime. 413

Article 1(4) lists crimes stipulated in various multilateral conventions and deems
those acts to be "terrorist crime", but only if the conventions were ratified by the
party concemed. 414 The utility of the cross-reference to multilateral conventions is

410
411
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undercut by excluding application to non-parties to those conventions. 415 This
implies that the Convention incorporated the definitions of terrorist crimes defined
in the above stipulated Conventions as terrorist crimes just exactly the same manner
in which Arab Convention incorporated same.

Article 2 provides for exceptions to what shall be deemed as terrorist cnmes
thereby limiting the ambit of Article 1(3) and (4). Article 2 (a) of the OIC

I

Convention provides that a peoples' struggle "including armed struggle against
foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and
self-determination in accordance with principles of international law shall not be
considered a terrorist crime". This exception contemplates that acts that would
otherwise be considered terrorist are condoned for a wide range of purposes. The
purposes are broad and imprecise.

416

Further, Article 2 (d) stipulates that all "international crimes" aimed at financing
terrorist objectives shall themselves be classed as terrorist crimes. This part of the
definition extends the meaning of "terrorist crime" to include other criminal
activities, such as trafficking in narcotics and human beings, that are intended to
finance terrorist plans.

Part II of the OIC Convention sets out extensive areas of cooperation required by
Member States to combat and prevent terrorist crimes. Article 3 (1) calls upon the
415
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member parties not to support terrorist acts and Article 3 (II)(A) lists the preventive
measures that each Member Party "shall see to". These include barring their
territories from being used as arenas for planning, organizing and executing terrorist
crimes; developing and strengthening border control and surveillance on transfer or
stockpiling of weapons; and strengthening security of protected persons,
international organizations, vital installations and public transport facilities. Article
3 (II) (B) of the OIC Convention lists "combating measures" as an area for

I

cooperation that includes arresting perpetrators of terrorist crimes, ensuring
protection of witnesses and investigators to terrorist crimes, and establishing
effective cooperation between the concerned government agencies and the citizens
for combating terrorism.

Under Article 4 Member States are encouraged to exchange information regarding
terrorist activities and legal assistance in prosecuting terrorist activities. Members
are also encouraged to incorporate in researches and studies that will help to combat
terrorism.

Article 5 makes provision for the extradition of alleged terrorists within Member
States. Member States undertake to extradite those indicted or convicted of terrorist
crimes. Article 6 further sets out circumstances under which extradition should not
be granted. Extradition may be refused if the crime for which extradition is
requested is deemed, under the laws in the requested State, to be one of a political
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nature, 417 as political crimes is exempted from terrorist crimes under Article 2 (b) of
the Convention. The only situation which can be contemplated under Article 6 to
legally compel the requesting State to extradite is when the crime has been
committed in the requesting State's territory by a person who is not a national of the
requested State. 418 Article 7 provides that if a person requested to be extradited is
under trial, the extradition shall be postponed.

I

Section III of Chapter II centres on judicial cooperation among Member States. It
provides that a Member State may request another state to prosecute the alleged
terrorist in its country on the requesting State's behalf. 419The national law of the
Member State, where the trial is taking place shall be followed. 420

Article 19 is the handing over of property and money along with the alleged
offender for extradition under the Convention. A proceeding in handing over the
required assets and grounds on which it may be withheld is provided for under
Article 20. Further exchange of protection and evidence obtained are covered under

I

Article 21.

Part III stipulates procedures for implementing cooperation among Member States.
Extradition procedures and requirements are provided under its Articles 22-28.
Article 23 provides that any request for extradition must be accompanied by the

417
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original or an authenticated copy of the indictment or arrest order issued in
accordance with the conditions stipulated in the requesting State's legislation.
Parties must also provide a statement of the acts for which extradition is sought,
which specifies details such as dates and places, and a description of the subject
wanted for extradition. These procedural requirements are specific, which is
advantageous in the absence of other extradition arrangements. 421 Articles 29-32
stipulate procedures and requirements for Rogatory commissions. Art. 33 require an
explanation for refusal of Rogatory Commission. The Article provides thus "any
refusal for Rogatory commission shall be explained."

Just like Arab Convention the wellbeing of witnesses and experts while in the
territory of a requesting State is covered under Articles 34-37 of Chapter III of the
Convention. Article 38 provides that a summoned witness or an expert who is
already in prison of the requested State can be transferred provisionally to the
location of the hearing. The same Article 38 provides grounds on which such a
request may be denied as follows:
"(a) If the witness or expert refuses.
(b) If his presence is necessary for undertaking
Criminal procedures in the territory of the
requested State.
(c) If his transfer would prolong his imprisonment.
(d) If there are considerations militating against his
transfer."

Article 39 of the final part is the ratification of the Convention by Member States
while Article 40 provides for the entry into force of the Convention. Article41 urges
Member States not to make any reservation contrary to this Convention and Article
421
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42 stipulates the procedure to be followed by a Member State who wishes to
withdraw from this Convention.

OIC Convention has been criticised by some authors and Human Right Watch
(HRW). The OIC Convention provides two separate, yet, overlapping definitions
for the terms 'terrorism' and 'terrorist crimes'. Such a distinction is problematic and
creates difficulty in the application of an instrument dedicated primarily to law

I

enforcement. 422 In addition, the definition of the term 'terrorism' is wide and
encompasses certain ambiguous and sometimes political concepts, thus adding to
the difficulty in applying and enforcing the Convention. 423

HRW noted that international law prohibits attacks against civilians no matter the
circumstances, and requested the OIC to amend its definition of terrorism "to clarify
that its condemnation of terrorism makes no exemptions, even if in the name of
causes that OIC Member States endorse". 424 HRW also criticised the OIC
Convention for using vague language which has led the definition to go beyond the
generally accepted understandings of the concept of terrorism and suggested that
the definition be amended to cover only those acts committed with the intention of
causing death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, which is in line with
the statements by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. 425

422
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On the prosecution side, the OIC Convention provides for a general obligation on
the Member States to prosecute or extradite, however, without requiring the states
to establish the terrorist acts as a crime under national law or subject to criminal
jurisdiction. This has legal implications for cooperation and extradition processes,
especially when viewed in light of the definition of terrorism in Article 1 which
may be subject to states' different interpretations. For example, under Article 6, the
only situation where a state is legally compelled to extradite is when the crime has
been committed in the requesting state's territory by a person who is not a national
of the requested state. 426 The lack of effective law enforcement instruments can
allow perpetrators of terrorist acts to escape punishment and prevent a state from
exercising national jurisdiction on a terrorist crime it may consider within it
competence. 427

The Convention is very ambitious in the extent of obligations of prevention and
combating to be fulfilled. However, it is left to the discretion of each Contracting
State to decide how to fulfil the obligations to cooperate. Unless it was the common
interest of the relevant States to cooperate in certain aspects of a certain case, such
cooperation may not be achieved solely on the basis of the legal nature of the
. . 428
obl1gat10n.
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Like Arab Convention, the Convention also needs to be reviewed by the OIC in
order to make it an effective law enforcement instrument for combating terrorism.
Such a review should include redefining terrorism and terrorist acts and unifying
the two terms; revising the issue of political crimes; establishing terrorist acts as
crimes under national laws and providing for the situations where jurisdiction must
be established; refining the language of the Convention to overcome ambiguities
. . 429
and 1ega1 uncertamtles.

I
4.4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THREE CONVENTIONS
(ARAB CONVENTION, OIC AND OAU ALGIERS CONVENTION)
ON COMATING TERRORISM.

The 1998 Arab Convention informs the 1999 OIC Convention and the two are
virtually identical. 430 The parties to the Arab Convention are also parties to the OIC
Convention, which has double the membership of the Arab League. Furthermore,
some of them with the double membership are also members of the OAU Algiers
Convention 1999.

There are many similarities and relatively minor differences between the three
Conventions, especially as it relates to Arab Convention and OIC Convention. The
drafting of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 is noticeably different from the other

429
430

!d.
Gregory Ross and Diana Nestorovska. Supra note 307

181

two, despite the undeniable fact that the former two Conventions inform its ideas.
Some of these similarities and differences are discussed below.

The OIC Convention condemns terrorism and stresses its unjustifiable nature. It
also sweepingly defines it but explicitly excludes, in a nod to, among others,
Peoples' struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression,
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in

I

accordance with the principles of international law". The Arab Convention takes
essentially the same position in that it excludes "all cases of struggle by whatever
means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for
liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international
law". Likewise, the detailed definition of terrorism in the OAU Algiers Convention
1999 is qualified by its exclusion of the "struggle waged by peoples in accordance
with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination,
including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation and domination by
foreign forces". 431

Under the OIC Convention, the meaning of "international crimes" is not clear and
does not address the financing by simple donation of funds by supporters, perhaps
the most ubiquitous form of financing. It casts "terrorism", "terrorist crime",
"international crimes", as well as 'ordinary and political crimes', together into one
conceptual swamp. The vague sweep of this definition is unsatisfactory. 432 This is
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one of the main differences between Arab Convention, OIC Convention and OAU
Algiers Convention 1999. OAU Algiers Convention of 1999, defined 'terrorist acts'
only; OIC defines both 'terrorism' and terrorist crimes' while the former defines
'terrorism' and 'terrorist offences'

The three regional conventions 'carving out' acts committed by liberation
movements in the pursuit of self-determination, implies that violence in pursuit of
certain just causes should not be classified as terrorism. 433 One ofthe exemptions is
also rather self-serving. The Arab Convention exempts liberation violence from
being regarded as terrorism, but where it is not directed against Arab States
themselves. In principle, it might be thought that the Arab States have already
attained self-determination during decolonization, and thus that there could not exist
any legitimate self-determination claim against the independent Arab States. 434

Suffice it to say that, the sweeping exclusion clauses in these three Conventions,
reflecting as they do, the political and ideological sympathies of the OIC, the Arab
League, and the OAU (AU), almost swallow the rule condemning terrorism, thus
meaning that all such "legitimate" forms of violence fall outside the OIC, Arab, and
OAU Algiers Conventions simply because of the conventions' exculpatory
language. 435

433
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The three Conventions usefully identify common areas for cooperation m
preventive measures, as being the stockpiling of weapons, border controls over
dangerous goods and suspected persons, and security for protected persons. None of
these Conventions address the prevention of terrorist financing and none provide
strong models for implementation of preventive measures. 436

Provisions to suppress the financing of terrorism are found in the OAU

I

Conventions, where Parties undertake to refrain from financing terrorist acts. 437 A
terrorist act is defined to include "sponsoring". 438 The OIC Convention also
contains relevant provisions but merges money laundering with terrorist acts where
it states that money laundering aimed at financing terrorism is itself to be
considered a terrorist crime. 439 It would seem a better approach to prosecute
perpetrators of money laundering activities intended to finance terrorist acts under
the two separate charges of money laundering and of terrorist financing so as to
maintain the conceptual distinction between money laundering and terrorist
. 440
fimancmg.

Under Article 5 of OAU Algiers Convention 1999, Parties undertake to strengthen
the exchange of information among them regarding acts and crimes committed by
terrorist groups and the communication methods used by such groups. 441 Both the
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OIC and OAU Algiers Conventions oblige the Parties to respect the confidentiality
of any information passed to them.

Although Articles 9 and 10 of the Arab Convention which is on 'Judicial
delegation' is a bit different from Part V of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 on
'Extra-Territorial Investigations (Commission Rogatoire) and Legal Mutual
Assistance'; but its Article 14 is almost the same meaning with Articles 9 and 10,

I

only that the wordings are different. The said Article 14 of the OIC Convention
provides that each party shall extend to the other every possible assistance for
investigation or trial proceedings related to terrorist crimes. OAU Algiers
Convention Parties undertake to exchange information leading either to the arrest of
any person charged with a terrorist act against the interest of a Party, or to the
seizure of arms. 442

Part V of the OIC Convention outlines procedures in relation to extra-territorial
investigations and mutual legal assistance. Article 14 ( 1) provides that any Party

I

may request another Party to carry out, with its assistance and cooperation, on the
latter's territory, criminal investigations related to judicial proceedings concerning
alleged terrorist acts. 443

The three Conventions are impliedly the same, even though the sectional
arrangements and some wordings are different.
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4.5. THE ORIGINALITY OF THE OAU CONVENTION ON PREVENTING
AND COMABTING TERRORISM 1999.

Many of the regional conventions are modelled after the multilateral conventions,
covering proscribed offences; establishing jurisdiction and extradition elements;
and calling on Member States to combat terrorism. 444 In 2006, the UN General
Assembly formerly adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 445 The
Strategy essentially call upon Member States to actively combat International
terrorism by taking various types of measures. The measures and their requisite
actions, are categorized as follows:
"(1) measures to address the conditions conducive
to the spread of terrorism;
(2) measures to prevent and combat terrorism;
(3) measures to build states' capacity to prevent and
Combat terrorism and to strengthen the role
of the UN system in this regard; and
(4) measures to ensure respect for human rights all
and the rule of law as the fundamental basis
of the fight against terrorism. "

Thus, while ambitious, the Strategy thus provides some guidance to both Member
States and UN institutions, in order to take the necessary steps, to not only combat

.
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But, before the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, OAU Convention on
Preventing and Combating Terrorism, under review, was already enacted in 1999,
after the Arab Convention of 1998 and the

ore Convention of 1999; and it seems to

be in line with the prescribed measures by UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
of2006. But the question is: how original is the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999?

From, the above discussion on comparative analysis of the three Conventions, it is

I

clear that OAU Algiers Convention 1999 is not 'unique' per se but rather a
duplicate of Arab Convention and
Arab Convention and

ore

ore Convention. Its underlying ideas are that of

Convention. Although, it is drafted slightly different

from the other two conventions, the contents are almost the same. For example;
Article 1 of the three conventions are drafted the same way by firstly defining
convention, followed by the meaning of 'Member States', then terrorist acts or
terrorism, but in different wordings. The noticeable differences are, as stated before,
while Arab Convention and OIC Conventions defined terrorism in addition to
'terrorist offence' and 'terrorist crime' respectively, OAU Algiers Convention 1999

I

defined only 'terrorist act'. Again, it did not import other definitions of terrorism in
other Conventions as part of its definition of 'terrorist act' in the convention, like its
counter parts (Arab Convention and OIC Convention),447 rather, it replaced it by
mandating the Member States to review their national laws and include 'terrorist
act' defined in this Convention, as a criminal offence in their national laws; 448

447

See Article 1(3) of the Arab Convention; Supra note 70 and Art. 1(4) of the OIC Convention;
Supra note 69.
448
Article 2 of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26.
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though, it listed other Conventions in its Annex, 449 but made no reference to them in
other parts of its Convention. OAU Algiers Convention 1999 exempted liberation
for self-determination including armed struggle against colonialism from its
definition of 'terrorist act' just like Arab Convention and OIC Convention.

Another example of derivative idea can be seen in the Part II of the OAU Algiers
Convention 1999, which is the same as Part II of the other two conventions except

I

that OAU Algiers Convention 1999 titled its own Part II 'Area of Cooperation'
while the other two titled their own 'Measures for Prevention and Suppression of
Terrorist Offences (Terrorist Crimes)', but the law in Part II of the three
conventions are the same. In the said Part II of the three conventions, the Member
States agree not to use or allow the usage of their territory for any act of terrorism.

Further, 1999 OAU Algiers Convention Part III which is 'States Jurisdiction' is the
same as the 'Judicial Field' of Arab Convention in its Chapter two of Part II. The
extradition provisions of the three conventions are almost the same, only that the
drafting and the required procedures for achieving extradition in OAU Algiers
Convention of 1999 is different from that of the Arab Convention and OIC
Convention. Also, there is no exemption to the specific types of crimes that should
be extradited under OAU Algiers Convention 1999 like its other counterparts that
listed circumstances under which extradition shall not be granted.

449

See the Annex of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 347.
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More so, final provisions of the three conventions are the same only that the
sectional arrangements are different. Another noticeable difference between the
three conventions is the obvious fact that Arab Convention and OIC Convention
contains 42 Articles each while OAU Algiers Convention 1999 has 23 Articles; but
the content remains almost the same.

It is therefore conclusive to state unequivocally, that OAU Algiers Convention 1999

is not 'original per se' but an imitative and modified version of Arab Convention
and OIC convention.

4.6. THE STATE PARTIES' RESPONSES TO TERRORISM.

Since the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 mandates Member States to criminalize
and combat terrorism in their different nations, what are these States' responses to
acts of terrorism in their countries? How effective are these responses if any? Could
it be better if responded and handled as one crime in regional level and by a
centralized regional court? Or should it be included in the jurisdiction of the ICC, or
that of the African Court of Human and Peoples' Right (AfCHPR), 450 or create
another Special Court vested with jurisdiction for terrorist cases in the Region, since

450

The African Court of Human and Peoples Right (AFCHPR) was created by Article 1 of 'The
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights with reference to the
constitution of a single court of justice in Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act of2000. The
AFCHPR complements the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and People's
right. Their decisions are binding on the member states, though it is not yet in force.
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there is definition of terrorist act in the OAU Algiers Convention 1999451 that is
acceptable by the Member States? And, have the Member States complied with the
requirements of the OAU Convention 1999?

The OAU Algiers Convention of 1999, urged all Member States to
"review their national laws and establish criminal
offences for terrorist acts as defined in this convention
and make such acts punishable by appropriate
penalties that take into account the grave
nature of such offenses "452

I

In response to the mandate, some African States have responded by enacting
counter-terrorism legislations and taking some other measures in combating
terrorism. For instance, some Member States of the Inter-governmental Authority
on Development (IGAD), comprising of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Eritrea,
Djibouti and Somalia, have taken measures to counter terrorism because their
population have sustained the loss of thousands of lives and considerable

I

destruction of property in recent years. 453 IGAD countries had held meetings on
combating of terrorism. The issue on combating of terrorism was firstly introduced
at IGAD Council of Ministers' Meeting held in Khartoum in January 2002, and was
discussed in details at the Addis Ababa meeting from 25 to 27 June, 2003. IGAD
members are of the opinion that terrorism can be effectively combated if they team
up as one, than fighting it in national levels. An Ethiopian government official

451
452
453

OAU Algiers Convention 1999; Supra note 14 at Article 1 (3).
ld., at Article 2 (a).
Prof. Knife Abraham., supra note 21 at 9.
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stated clearly that, 'it is obvious that no matter how economically and militarily
strong a state may be, it cannot, alone, fight terrorism". 454

The countries under-review in this dissertation has responded in the following
ways:

4.6.1. ETHIOPIA:

After signing onto the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism, Ethiopia passed a new anti-terrorism law known as "A Proclamation on
Anti-Terrorism No:652/2009" in accordance with Article 55(1) of the Constitution
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, signed into law by their president,
Girma Woldegiorgis in 2009.

The Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism No: 652/2009 is divided into five parts. In the
preamble of the Anti-terrorism Proclamation 652/2009, the country noted that it is
necessary to enact adequate legal provisions "since the laws presently in force in the
country are not sufficient to prevent and control terrorism"455 . The Act in its
definition section, defined terrorist organizations but did not define 'terrorism' ;456 it
also defined terrorist acts 457 and related offences. 458 The Act also went well beyond
even the AU's broad definition, specifying that terrorist acts are "acts that might
454

Id. at 11.
see preamble part of A Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism No:652/200 of Ethiopia
456
A Proclamation on Anti-Terrorism No:652/200, at part 1(2)
457
Id. at Part 1(3).
458
Id. at Part 5.
455
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endanger or increase a risk of persons, property, public services, and environmental
resources while the perpetrators was attempting to coerce the government or
intimidate a segment of the population". 459 In addition to criminalizing terrorism,
the law also criminalizes planning, preparation, conspiracy, attempt, rendering
support, encouragement, and other acts. Moreover, the crime of terrorism is
punishable by death. 460

I

The Proclamation gave the House of People's Representatives the power "upon
submission by the government to proscribe and de-proscribe an organization as
terrorist organization." 461 The Act also provides for penalties for terrorist acts.

In Part 6 (31) of the Proclamation, both the Federal High Court and the Supreme
Court are vested with jurisdiction to try terrorist cases. It also declared in the same
sub-section 31 that
"Articles 13 and 17(1) (b) of the 2004 Criminal
Code of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia relating
to jurisdiction shall also include terrorism offences. "

I

Since February 12, 2012, the UN Human Rights activists have been voicing against
the use of the anti-terrorism laws to curb the freedom of speech in Ethiopia. Human
Rights Watch has condemned the law by saying that It provides "the Ethiopian
government with a potent instrument to crack down on political dissent .... It would
permit long-term imprisonment and even the death penalty for 'crimes' that bear no

459
460
461

Id. at Part 2, Article 3.
ld. at Article 4.
Id. at Part 25 (I).
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resemblance, under any credible definition, to terrorism". 462 Several journalists
were sentenced to prison for no just cause under such legislation. Ethiopia should
apply the Anti-Terrorism legislation cautiously and in accordance with the
country's International Human Rights obligations. 463

Most of the human rights activists are actually blaming the Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi for using his position in mis-application of the anti-terrorism law by

I

infringing on the fundamental human rights of the people in the country.

Ethiopian Penal Code includes a list of acts that constitute terrorist acts if they are
perpetrated against an individual or group with the aim of seriously disrupting
public order. Among the list are "deliberate attacks on human life", deliberate
attacks on the physical integrity of the person", "theft" and "destruction".

Other measures Ethiopia had taken in combating terrorism is by being a party to
many International Conventions and Protocols relating to terrorism. It motivated the

I

adoption of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 and ratified same in 2003. Article 9
(4) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Ethiopia made international and
regional instruments relating to combating of terrorism part and parcel of their
national law. 464 The country also entrusted the National bank of Ethiopia with the
responsibility of overseeing banking and monetary activities in the country to
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ensure no illegal transfer of funds and to avoid sponsoring of terrorism. It has also
tightened its boarder control system. 465

Ethiopia is also a Member State of the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development and participated actively in its Security Sector Program, which builds
the capacity of its Member States to mitigate, detect and deter advances by
terrorists. Ethiopia was an active participant in the AU's counter-terrorism efforts

I

and participated in its Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism and in meetings
of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa. 466

The Ethiopian government froze assets allegedly used in planning terrorist acts,
pending investigation as to whether those assets can be legally confiscated. The
Government of Ethiopia's Charity and Societies Agency is responsible for
monitoring non-profit organizations to prevent misuse of funds and terrorist
. 467
fimancmg.

Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan are members of Partnership for Regional East
African Counter-terrorism (PREACT). PREACT, formally known as the East
African Regional Strategy Initiative, is the East Africa counterpart to the TransSahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). PREACT, first established in 2009,
is a US funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to

465

Id., at 14.
See Chapter 2 of US Department of Sate: Diplomacy in action. It can be found at
www.state.gov> ... >country reports on terrorism 2012 .
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build the counter-terrorism capacity and capability of Member countries to thwart
short-term terrorist threats, counter violent extremism and address longer-term
. 468
vu1nerab1.l.1t1es.

4.6.2. SOMALIA:

I

Somalia has no anti-terrorism legislation yet, though the Somalia's Cabinet has
recently submitted an anti-terrorism law to the Parliament for their approval. This
could be as a result of the present unrest in the country caused by Al-Shabaab
Islamic extremist group terrorizing the country as discussed in Chapter two. The
country is a member of many Regional and International Conventions on terrorism.
Only those International and Regional Conventions that the country is a party to, is
sustaining the country right now in terms of combating terrorism. Kenya, its
neighbouring country, is also helping them fight the terrorist Islamic sect by
sending some troops into the country.

I
In 2012, the Somalia government worked with international and regional partners,
including Kenya, Ethiopia, the AU, and the UN to degrade al-Shabaab as a
domestic threat to stability and a terrorist threat abroad. Somalia is a member of the
AU, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States,
and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The Puntland regional government
stepped up its security campaign against al- Shabaab by encouraging citizens to
468

!d.
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report any actions they believed could lead to insecurity or may be linked to or
assist al-Shabaab. 469

From August 2012, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the
Government of Somalia along with regional governments, continued to pursue alShabaab suspects throughout the year. In partnership with African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) and neighbours, the government conducted a successful

I

military campaign against al-Shabaab strongholds in southern and central Somalia,
capturing al-Shabaab strongholds of Baidoa, Afgoye, Afmadow, Balad, Lanta
Buuro, Merca, Miido, Wanla, Weyn and Jowhar. Their most significant victory was
the September 28 capture of the port-city of Kismayo, which al-shabaab has used as
a primary source of revenue through extortion activities and charging of duties, in
particular on the export of charcoal. 470

The Somalia government has increasingly become more adept at proactively
countering al-Shabaab's violent extremist messaging. Examples of successful

I

counter-messaging included the countering Violent Extremism programs on Radio
Mogadishu and the state-owned TV station. In 2010, the TFG's Ministry of
Information and Telecommunications began airing the Islamic Lecture Series
(ILS)471 in Mogadishu, a program which has since expanded to include former alShabaab strongholds of Baidoa, Beledwyne, Dhusamareb, and Abudwaq.

Id.
Id.
471
ILS is a one-hour, call-in radio program designed to undercut al-Shabaab's effort to acquire
religious legitimacy for its violent extremist ideology. See supra note 467.
469
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4.7.3. KENYA:

Kenya have series of legislative Acts or laws relating to terrorist acts, examples,
Penal Code (Cap 63) oflaws of Kenya, Anti-Money laundering and Crime proceeds
of Crime Bill, Criminal Procedure Code (Cap75) and so on.

In 1998, Kenya revoked the registration of muslim NGO's, including Al-Haramin,
because of their links to terrorism. In Febuary 2003, the government formed an
Anti-Terrorist Police Unit composed of officers trained in anti-terrorism. At the
same time, the cabinet authorised negotiations between the executive and legislative
branches on legislation to detect and punish suspected terrorists. In June 2003,
foreign minister Musyoka called on parliaments to expeditiously pass an AntiTerrorism Bill. This led to the enactment of Suppression of Terrorism Bill,
published in Kenya, 2003, which was rejected after fierce opposition from Human
Rights activists in Kenya. They are of the opinion that the provisions of the bill
conflicts with basic human rights because it provides for indefinite detention of
terrorist suspects and confiscation of their assets among other provisions. 472 But in
October, 2011, the Bill was discussed again in the conference of Kenyan activists
and legal experts. 473

On 12 October, 2012, the President of the country signed 'The Prevention of
Terrorism Act, 2012, No 30 of 2012' which is an act of parliament to provide
472

Joyce Maulama., Opposition to Anti-terror law that violates even basic rights.
http/ipnews.net/Africa/nota.asp?idnews=36894
473 Id.
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measures for the detection and prevention of terrorist activities; to amend the
extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Act and the Extradition (Contiguous and
foreign Countries) Act, and for connected purpose.

474

It is made up of six (6) parts

with fifty-three (53) Sections. The Act became effective on 24 October, 2012.
Section 2 (m) (a) contains the definition of 'terrorist Act' and commission of
terrorist act is provided under Section 4 of Part III of the Act.

I

Nevertheless, Kenya has demonstrated its commitment to combat terrorism together
with Uganda and Tanzania via the establishment of a joint East African Community
(EAC) committee which coordinates activities against terrorism.

475

Kenya has also

expressed willingness to collaborate with the other IGAD Member States to fight
terrorism. Just like Ethiopia, Kenya is also a party to many Protocols and
Conventions relating to terrorism.

In August 2010, Kenya passed a new Constitution, which allows it to apply
International laws within its jurisdiction. 476 They believe that the provision will be
of immense help to the country in combating terrorism and other international
crimes. They can prosecute terrorism using the provisions of the Money laundering
law and organized crimes law, which was passed by Kenya's parliament. 477

474
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Kenya's Prevention of Terrorism Act, marked a key legislative milestone in the
fight against terrorism. Combined with the 2009 proceeds of crime and Anti-Money
Laundering Act and the 201 0 Prevention of Organized Crime Act, Kenyan
prosecutors have a robust suite of tools for bringing individuals and organizations to
justice; tools which will also greatly facilitate international cooperation and mutual
legal assistance in terrorism cases. Even, prior to the passage of the new law,
Kenyan authorities began prosecution of two ongoing high-profile terrorist cases
against Iranian citizens and alleged Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods
Forces; persons Ahmad Abolfathi and Sayed Mansouri on explosive charges, and
against British citizen Jern1aine Grant on charges of plotting to kill Western tourists
on behalf of al-Qa'ida.

Kenya is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money
Laundering Groups, a Financial Action Task Force (F ATF)-style regional body.
The FATF had previously highlighted the deficiencies in Kenya's anti-money
laundering/combating the financing of terrorism regime and intimated possible
counter-measures against Kenya. In response, Kenyan authorities developed and
made significant progress on an action plan to address those deficiencies, including
the establishment of the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) and adoption of the
Prevention ofTerrorism Act (POTA) in October. 478

Other measures within the State in combating terrorism are: the Ministry of Finance
establishment of Task Force on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the
478

U.S Department of State. Supra note 466.
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Financing of Terrorism, consisting of representatives from finance, trade and
foreign affairs ministries; the Central Bank; the police, the criminal investigation
department (CID); and the National security intelligence service. These team seeks
to review existing legislation and recommend a national policy on combating the
. of terronsm.
. 479
fimancmg

Kenya is an important partner in the U.S Combined Joint Task Force-Hom of

I

Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Dgibouti that seeks to check terrorism. This program
envisages the U.S training of regional militaries in counter-terrorism procedures.
Furthermore, as part of the multinational campaign, a special Anti-terrorism Squad,
composed of the German Naval Air Wing, is currently based in Mombassa to
monitor ships plying the gulf of Aden and the Somalia coast. 480

Kenya was an active law enforcement partner and participated in the Department of
State's Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA programs focused on
strengthening border security, enhancing investigative capacity, promoting respect

I

for human rights, and building critical incident response capacity through training,
mentoring, advising and equipping Kenyan counter-terrorism- focused lawenforcement agencies. Kenya also continued its partnership with the United States
on expanding Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System,
PISCES, border controls to additional ports of entry. 481
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Kenya is also a member of the AU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development, the Community of Eastern and Southern African, and the East
African Community. The Kenyan government coordinated with these groups
significantly during its military campaign against al-Shabaab militants in Somalia.
Kenyan law enforcement agencies worked closely with the international
community, including the United States, to increase their counter-terrorism abilities,
secure porous land borders, and improve maritime security. Kenya hosted numerous
trainings involving law enforcement professionals from neighbouring nations to
build counter-terrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation. Kenya also
cooperated with the United States and other nations to secure especially dangerous
pathogens and enhance the Kenyan government's capability to prevent the sale,
theft, diversion, or accidental release of chemical, biological or radiological
weapons-related materials, technology and expertise. 482

4.6.4. SUDAN:

Sudan had succeeded in convincing the UN to lift the terrorism related sanctions
placed on it. In 1999, Sudan signed the International Convention for the
Suppressing of Financing terrorism which showed that it is ready to cooperate in
combating of international terrorism. 483 The following year, 2000, it ratified the
International Convention for Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, which led to the

482
483
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UN to lift the sanction against Khartoum, Sudan in 2001. Sudan also ratified the
OAU Algiers Convention in 2003 and the same year signed Counter-Terrorism
Agreement with Algeria, Yemen and Ethiopia.

In 2000, the US and Sudan entered into a counter-terrorism dialogue, prompting
Sudan to close down the popular Arab conference, which had been functioning as a
forum for terrorists. In May 2003, Sudanese authorities raided a suspect terrorist

I

training camp in Kardufan State, arresting more than a dozen extremists and seizing
illegal weapons. Four months later, a Sudanese court convicted a Syrian engineer
and two Sudanese nationals of training group of Saudis, Palestinians, and others to
carry out attacks in Iraq, Eritrea, Sudan and Israel. In August 2004, Sudanese
authorities arrested, prosecuted and convicted Eritrean who hijacked a Libyan
aircraft and forced it to land in Khartoum. 484 In 2007, the US State Department
called Sudan a 'strong partner in the war on terror', and praised Sudan for
aggressively pursuing terrorist operations that threatened US interests. 485

The most significant development of Sudan's statute with US took place on 9 July
2011, when the southern portion of the country seceded to become South Sudan.

Notably, Sudan has an Anti-Terrorism Act, 2001, which vests jurisdiction of
terrorist cases on special court known as Anti-Terrorism Courts. They also have
Rules of Procedures for Anti-Terrorism Courts, 2008, which prescribes the

484
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procedures to be followed by the Anti-Terrorism Court in prosecuting terrorist
case. 486

Human Rights activists are in opposition of the activities of the Anti-terrorism
Courts on the ground that it infringes the International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Laws, especially the Court's trial procedures and imposition of
. 487
pena1t1es.

Sudan also has Anti-Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 2010. It
consists of 37 Articles and is the first comprehensive legislation for fighting money
laundering and financing terrorism. The law was made as a substitute to the law
combating money laundering 2003, so as to cope with the international legislative
developments of fighting the money laundering phenomenon. 488

Further, in 2014, the National Assembly endorsed the new Anti-terrorism and AntiMoney Laundering Laws, thereby convincing the FATF to remove them from list of
countries classified as a high risk in the field of money laundering and antiterrorism.
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4.6.5. NIGERIA:

Nigeria has "the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act"
(EFCC), 2004. It also has another Anti-Terrorism legislation known as Terrorism
(Prevention) Act, 2011, which was signed into law on June 3, 2011 by the president
of the country, Goodluck Jonathan but the Act has an Amendment Act known as
"Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2013".

The 2011 Act provides for the Prevention and Combating of Acts of Terrorism and
for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism in Nigeria. 489 It also emphasized on the
effectiveness of OAU Algiers Convention, 1999.

The Act did not define terrorism per se, but it provided for "Acts of Terrorism" and
Related Offences. It also provided penalties for such acts. The power to prosecute
the offender is vested on the Attorney General of the Federation (AG) 490 and it also
confers sole jurisdiction of trial of the offence and imposition of penalties under the

I

Act on the Federal High Court. 491 Section 33 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act,
2011 provides for penalties for terrorist offence and related offences, starting from
one million naira (Nl, 000 000), and three years imprisonment to life imprisonment
depending on the category of the crime. The Act also prescribed hostage taking as
an act of terrorism, 492 as described in Niger-Delta crises supra; invariably,

489
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criminalizing and groupmg the Niger-delta cnses gomg on m the country as
terrorist acts.

But, the 2011 Act ensued heated debate among the members of the house that led to
the amendment of the Act in 2012, by enacting the "Amendment Bill 2012" as an
addendum to the existing Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. However, there were
obvious differences between the bills that prompted the re-submission of the two

I

bills for review by both Chambers to reconcile the difference. The outcome of the
reconciliation of the two Acts is the "Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act,
2013". It is an Act which amends the 'Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 ', makes
provision for extra-territorial application of the Act and strengthens terrorist
financing offence. 493

The Act altered some sections of the existing Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011
by deletion and addition of new sections. Importantly, the 2013 Amendment Act
provides "that anybody guilty of the offence under this Act is liable on conviction
to maximum of death sentence". 494 It also deleted Section 11 (Hostage taking) of
the 2011 Act, but provided for the same offence of 'Hostage taking' in Section 15
of the 2013 Amendment Act.

The Nigeria incidence of January 24, 2011, in which the notorious Boko-Haram,
Islamic sect, bombed Kano state, killing two hundred people, induced the Federal

493
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government of the country to launch the Integrated Assistance for Countering
Terrorism (I-ACT), projects on conflict prevention and internal Coordination and
Information sharing among law enforcement. 495 The law promotes information and
intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies in Nigeria, facilitated by the
UN Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). 496 On April24, 2012,
Nigeria military joint task force invaded a suspected Boko-Haram bomb factory in a
suburb of the restive Northern city ofKano. 497

Nigeria is also a member of the Trans- Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership
(TSCTP), established in 2005, that is a US funded and implemented multi-faceted,
multi-year effort designed to counter violent extremism and contain and
marginalized terrorist organizations. TSCTP's core goals are to enhance indigenous
capacities of government in the Pan-Sahel, to confront the challenge posed by
terrorist organizations in the Trans-Sahara, and to facilitate cooperation between

I

those countries and US partners in the Maghareb. 498

Furthermore, Nigeria is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against
Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a financial Action Task Force
(F ATF)-style regional body. The country was publicly identified by the FATF in
February 2010 for the strategic anti-money laundering and combating the financing
495
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of terrorism deficiencies. In October 2011, Nigeria was named in FATF Public
Statement for its lack of progress in implementing its action plan. In 2012, Nigeria
made significant progress in addressing its outstanding deficiencies, including,
through the adoption of amendments to its Money Laundering (Prevention) Act. 499

The Ministerial Plenary Meeting of the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF),
Nigeria announced it would partner with Switzerland to co-host a Sahel Working

I

Group meeting on combating the financing of terrorism in early 2013. In January,
the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Launched three projects
under the Integrated Assistance for Counter-Terrorism initiative to support Nigerian
government efforts to combat terrorism. Nigeria is a lead member of the Economic
Community of West Africa States and has committed ground forces and logistical
support for a possible intervention force in Mali. Through its Office of the National
Security Adviser, Nigeria has taken a lead role in initiating dialogue between
regional countries on how they can better coordinate their efforts to confront
networks of terrorist groups that span international boarders. 500

Moreso, in response to the '200 missing school girls', abducted by Boko- Haram
(discussed in Chapter two), Nigerian President accepted assistance of foreign
countries in finding the missing girls that was kidnapped by Boko Haram. The
assistance includes communications, logistics and intelligence planning but will not
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include any military operations. 501 The U.S deployed a Military Surveillance
aircraft to try and locate the students and dispatched hostage negotiation experts and
other specialists to Nigeria. Britain also sent a team of experts and France had
proposed holding talks among the leaders of Nigeria and nearby nations to discuss
how to handle the situation. The Japanese indicated willingness to offer assistance
to bring stability to the region and prevent violence against women. 502

Also, by way of response to the Niger-Delta Crises, Nigerian government, in
October 2009, persuaded all major militant leaders to renounce violence and
surrender their arms in exchange for amnesty, government stipends, training
opportunities, and pledges of greater development for the Niger-Delta. Most
militant groups in the Niger Delta accepted the then president's offer of amnesty in
2009, and the overall level of violence there declined. Although, the amnesty led to
a sharp decline in attacks by militants, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies and
gang wars; fighting connected to the theft of crude oil ( known as illegal oil
bunkering) continued and contributed to the region's general insecurity and lack of
economic viability.

By the end of 2012, at least twenty-six thousand, three hundred and sixty-eight
(26,368) former militants had benefited in some way from the amnesty program.
Many former militants received vocational training and stipends. At year's end five
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thousand, two hundred and eighty (5,280) former militants were undergoing
vocational training, with one thousand, five hundred and thirty-eight (1,538)
attending courses abroad. The amnesty program resulted in a sharp decline in
militant violence in the region.

Furthermore, with the establishment of a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, manned
by indigenes of the area, it is expected that visible changes will occur in matters of

I

youth employment, industrialization and the provision of amenities, that will finally
end the crises in Niger-Delta.

4.7. CONCLUSION.

No doubt that most Member States have complied with the requirement of the OAU
Algiers Convention 1999, by enacting anti-terrorism laws and other security laws in
their respective nations, including establishment of criminal offences for terrorist
act. But how effective are these laws in combating terrorism in their nations?

Despite all these existing legislations on combating terrorism, terrorist acts are still
on the increase in Africa. Most of these national anti-terrorism legislations are being
criticized by legal experts and human rights activists on the ground that it infringes
on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws. Is it therefore right to
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conclude that, those national anti-terrorism legislations are not in compliance with
the UN's requirements for combating of terrorism?

A critical look at the three Conventions above shows that the OAU Algiers
Convention 1999 got its foundational ideas and initiatives from the Arab
Convention and OIC Convention, but undoubtedly enacted more precise antiterrorism Convention than the other two Conventions. Also, some of these Member
States in OIC and Arab Convention are also members of the OAU Algiers
Convention, as Stated before, and the Conventions defined terrorism in their own
different ways; which of the definitions will the Member States, with multiple
membership, be bound with?

There is need for AU to review, amend, delete and add sections to its already
existing Convention on terrorism, to reflect what is practicable within the capability
of the continent, bearing in mind the Member States' economic and technological
power, in combating terrorism as a nation. Convention should not merely be

I

enacted to fulfil ones obligation under UN mandate. UN is interested m
effectiveness of the Convention achieving its purpose.

Therefore, duplicating or imitating a more advanced States' or regional conventions
will not impede terrorist acts in Africa because they are economically and
technologically sophisticated than Africa. Applicable laws in those regions should
not be copied because it will never be effectively enforceable in Africa.
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CHAPTER FIVE.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION.

5.0. CONCLUSION.

This dissertation has reviewed the OAU Conventions on Preventing and Combating

I

terrorism and assessed its effectiveness in combating terrorism in the continent of
Africa.

Notwithstanding the highlighted pitfalls of the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999,
the OAU Algiers Convention forms the major pillar for the enactment of other
OAU (AU) legislations on peace and security in Africa. Comparatively, among the
three conventions discussed in this dissertation (OAU Algiers Convention, 1999,
Arab Convention, 1998 and OIC Convention 1999), some scholars had praised the
OAU Convention as one of the best regional conventions on combating terrorism
with a clearer definition of terrorist acts.

But, arriving at appropriate implementation of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999
remains an important task for the continent, despite the AU's action plans;
especially because of poor economy level of Member States, porous boarders and
lack of modern technologies in the continent for tracking down and prosecuting
terrorist acts.
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The purpose of the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
was to provide a concrete expression to the commitment and obligations of African
countries, to combat terrorism and to enhance their access to appropriate counterterrorism resources. It sought to provide robust guidelines and strategies for
collective and individual state action against terrorism by incorporating continental
and international standards for combating terrorism with particular attention to the
provisions of resolution 1373. 503 But this purpose has not been attained so far. Also,
the presence of PSC neither increases the efficacy of the applicability of 1999 OAU
Algiers Convention and its preventive measures nor combat terrorism itself.

The biggest shortfall of Africa's engagement of the war on terror is the absence of
an effective and efficient continental mechanism to support the required
cooperation between states, give effect to the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999,
implement its operative provisions and assist Member States to comply with
international law and continental obligations.

504

The international mandate to fight terrorism in the same way has generated an
extraordinary level of compliance, but that compliance has been customized at the
level of Member States, resulting in a set of laws that may not in fact provide the
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DuPlessis, Inus. The impact of war on Africa Security. 511/05 SREVSAFR 47 at 10.
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common legal framework that the architects of the Security Council anti-terrorism
resolutions had in mind. 505

It is difficult to discern clearly the practical impact of many of the regional

conventions. At present, the sheer diversity of regional definitions is sufficient to
militate against the view that there is any embryonic customary definition of
terrorism. While some of the more recent treaties include generic definition of

I

terrorism, others have deliberately refrained from this, following the approach of
the older regional treaties. Among those treaties which include generic definition, it
is further difficult to discern any underlying shared conception of terrorism. As the
International Court of Justice stated in the Asylum case, these treaties reflect 'so
much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy ... that it
is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as
law' .so6

I

The principal obligation in international treaties against terrorism is to incorporate
the crimes defined in the treaty into the domestic criminal law and further to make
them punishable with sentences that reflect the gravity of the offence. State parties
also agree to participate in the construction of "universal jurisdiction" over these
offences. Partly because of the lack of political will among a number of states to
support the international cooperation against terrorism, and partly because of the
belief that terrorism is a notion dependent on an individual's political belief, it has
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so far been impossible to achieve a universal consensus on a comprehensive antiterrorism convention and on a universal definition of terrorism.

International human rights law lays down obligations and duties which Party States
are bound to respect and fulfil. This obligations means that States must refrain from
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to
protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights

I

abuses. The obligation to fulfil means the states must be of positive action to
facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. 507

Through ratification of international human rights treaties, Government undertake
to put into place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty
obligations and duties. The domestic legal system, therefore, provides the principal
legal protection of human rights guaranteed under the international law. Where
domestic legal proceedings fail to address human right abuses, the mechanisms and
procedures for the individual and group complaints are available in the regional and

I

international levels to help ensure that international human rights standard are
indeed respected, implemented and enforced at the local level. 508

A comparative analyses of five states' responses (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan
and Nigeria) demonstrates that economic level, security laxity, religious differences

507
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The foundation oflntemational Human rights Law. }YWw.un.org/en/document/udr/hr/law.shtml
Id.
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and political interest of Member States largely affect the effectiveness of combating
terrorism in the continent.

The difficulty of overcoming the politically subjective nature of terrorism remains a
significant obstacle to the drafting of any comprehensive international antiterrorism treaty. International law has not emerged as an effective tool for
prosecuting terrorism and is perhaps only "useful as a measure of international

I

concern and opinion ... .lacking methods and mechanisms for enforcement, it cannot
be said to be an effective deterrent." 509

A number of human rights issues have arisen from OAU Algiers Convention 1999
and its Member States domestic anti-terrorism laws designed to deal with terrorism.
The Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights notes that the 'definitional
problem is the major factor in the controversy regarding terrorism', not believing
that broad definitions of acts of terrorism can be justified. Since counter-terrorism is
designed to address specific conduct, the necessary definitions ought to be
.
d wit
. h precisiOn.
. . 510
de1meate

The provisions ofthe Convention, no doubt, appear to be in contravention to human
rights law. For example; the right to freedom may be implicated under the
Convention. Under Article 3 (b) of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999 for example,
the definition of terrorist act includes 'any promotion, sponsoring ... incitement,
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encouragement. .. or procurement of such act'. Again, it would be difficult to justify
such a blanket and far-reaching limitation of the right and unless it is carefully
tailored to meet the ends of fighting terrorism. 511

Article 4 (b) and (e) ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999 deal with monitoring and
data collection of terrorist elements of groups. Given that the scope of what
constitutes terrorist elements of acts is extremely broadly defined, these provisions
may constitute a serious violation of the right to privacy and may include the
monitoring and collection of information on peaceful and non-criminal activity.
Under some domestic laws, search and seizure provisions may also constitute an
unjustifiable limitation on the right to privacy. 512 OAU Algiers Convention 1999
can also be said to be derogatory from human rights law because of death penalty
imposed in the domestic laws of some Member States' anti-terrorism law.

Since the classification of conduct of terrorism is frequently accompanied by an
abridgement of procedural and fair safeguards, it is all the more crucial that the
crime is precisely and restrictively defined. This is even more so when it is
punishable by death. How to define terrorism is of course a particular vexed issue.
It is important that States, when adopting such measures, be vigilant about ensuring

the continued protection of rights. 513

511
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513

Id.
Id.
Id.
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On the other hand, despite these requirements of obligations from Member State to
comply with the norms of international human rights law, strict adherence to such
obligations will gravely affect the effectiveness of combating terrorism. Terrorism
has no justification. Terrorists themselves are not exempted from these obligations
being citizens of a State. Although, human rights and humanitarian laws are also
necessary in combating terrorism, priority should be given to social stability, than
securing an individual's right at a very critical moment, especially when the
individual is a perpetrator of terrorist act.

A terrorist cannot claim an infringement of fundamental human right when he is
also guilty of violation of human rights. The equitable maxim of 'whoever that
comes into equity must come with clean hands" should never be dispensed with'.
Human rights activists should think towards reviewing the laws, especially as it
relates to 'combating terrorist acts'; find the proper balance between counterterrorism and human rights law, bearing in mind the extreme cruelty of terrorist acts
against innocent people.

I
The menace posed by international terrorism which demands both national and subregional concerted action is, for instance, manifest in the policy pronouncements of
Kenya, Uganda, the Sudan, Ethiopia and other IGAD Member States. An official of
the Ethiopian government had made this very clear when he stated, "it is obvious
that no matter how economically and militarily strong a state may be, it cannot
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alone fight terrorism." 514 Again, in order to avoid conflicts and find the proper
balance between counter-terrorism and Human Rights law in Africa, there should
be a 'Universal Court' vested with terrorist jurisdiction.

5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS:

I

Solely, obligations and cooperation on the part of Member States of OAU Algiers
Convention 1999, as mandated under the OAU Algiers Convention, are not enough
to combat terrorism; except where it is in common interest of the Member States
concerned, as clearly discussed under extradition in chapter three of this
dissertation. Concurring with the Ethiopian government official, who said that no
matter how strong a nation may think it is; it cannot combat terrorism alone. Joint
effort by all Member States will be the most effective approach to eradicate
terrorism in Africa.

515

Most Member States of the AU are financially incapacitated in combating terrorism
alone as a nation. The AU should uphold the most important element of their
Charter which is "solidarity, development of friendly relations and cooperation
among Member States"; and help the less privileged States combat terrorism, not
just by mere encouraging or urging Member States to cooperate or offer legal
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mutual assistance to one another, but, by combating same under one umbrella of a
universal court.

The OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 needs to be amended by AU in order to
make it an effective law enforcement instrument for combating terrorism. Such
amendment should include establishment of 'universal court' vested with
jurisdiction of terrorism, to deal with this terrible phenomenon, which is beyond the

I

capacity of any one country to handle alone; or in alternative, confer jurisdiction of
terrorism on the already existing African Court on Human and People's right. 516

Parts IV and V of the OAU Algiers Convention 1999, focusing on Extradition and
extra-territorial investigation, should also be amended to remove the limitations
attached to it, under which a Member State shall not extradite or refuse to legally
assist another. General procedure for arraignment of a terrorist offender in a
universal court should be included in the Convention, so that even if the offender
flees the State in which the crime was committed, the offender cannot escape
punishment.

Most importantly, the OAU Algiers Convention of 1999 created an avenue for
amendment under its Article 21 (2) and (3), which provides thus:
"This Convention may be amended if a State
516

The AU has African Court on Human and People's right, which came into being in January 2004.
the court is vested with the jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the
interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and People's rights, the Charter, the
Protocol, and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States. See Article 28 of the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
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Party makes a written request to that effect to
the Secretary General of the Organization of
African Unity ...
2. The amendment shall be approved by a simple
majority of the State Parties. It shall come into
force ... received notice of the acceptance. "
It should therefore, amend the Convention, through the prescribed procedure of

Article 21(2) and (3) supra, to include establishment of universal court for trial of
terrorist offences, appoint qualified personnel to handle terrorist offences; in the

I

absence of conferment of terrorism jurisdiction on the African court. The
establishment of the universal court will facilitate the tracking, investigation, arrest,
trial and punishment of terrorist acts.

More so, there is already a universal acceptable definition of terrorist act in the
OAU Algiers Convention 1999 517 by the Member States. AU also has a multilateral
agreement for extradition and extra territorial investigations and mutual
assistance, 518 which can be conveniently handled by a centralized judicial body for

I

the Union.

Combating terrorism in Africa should be moved from national level to regional
level for effective preventing and combating terrorism.

517
518

Article 1(3) ofthe OAU Algiers Convention 1999. Supra note 26.
Id. at Article 7, Parts IV and V.
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